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ABSTRACT 
Many organizations face challenges that impact their effectiveness and therefore success. 
These challenges are not easy to visualize, thus making it more difficult to derive and 
implement appropriate measures to deal with them. The problem becomes compounded 
when procedures or treatments are applied without diagnosis. 
 The establishment of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to serve 
Africa’s unique security concerns generated some reservations both within and outside 
the United States (U.S.). Despite attempts to communicate AFRICOM’s intentions, the 
lukewarm acceptance among its stakeholders still persists and has raised concerns about 
its efficacy as a panacea for the problems on the African continent.  
 The basic premise of this study is to diagnose AFRICOM’s internal processes and 
examine its external environment in order to identify any organizational or environmental 
variables that support or hinder its effectiveness in attaining its goals. This thesis 
examines the extent to which key variables, such as mission, tasks, structure, culture, and 
environment are congruent or incongruent. Data was obtained both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. This study establishes that there is some degree of misalignment among 
the inputs, outputs, and the desired outcomes of AFRICOM’s programs, and proffers 
recommendations for a better fit. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
B. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION ...............................................................4 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ...............................................................5 
D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................5 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS............................................................6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. GAP IN LITERATURE ON AFRICOM’S EFFECTIVENESS .................7 
C. WHAT IS AN ORGANIZATION? ................................................................9 
D. AN ORGANIZATION AS AN OPEN SYSTEM ..........................................9 
1. Characteristics of an Open System Organization...........................10 
a. Inputs, Transformations, and Outputs...................................10 
b. Boundaries ..............................................................................11 
c. Feedback..................................................................................11 
d. Equifinality..............................................................................11 
e. Alignment ................................................................................12 
2. Organizational Configuration...........................................................12 
3. Coordination Mechanisms ................................................................14 
a. Mutual Adjustment .................................................................14 
b. Direct Supervision...................................................................15 
c. Standardization of Work Processes........................................15 
d. Standardization of Outputs.....................................................15 
e. Standardization of Skills or Competencies ............................16 
4. Internal Processes ..............................................................................16 
a. Mission/Objectives/Strategy....................................................16 
b. Task/Technology .....................................................................17 
c. Structure ..................................................................................17 
d. Information, Information Processing and Decision 
Making.....................................................................................17 
e. Policies and Procedures..........................................................18 
f. Culture.....................................................................................18 
g. Outputs ....................................................................................19 
E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF AN ORGANIZATION.....................19 
1. Characteristics of the External Environment .................................20 
a. Uncertainty ..............................................................................20 
b. Equivocality.............................................................................21 
c. Environmental Complexity .....................................................21 
d. Hostility....................................................................................22 
2. The Effect of the External Environment on an Organization .......22 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS..................................................24 
 viii
G. RELATIONSHIP AMONG ORGANIZATIONAL 
EFFECTIVENESS, INTERNAL PROCESSES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT...........................................................................................26 
H. METHODS .....................................................................................................27 
1. Data Gathering Methods...................................................................27 
2. Data Analysis Methods ......................................................................27 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................30 
III. THE EXTERNAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF AFRICOM..................33 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 
B. GEOPOLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS...............................33 
C. TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES....................................36 
1. Terrorism and Violent Extremism...................................................37 
2. Maritime Challenges..........................................................................39 
a. Piracy, Armed Robbery and Sea and Oil Theft......................39 
b. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing .......................41 
c. Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and SALW ..................................41 
D. HEALTH CHALLENGES............................................................................44 
E. WAR AND CONFLICTS..............................................................................46 
F. COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE BY OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS......................................................................49 
G. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY CHALLENGES 
AND MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTION...............................................52 




5. EAC .....................................................................................................59 
H. AFRICA’S MILITARY.................................................................................60 
1. Armies .................................................................................................61 
2. Navies ..................................................................................................61 
3. Air Forces ...........................................................................................62 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................63 
IV. AFRICOM’S INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................67 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................67 
B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROGRAMS TOWARD AFRICA ........68 
1. Security Assistance and Capacity Building .....................................69 
2. Building Strong and Stable Democratic African Governments ....69 
3. Supporting Socio-Economic Growth and Development.................70 
4. Strengthening Public Health.............................................................71 
5. Transnational Challenges..................................................................71 
6. Humanitarian Assistance ..................................................................71 
C. PRIMARY ACTORS IN U.S.-AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY AND 
PROGRAMS ..................................................................................................72 
D. AFRICOM MISSION/OBJECTIVES .........................................................73 
E. AFRICOM STRATEGY...............................................................................75 
 ix
F. AFRICOM’S LOCATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE..75 
1. Location ..............................................................................................75 
2. Organizational Structure ..................................................................77 
G. RESOURCING AFRICOM..........................................................................80 
1. Manpower...........................................................................................80 
2. Funding ...............................................................................................80 
H. CULTURE......................................................................................................81 
I. TASKS AND TECHNOLOGY.....................................................................81 
J. TRANSFORMATIONS AND OUTPUTS IMPLEMENTED BY 
AFRICOM......................................................................................................82 
1. Preventing HIV/AIDS Among African Militaries ..........................83 
2. Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) ...............84 
3. International Military Education and Training (IMET) ...............86 
4. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Funded Africa 
Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program ...........88 
5. Foreign Military Sales and Financing Programs (FMS/FMF)......89 
6. Regional Programs and Activities ....................................................91 
K. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................93 
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ...................................................................................95 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................95 
B. MISSION ALIGNMENT ..............................................................................96 
C. STRUCTURE ALIGNMENT.......................................................................97 
D. ALIGNMENT OF TASKS, PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES...................98 
1. Addressing HIV/AIDS Pandemic .....................................................99 
2. Countering Extremism Through OEF-TS.....................................100 
3. Equipment Support .........................................................................105 
4. GPOI .................................................................................................106 
5. IMET.................................................................................................107 
E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ALIGNMENT .......................................108 
1. Interagency Collaboration ..............................................................108 
2. International Collaboration ............................................................109 
3. Regional Collaboration....................................................................111 
F. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................112 
VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER AREAS OF 
RESEARCH .............................................................................................................115 
A. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................115 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................118 
1. Demonstrate Consistent and Predictable Actions That Are 
Congruent With Its Mission and Seek African Partners’ 
Perspectives in Order to Build Trust and Enduring 
Partnerships......................................................................................118 
2. Leverage Technology as a Force Multiplier and Use This 
Comparative Capability to Offset Security Challenges in the 
African Environment.......................................................................118 
 x
3. Synergize Resources and Efforts with Other International 
Partners to Bridge Gaps in Training and Equipment Support 
to Africa’s Militaries in Order to Have More Effective 
Outcomes ..........................................................................................119 
4. Create Feedback Mechanisms to Determine the Outcomes of 
AFRICOM’s Training and Equipment Support ..........................120 
5. Develop a Process Whereby U.S. Training Institutions and 
Personnel Cultivate Enduring Relationships With Foreign 
Military and Civilian Partners While Undergoing Training to 
Foster Cooperation ..........................................................................120 
6. Conduct Adequate Evaluation of the Full Range of Causal 
Factors for Extremism in Each Country to Avoid 
Generalizations in Other Countries That Unintentionally 
Promote Disorder and Societal Disagreement ..............................121 
7. Leverage Existing Resources Under the UN and the Regional 
Organizations, Such as ECOWAS, SADC and Others to 
Reinforce Legitimacy and Credibility............................................121 
C. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH........................................................121 
1. Optimizing Budget Cycles in Support of AFRICOM’s 
Engagements.....................................................................................122 
2. Considering Competing Interests and Differences in Priorities, 
as Well as Perceptions of Shared Security Concerns, Examine 
to What Extent Are African Partners Committed to Their 
Engagements.....................................................................................122 
3. How Does AFRICOM’s Culture Affect Behavioral 
Expectations of Its Stakeholders?...................................................122 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................123 
LIST OF APPENDICES .....................................................................................................143 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................151 
  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. After Modification David Hanna’s Model of an Open System .......................10 
Figure 2. Mintzberg’s Five Organizational Configurations ............................................13 
Figure 3. Model of the Effects of External Environment on an Organization ................23 
Figure 4. Model of the Alignment of Internal Processes and Environmental 
Variables ..........................................................................................................27 
Figure 5. After Modification Nadler and Tushman’s Model ..........................................29 
Figure 6. From the Encyclopedia Britannica, Africa: Population Density .....................36 
Figure 7. From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM’s Locations in Africa ....76 
Figure 8. From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM Headquarters  
Organizational Structure ..................................................................................78 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACOTA - Africa Contingency Training 
and Assistance 
ACRI - African Crisis Response 
Initiative 
AFAFRICA - U.S. Air Forces, Africa 
AFRICOM - U.S. Africa Command  
AGOA  - African Growth and 
Opportunity Act 
AIS - Automatic Identification Systems 
AMISOM - AU Mission in Somalia 
AOR - Area of Responsibility 
APRM - African Peer Review 
Mechanism 
APS - Africa Partnership Station 
AQIM - al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb  
ART - antiretroviral therapy 
ASF - African Standby Force 
AU - African Union 
CAR - Central African Republic  
CDC - Center for Disease Control 
CENTCOM - U.S. Central Command 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency 
CJTF-HOA - Combined Joint Task 
Force Horn of Africa 
CMA - Civil-Military Alliance to 
Combat HIV/AIDS 
COCOMs - Combatant Commands 
COESPU - Centre of Excellence for 
Stability Police Units 
COMESA - Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
COPAX - Council for Peace and 
Security in Central Africa 
CSL - Cooperative Security Locations 
DATT - defense attachés 
DCMA - Deputy to the Commander for 
Civil-Military Activities  
DCMO - Deputy to the Commander for 
Military Operations 
DCS - Direct Commercial Sales 
DHAPP - Department of Defense 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Program 
DfID - British Department for 
International Development 
DHS - Department of Homeland 
Security 
DoD - Department of Defense 
DoS - Department of State 
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo 
DSCA - Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency 
EAC - East African Community 
EACTI - East Africa Counterterrorism 
Initiative 
 xiv
EASTBRIG - East African Standby 
Brigade 
ECCAS - Economic Community of 
Central African States 
ECOWAS - Economic Community of 
West African States 
EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone 
E-IMET - Expanded IMET 
ESF - ECOWAS Standby Force 
EU - European Union 
EUCOM - U.S. European Command  
FDA - Foreign Disaster Assistance 
FMF - Foreign Military Finance  
FMS - Foreign Military Sales 
FOMAC - Central African Brigade 
FY - Fiscal Year 
GAO - Government Accountability 
Office 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GFM - Global Force Management 
GHI - Global Health Initiative 
GoG - Gulf of Guinea 
GPOI - Global Peace Operations 
Initiative 
GSPC - Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat 
HIV/AIDS - Human Immune 
Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 
ICC - International Chamber of 
Commerce 
ICC - International Criminal Court 
IDP - Internally Displaced Person 
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development 
ILO - International Labor Organization 
IMET - International Military Education 
& Training 
IUU - Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
KAIPTC - Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre 
LRIT - Long Range Identification and 
Tracking 
MARFORAF - U.S. Marine Forces 
Africa 
MCA - Millennium Challenge Account 
MCS - Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance 
MDA - Maritime Domain Awareness  
MPA - Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MSS - maritime safety and security 
MSSIS - Maritime Safety and Security 
Information Systems 
N miles - Nautical Miles 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
NAVAF - U.S. Naval Forces, Africa 
 xv
NEPAD - New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development 
NGO - Nongovernmental organization 
NHRC - Naval Health Research Centre 
NIH - National Institute for Health 
NSC - National Security Council  
NSS - National Security Strategy 
OAU - Organization of African Unity 
OEF-TS - Operation Enduring Freedom 
Trans-Sahara 
OGAC - Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator 
OOV - Operation Objective Voice  
OSC - Offices of Security Cooperation 
PACOM - U.S. Pacific Command 
PEPFAR - President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief 
PLWHA - People Living with 
HIV/AIDS 
PMI - President’s Malaria Initiative 
PMTCT - Prevention of Mother-to-Child 
Transmission 
PSI - Pan Sahel Initiative 
PSO - Peace Support Operations 
RFS - Request for Forces System 
SADC - Southern African Development 
Community 
SADBRIG - SADC Standby Brigade 
SALW - Small Arms and Light 
Weapons 
SAMM - Security Assistance 
Management Manual 
SAO - Security Assistance Offices 
SATP - Security Assistance Training 
Program 
SDO - Senior Defense Officials 
SOCAFRICA - U.S. Special Operations 
Africa  
SOCOM - U.S. Special Operations 
Command 
TB - Tuberculosis 
TDA - Trade and Development Agency 
TFG - Transitional Federal Government 
TSCTI - Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Initiative 
TSCTP - Trans Sahara Counter 
Terrorism Partnership 
UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN - United Nations 
UNAIDS - UN Programme on 
HIV/AIDS 
UNEP - UN Environment Programme 
UNAMID - UN – AU Mission in Darfur 
UNODC - UN Office of Drug and Crime  
UNSC - UN Security Council  
USCG - U.S. Coast Guard 
USEDA - U.S. Economic Development 
Administration 
USG - U.S. Government 
 xvi
USAID - U.S. Agency for International 
Development 
USARAF - U.S. Army Africa  
VLCC - Very Large Crude Carrier 
WHO - World Health Organization 








A work such as this invariably accumulates many debts. We are grateful to many 
people for their assistance, inspiration, and support in many ways throughout the conduct 
of the study and writing of this thesis. We cannot possibly mention all of them; however, 
we would like to mention a few of them for their invaluable assistance in one way or 
another. These include Prof. Erik Jansen for his tireless guidance and creative 
contribution of ideas and material support in all of the stages of the research that led to 
the final conclusion of this thesis. We also wish to extend our sincere gratitude to Prof. 
Anna Simons as our second reader for her direction during our research and assistance in 
the organization of our thesis. We also wish to acknowledge the Department of Defense 
Analysis’ overall staff for their dedication towards academic excellence. We would like 
to extend our gratitude to our military services and the U.S. government for this privilege. 
In addition, we would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to our families for their 
understanding and sacrifice throughout our time at NPS. Thank you for being so patient. 
Finally, we would like to mention any errors or omissions, which might be detected in 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and 
desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States— 
preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global 
terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the 
same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that 
lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our 
European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build 
indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law 
enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. 
     
President George W. Bush in 2002 National Security Strategy1  
  
Proponents of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) claim that the 
creation of the Command reflects the strategic importance of Africa to the United States 
(U.S.) and recognition that a single independent Command can address Africa’s unique 
security concerns effectively.2 Its critics suggest a pessimistic viewpoint as described in 
many articles: ‘It does not work!’, ‘It is the militarization of Africa!’, ‘The Africans do 
not want it!’, or ‘It is going to take away the importance of what Department of State 
(DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are doing currently!’ 
Other than an expression of optimism or initial misgivings, what leads proponents and 
critics to these beliefs? How can we evaluate AFRICOM if we do not understand the 
organization? Assuming some of these criticisms are factual, what might be ways to 
mitigate them? This in turn, begs the question, is AFRICOM an effective organization or 
a military hurdle?     
Many organizations have challenges that are complex, making it more difficult to 
derive and implement appropriate measures to deal with them. The problem becomes 
even worse when procedures or treatments are applied without diagnosis. According to 
Harry Levinson, “without diagnosis there is no assurance that any treatment will address 
                                                 
1The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 
2002, 10, accessed April 28, 2010, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss4.html.  
2Brett D. Schaefer and Mackenzie M. Eaglen, “U.S. Africa Command: Challenges and Opportunities,” 
Backgrounder, No. 2118, March 21, 2008, accessed January 21, 2010, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/us-africa-Command-challenges-and-opportunities. 
 2
what ails the organization or what is likely to result in long-lasting change.”3 Arguably, 
AFRICOM has entered an unchartered territory, both physically and metaphorically, and 
a steep learning curve is not unexpected. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
effectiveness of AFRICOM in its current organizational design. A misalignment of an 
organization’s internal processes with its environment has the potential to encumber its 
effectiveness. The challenge is to accomplish a fit in the organization, because too often 
there is a gap between what an organization seeks to accomplish and what it is actually 
doing. Therefore, this thesis will examine the extent to which key variables such as 
mission, strategy, tasks, structure, outputs, and environment are congruent or 
incongruent. 
A. BACKGROUND  
U.S. military concerns around the world are administered through unified 
combatant commands (COCOMs), which are the highest organizations within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) responsible for a geographical area (e.g., U.S. European 
Command, EUCOM) or a mission (e.g., Special Operations Command, SOCOM). Africa 
was the only geographic region without a designated U.S. military command before the 
official activation of AFRICOM on October 1, 2008. Hitherto, U.S. military programs on 
the African continent were administered by three COCOMs.4 The shift in focus became 
necessary in recognition of the growing strategic significance of Africa to the rest of the 
world and in particular, to U.S. national security and economic interests. The 1998 
bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa, challenges posed by piracy off the coast of 
Somalia and along other coasts, civil wars, and health concerns, including terrorist 
activities in the Trans-Saharan region and Somalia, exacerbated by undergoverned spaces 
                                                 
3Rodney L. Lowman, “Importance of Diagnosis in Organizational Assessment: Harry Levinson’s 
Contributions,” The Psychologist-Manager Journal 8, no. 1 (2005) 17–28.  
4From 1952 to 2006, U.S. national interests in Africa had been overseen by different geographical 
COCOMs.  The US European Command (EUCOM) was responsible for the African continent minus 
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan, which were under the responsibility of the U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM). The islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles were 
under the US Pacific Command (PACOM), while the African continent’s western islands were assigned to 
the former US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). See Global Security, “Africa Command (AFRICOM),” 
accessed January 21, 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/africom.htm.  
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and an absence of state capacity to exercise control, highlight Africa’s strategic 
significance, which AFRICOM has been created to help address.   
Unlike the three other COCOMs, AFRICOM is designed along nontraditional 
lines to focus on military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs oriented towards conflict 
prevention rather than war-fighting and to play a supporting role to DoS, USAID, and 
other USG agencies to promote regional stability.5 To this end, AFRICOM integrates 
representatives from other U.S. agencies into the structure of the Command headquarters 
in critical leadership and decision making positions. Overall, the Command represents an 
internal reorganization within DoD to provide a single focus for all DoD activities in 
Africa. According to President George Bush: 
This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa 
and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our 
partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring 
peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals 
of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in 
Africa.6  
 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Theresa Whelan also remarked:  
Our primary objective is, in addition to making the U.S. DoD 
organizational structure more efficient and effective by having one 
command focused on Africa as opposed to having three separate 
commands focused on separate pieces of Africa, we also want to try to 
integrate better with our counterparts in the U.S. Government, such as the 
State Department….7  
 
By organizing AFRICOM around both military and interagency organizations, the U.S. 
hopes to synergize all aspects of its instruments of national power for dealing with 
security concerns relating to Africa more effectively. In essence, this new organization 
has the capacity to address key coordination issues that are prevalent in the interagency 
realm.  
                                                 
5AFRICOM, accessed January 25, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.  
6 China.org, “Bush Visits Africa to Promote US image, Strategic Interest,” Xinhua News Agency, 
February 15, 2008, accessed January 19, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/242784.htm.  
7Theresa Whelan, “U.S. to Establish New U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM),” Foreign Press Center 
Briefing, U.S. Department of State (DoS) Washington Foreign Press Center, February 9, 2007, accessed 
January 10, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1547.  
 4
Although the U.S. military has worked in Africa prior to the creation of 
AFRICOM, the new Command has been received with a widespread lack of enthusiasm 
among Africans and within the U.S. interagency realm.8 Indeed, the establishment of 
AFRICOM has raised concerns about its efficacy as a panacea for the problems on the 
African continent. Is it a new recipe for old realities or an old recipe for new realities? As 
an open system subject to influences by forces internal and external to the organization, 
AFRICOM must continually adapt and influence its operating environment in order to 
leverage challenges and opportunities to become effective. This raises some pertinent 
questions about AFRICOM’s performance.   
B. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION 
The fundamental question this thesis seeks to answer is how effective is 
AFRICOM in its current organizational design? An ideal organization “does not 
necessarily exist in reality, but it could be and it is desired.”9 It is suggested that an 
organization will be more effective if two or more of certain variables such as an 
organization’s environment, mission, technology, strategy, and structure are congruent 
with each other,10 which goes beyond looking at internal functioning to the more intricate 
problem of how what happens inside the organization is related to conditions in its 
environment - an open system view in which the different characteristics of the 
organization are interrelated, interdependent, and interacting with its environment. 
Although everything outside the boundary of the organization is its environment, not 
everything is equally relevant to the system’s purpose and survival. Based on the 
aforementioned, the theoretical framework of this study seeks to establish the causal 
mechanisms neglected in the existing literature, such as the linkage of the internal 
processes of an organization and its environment to its effectiveness or performance. 
                                                 
8 Schaefer and Eaglen, “U.S. Africa Command: Challenges and Opportunities.”  
9 Richard M. Burton and BØrge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing 
Theory for Application, 2nd ed. (Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 281.  
10 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 1–2.  
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Thus, for AFRICOM, this thesis argues that a misalignment of internal processes and the 
environment increases the likelihood of ineffectiveness or poor performance.  
This thesis will utilize qualitative and quantitative research methods. Data was 
collected from libraries, archives, reports, seminar papers, executive summaries, and 
memoranda available through open sources. The model used for data analysis is a 
modified version of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman with some 
components added from the McCaskey model. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study is to improve situational awareness of the 
Command’s operating environment. An understanding of the dynamics of the operating 
environment will assist AFRICOM in becoming more adaptive to environmental changes 
and thus better deal with the desires, expectations and challenges, and to leverage 
opportunities to become more effective in accomplishing its mission. Furthermore, it will 
assist AFRICOM in its intra and interagency collaboration efforts with other agencies 
that have shared missions. Interagency collaboration is vital to the overall mission of 
AFRICOM, especially since AFRICOM was uniquely intended to support other agencies. 
It is the authors’ hope that this study will assist the U.S. government (USG) in mitigating 
encumbrances to AFRICOM’s effectiveness, contribute to the existing body of literature 
on AFRICOM-related issues, and address further areas that need to be researched.  
D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
It has been two years since AFRICOM was established and thus it deserves to be 
considered a relatively new organization and a work in progress. The major limitation of 
this study is the lack of involvement of AFRICOM and other stakeholders through 
surveys or interviews. The authors were unable to receive assistance from the Command 
despite several attempts and could not reach out to other stakeholders discussed in the 
study due to time constraints. AFRICOM’s involvement would have provided additional 
information from an insider’s perspective about the internal processes of the Command 
while the views of the other stakeholders could have provided additional insights.  
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This thesis assumes that the African continent will remain strategically important 
to the U.S. in the foreseeable future and AFRICOM will continue to play a significant 
role in advancing U.S. interests. If this assumption is true, the USG will need to summon 
the political will and economic means to support AFRICOM in accomplishing its mission 
effectively.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 Chapter II identifies the gaps in literature from summaries and reviews of 
publications and studies about organizational effectiveness as it relates to AFRICOM. It 
also introduces relevant concepts about organization and the internal processes, 
organizational effectiveness, and the environment. Based on these concepts, Chapter II 
examines the relationship among organizational effectiveness, internal processes, and the 
environment, as well as how organizations can be influenced by an organization’s 
external environment. It also outlines the methods used as the basis for research. Chapter 
III addresses the external environment, paying particular attention to the African 
continent, excluding the U.S. agencies that are operating in the area. Chapter IV 
examines AFRICOM’s internal processes as well as those of the U.S agencies that are 
part of its external environment. The inclusion of U.S. agencies in this chapter is to 
provide an overall focus on how the U.S. applies the whole-of-government approach to 
addressing U.S. interests in Africa. Chapter V discusses the findings and analysis of the 
data, and finally, in Chapter VI the recommendations and conclusion are presented, with 
continued research areas identified. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies the gap in the existing literature regarding AFRICOM’s 
effectiveness. It draws from reviews and summaries to be found in major publications. It 
also introduces relevant organizational concepts as they relate to organizational 
effectiveness, internal processes, and the external environment. This chapter then goes on 
to specifically define an organization, introduces an open system perspective as a way to 
view an organization, and highlights the characteristics of an organization and its internal 
processes. The characteristics of an external environment, including how an organization 
can be influenced by its external environment, are also highlighted. Various perspectives 
on the concept of organizational effectiveness, including the relationships among 
organizational effectiveness, internal processes, and environment are discussed. Finally, 
this chapter describes the methods by which data was collected and the model used for 
analysis.  
B. GAP IN LITERATURE ON AFRICOM’S EFFECTIVENESS 
 There is a lack of literature regarding AFRICOM’s effectiveness. Most studies on 
the Command center on controversies arising from its establishment rather than its 
performance.11 One possible reason for this lack of literature is due to the recent 
establishment of the Command and therefore recognize it as a work in progress. Another 
reason seems to be that the African continent has been of relatively low strategic value to 
the U.S. Nevertheless, the available literature on the subject can be categorized into three 
main groups: literature with recommendations about what needs to be done in order for 
                                                 
11 A recently published U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discusses some 
challenges that AFRICOM faces, such as not fully integrating interagency perspectives early in activity 
planning and difficulty in applying funding sources to activities, and not measuring long-term effects of its 
activities. See U.S. GAO, “Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa,” Report GAO-10-794, July 28, 2010, accessed 
September 23, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10794.pdf. These findings do not in any way 
invalidate this research, but rather reinforce our findings. Any report provide by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office will be abbreviated as U.S. GAO throughout the remainder of the document.  
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AFRICOM to function effectively, but with no justification for these arguments;12 
literature that asserts that AFRICOM’s effectiveness will improve or decline by some 
degree, but without identifying the causes or effect of the any such changes;13 and 
literature that does not adequately address, but outlines recommendations to enhance 
AFRICOM’s effectiveness anyway.14  
 Several questions arise from a critical examination of the variables that have the 
potential to adversely impact AFRICOM’s effectiveness. First, throughout the literature 
there are no specific linkages between AFRICOM’s effectiveness and its external 
environment. Whose perspective or which constituency’s point of view is considered 
when it comes to evaluating AFRICOM’s effectiveness? AFRICOM is an open system 
and therefore must focus attention on its interactions with its external environment, which 
influences its activities and choices, and determines its risks and opportunities. How then, 
and to what extent, does the environment influence AFRICOM’s effectiveness? 
Secondly, the literature does not specify the factors that could adversely impact 
AFRICOM’s effectiveness from the perspective of its internal design. An in-depth study 
of key influences, such as the organization’s internal processes, is largely missing.  
 
                                                 
12Charles F. Schlegel and Thomas F. Talley, “AFRICOM’s Regional Engagement: Designing the 
Right Mix of Authorities, Resources, and Personnel,” AmericanDiplomacy.org Website, accessed February 
3, 2010, http://www.unc.edu.  
 13AKO, “AFRICOM Commander Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee,” AFRICOM, 
March 11, 2010, accessed April 5, 2010, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/11/35741-africom-
commander-testifies-before-house-armed-services-committee/.U.S. GAO, “Force Structure: Preliminary 
Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command,” 
Report GAO-08-947T, July 15, 2008, accessed January 21, 2010,  
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08947t.pdf; and Robert G. Berschinski, “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The 
‘Global War on Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’ Humanitarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Security 
Policy in Africa,” US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, accessed January 21, 2010, 
http://terrorisminfo.mipt.org.pdf/6424-AFRICOM-Policy.pdf. 
14Schaefer and Eaglan, “U.S. Africa Command: Challenges and Opportunities;” Benedikt Franke, 
“Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity Building and Africa’s Emerging Security 
Architecture,” January 2007, accessed January 23, 2010, 
https://webmail.nps.edu/exchange/slassa/Inbox/RE:%20AU.EML/AU.pdf/C58EA28C-18C0-4a97-9AF2-
036E93DDAFB3/AU.pdf?attach=1; U.S. GAO, “Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to 
Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed,” Report GAO-08-754, June 2008, 
accessed October 2, 2010,  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754; and U.S. GAO, “Defense 
Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and 
Determine Full Costs associated with the U.S. Africa Command,” Report GAO-09-181, February 20, 2009, 
accessed March 12, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09181.pdf. 
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Therefore, to what extent can any recommendations made towards AFRICOM’s 
effectiveness be compelling without adequately understanding the nature of its internal 
processes?  
C. WHAT IS AN ORGANIZATION? 
“An organization is a consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively 
identifiable boundary, which functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a 
common goal or set of goals.”15 According to Arrow, “[t]he purpose of organizations is 
to exploit the fact that many (virtually all) decisions require the participation of many 
individuals for their effectiveness….”16 Basically, an organization provides a means of 
using individual strengths drawn from the group to achieve more than can be 
accomplished by the collective efforts of group members working individually. 
Coordination of the collective efforts or activities of individual members is necessary for 
the organization to accomplish its purpose. This is achieved through information 
exchange among subsystems or components, such as departments, teams, individuals, or 
activities inside and outside an organization’s boundary.17  
D. AN ORGANIZATION AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 
 “An open system model recognizes that organizations exist in the context of a 
larger environment that affects how the organization performs and in turn is affected by 
how the organization interacts with it.”18 It is an arrangement of interrelated, 
interdependent, and interacting components of an organization with its external 
environment to achieve a common purpose. Essentially, inputs are taken into the system, 
transformed into outputs and then returned to the environment, and can be used as 
feedback for the organization’s functioning and survival. The organizational components 
                                                 
15Stephen P. Robbins, Organization Theory: Structure, Design, and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hill, 1990), 4.  
16Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), 33.  
17Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 3. 
18Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley, Organization Development and Change, 9th ed., 
(Cincinnati OH; South-Western Thomson, 2008), 89.  
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that make up the system are not completely in control of their own behavior, but are open 
to influences by forces in the external environment, which the organization depends on to 
survive.19 Such a model suggests that organizations have common characteristics and 
features that explain how they are organized and how they function.    The open system 
perspective is thus based on observing the relationship of the organization with its 
external environment and the factors that compose it.  
1. Characteristics of an Open System Organization 
The characteristics of an open system organization consist of inputs, 
transformations, and outputs, in addition to boundaries, feedback, equifinality, and 





Figure 1.   After Modification David Hanna’s Model of an Open System20 
a. Inputs, Transformations, and Outputs 
The inputs include people, money, ideas, equipment, etc., which are part 
of and acquired from the system’s external environment for it to function. 
Transformations are the processes of converting inputs into outputs by the interactions of 
such mechanisms as social components (people and their tasks or work relationships) and 
technology (tools, techniques, and methods of service delivery). The outputs are the 
                                                 
19David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1988).  





products, services, skills, etc., that have been transformed and returned to the 
environment to fulfill the purpose of the organization.21   
b. Boundaries 
Open system boundaries are the borders that help to distinguish between 
systems and environments. Although the boundary outlines the limits of one system from 
another, open systems have permeable boundaries, which allow for interactions with the 
environment. “The degree of permeability (or openness) in the boundary is critical for the 
system’s survival. However, too much permeability can overpower the system with 
external demands, too little can cut off the system from needed resources.”22 
c. Feedback 
Feedback is information about the actual performance of the system. It 
describes whether or not the output is on course with the purpose and goals (negative or 
deviation correcting feedback) or the purpose and goals are aligned with the 
environmental needs (positive or deviation-amplifying feedback). This characteristic 
enables the system to be self-correcting to maintain itself in a steady state (dynamic 
homeostasis) or help the organization adapt to changing circumstances.23 However, 
because not all information is feedback, organizations will need to select essential 
elements within them to seek feedback and devise ways of monitoring these information 
channels in order to control the future functioning of the system. 
d. Equifinality 
The concept of equifinality states that systems can achieve the same 
results or outputs from different initial conditions and through a variety of ways.24 This 
suggests that organizations have adaptive capacity, options, or flexibility to use varying 
                                                 
21Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 12–13.  
22Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 9. 
23Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 14–15. 
24D. H. Doty, W. H. Glick and G. P. Huber, “Fit, Equifinality, and Organizational Effectiveness: A Test 
of Two Configurational Theories,” Academy of Management Journal 36 (1993): 1196–1251.  
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degrees of inputs and transform them in different ways to develop or achieve the same 
satisfactory results. Rather than insisting on one best way to handle a situation, 
organizations should evaluate whether proposed actions will lead to desired results.  
e. Alignment 
Alignment or fit refers to the extent to which the different features, 
operations, and characteristics of an organization are congruent with each other and with 
its environment. Lawrence and Lorsch’s contingency theory,25 Nadler and Tushman’s 
model,26 and the McCaskey model,27 among others, follow the common theme that there 
must be a fit between the environment and the organization, as well as among the 
different components of the organization. This alignment partly determines a system’s 
overall effectiveness.   
2. Organizational Configuration 
Organizational configuration is often represented by an organizational chart and 
specifies the general principle used for dividing work, tasks, and coordinating activities.28 
Mintzberg distinguishes five basic organizational configurations: simple structure, 
machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, and divisional form 
configuration, in which one of five parts that make up the whole organization has a key  
 
 
                                                 
25Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment, (Boston: Harvard Business 
Press, 1967).   
26David A. Nadler, Michael L. Tushman, and Nina G. Hatvany, Managing Organizations: Readings 
and Cases, (Toronto, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980), accessed February 10, 2010, 
http://cumc.columbia.edu/dept/pi/ppf/Congruence-Model.pdf. 
27Michael B. McCaskey, “Framework For Analyzing Work Groups,” Harvard Business Review, 
Harvard Publishing, 1995.   
28Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 45. 
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role and one of the coordinating mechanisms is central.29 However, not all organizations 
require all of these parts. The five basic organizational configurations including the five 












































































Figure 2.   Mintzberg’s Five Organizational Configurations30 
The simple structure configuration is characterized by one or a few top managers 
and operators who do the basic work.  The definition of work, coordination, and decision 
making is carried out at the strategic apex by direct supervision. Machine bureaucracy is 
based on the standardization of work processes where the entire organization’s 
administrative structure is more elaborated with a clear distinction between line and staff.  
It requires many analysts to design and maintain its systems and a large hierarchy in the 
                                                 
29The five parts of an organization include: the strategic apex (top management), middle line (middle 
management), operating core (operations, people that do the basic work), technostructure (analysts that 
design systems, processes, etc), and support staff (support outside of operating workflow, provide indirect 
services to the rest of the organization). See Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” 
Harvard Business Review, January–February 1981.  
30Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
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middle-line to oversee the specialized work of the operating core. Professional 
bureaucracy relies on the standardization of skills for its coordination. Power over many 
decisions flows down the hierarchy to the professionals at the operating core and, because 
the professionals work independently, the size of the operating core can be very large 
thereby requiring a few line managers.31   
The divisional form configuration relies on standardization of output for its 
coordination or performance control. It is a derivative of machine bureaucracy and 
consists of a set of semiautonomous divisions where top management maintains a 
semblance of control through the mangers of the divisions, whom it holds responsible for 
divisional performance. The middle-line manager is the key part of the organization. 
Adhocracy relies on mutual adjustment. It has high horizontal and low vertical 
differentiation, including low formalization.32 Much of the power lies with trained and 
specialized experts who are dispersed unevenly throughout the different parts of the 
organization according to the decisions they make.33 
3. Coordination Mechanisms 
Using Mintzberg’s model in Figure 2, coordination can be obtained by a number 
of mechanisms that may be used in various combinations. These are explained below: 
a. Mutual Adjustment 
This mechanism involves the coordination of work by a process of direct 
informal communication in which there is no hierarchy between those performing 
interdependent works.  It is often used for multi-functional or very complex tasks by 
people who have a higher competence and especially when nobody really knows at the 
outset what needs to be done but people need to take initiative as work progresses. To 
some degree, mutual adjustment exists in every activity of every organization, but is 
                                                 
31Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
32Horizontal differentiation refers to the specialization within an organization while vertical 
differentiation is the number of hierarchical levels between top management and the bottom of the 
hierarchy.  See Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 45, 69–71. 
33Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
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typical of innovative organizations. It allows for immediate adaptation to local needs, 
especially when coordination directly involves members of the organization doing the 
work.34 
b. Direct Supervision 
In direct supervision, coordination is achieved by working through a chain 
of command where a designated supervisor or person in an organization has centralized 
control, issues instructions or orders to several people, monitors their work to verify that 
it is done according to directives, and takes responsibility for their actions. This 
coordination mechanism is necessary when competencies are unavailable, when 
procedures or rules cannot be employed, or subordinates cannot be trusted to coordinate 
with each other through mutual adjustment.35   
c. Standardization of Work Processes 
Coordination through standardization of work processes is achieved when 
each person carrying out interrelated tasks follows specified routines, rules, or procedures 
with little or no direct supervision. This coordination mechanism is typical in machine 
organizations or is used by workers on assembly lines.36  
d. Standardization of Outputs 
This coordination mechanism is achieved by ensuring that an activity or 
task meets specified objectives, desired standards, or outputs without any need for mutual 
adjustment or interference from the hierarchy. It requires that individuals involved are 
sufficiently competent and given adequate means to function. This mechanism is typical 
of diversified organizations.37 
                                                 
34Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
35Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”   
36Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
37Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
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e. Standardization of Skills or Competencies 
Coordination through a standardization of skills relies on trained 
professionals or skilled people working independently of their colleagues and which 
allows for considerable control over their work. The organization also surrenders some of 
its authority to their associations or institutions that select and trains them. According to 
Mintzberg, standardization of skills is typical of professional bureaucracies.38 
4. Internal Processes 
As earlier suggested, an organization’s internal processes include its 
goals/mission, objectives, or strategy; structure; tasks and technology; information 
systems; policies; culture; and decision making, among others. The internal environment 
sets the pace for an organization’s workflow, and the conditions, entities, events, and 
factors that influence its activities and choices.39 These interacting forces within an 
organization should be synchronized to enhance the strengths and reduce the weaknesses 
of the organization. While the organization’s internal processes must match the 
environment, the organization itself must be internally consistent.  Highlighted below are 
some of the key areas that would need to be synchronized. 
a. Mission/Objectives/Strategy 
The concept of mission/objectives/goals and strategy are analogous. 
Generally, the mission, objectives or goals of an organization are its reason for existence 
and guide decisions about what tasks the organization will complete, and what products 
or services it will provide to the stakeholders. Strategy includes the decisions or tactics 
the organization will employ or is employing to achieve its mission/objectives/goals or 
how the organizational resources are utilized to meet the demands, constraints, and 
                                                 
38Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  
39Business Dictionary, “Internal environment,” accessed May 10, 2010, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/internal-environment.html.  
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opportunities of the environment.40 Generally, while the mission, objectives, or goals 
define where the organization wants to go, strategies determine the tasks and plans for 
how to achieve the objectives. 
b. Task/Technology 
  A task is a piece of work assigned or done as part of one’s duties, or a 
function to be performed.41 Technology refers to the purposeful application of a wide 
range of tools, knowledge and/or techniques, and actions to transform organizational 
inputs into outputs.42 It also specifies how a given organization accomplishes its tasks.  
c. Structure 
  Organizational structure is the framework within which lines of authority, 
tasks, and responsibilities are defined, delegated, and coordinated, and how information 
flows between levels of management.43 It is the formal system for reporting and the 
backbone for decision making. The complexity of the organization’s structure is often 
proportional to its size and geographical spread.   
d. Information, Information Processing and Decision Making 
Information is the nervous system of an organization. It is “something told 
or facts learned.”44 Organizations need quality information and an adequate information 
processing capability to cope with environmental uncertainties and improve decision 
                                                 
40Nadler, et al., Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases, 39–40; and Richard L. Daft, 
Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design,” 8th ed., (Cincinnati OH: South-Western Educational 
Publishing, 2003), 18–24.  
41American Heritage Dictionary, “Task,” 2009, accessed July 2, 2010, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/task.  
42Eric Jansen, “Tasks and Techology,” Organizational Design class notes, briefed November 2009, 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. 
43Business Dictionary, “Organizational Structure,” Business Dictionary.com, accessed July 1, 2010, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organizational-structure.html; and Dr. Bernd Venhor. 
“Strategy Process, Organization Structure and Control,” accessed February 6, 2010, 
http://www.berdvenohr.de. 
44Webster Dictionary, “Information,” Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, 2nd ed., 2002, 
329.  
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making. “Innovations in information technology change both the organization’s demand 
for information processing and its capacity for processing information.”45 However, if 
there is information overload and decisions are not being made in a timely manner or 
there is a lack of information, this could be detrimental to an organization. 
e. Policies and Procedures 
 “Policies are principles, rules, and guidelines formulated and adopted by 
an organization [governing the implementation of processes] to reach its long-term 
goals... [and] to influence and determine all major decisions and actions…” On the other 
hand, “[p]rocedures are the specific methods employed to express policies in action in 
day-to-day operations of the organization.”46 It is argued that procedures are developed 
with the users/client in mind and evolve over time as new processes develop in response 
to internal or external environmental changes.   
f. Culture 
Organizational culture is “the specific collection of values and norms that 
are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they interact 
with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization,”47 including how 
decision-making processes are framed. “It encompasses beliefs, expectations, norms, 
rituals, communication patterns, symbols, heroes, and reward structure…,”48 commonly 
distinguished between the visible and the hidden levels of organizational culture. 
Organizational culture is a key variable that affects organizational performance. 
According to Ouchi and Wilkins, organizational performance cannot be adequately or 
                                                 
45Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 5. 
46Business Dictionary, “Policies and Procedures,” accessed July 1, 2010, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/policies-and-procedures.html. 
47Charles W. L. Hill and Gareth R. Jones, Strategic Management (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 
68. 




accurately understood without a comprehension of the culture of the organization,49 
necessitating its alignment with other organizational components to enable effective 
performance.    
g. Outputs 
As earlier defined, outputs are the products, services, skills, etc., that have 
been transformed and returned to the environment to fulfill the purpose of the 
organization.  According to the second edition of the Webster Dictionary, it is the work 
done or amount of goods or services produced over a given period.50 
E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF AN ORGANIZATION 
An organization’s environment includes everything outside the system’s 
boundary, such as competitors, suppliers, human resources, financial resources, clients, 
technology, economic conditions, government, socio-cultural, and international sectors.51 
“Although everything outside the system is its environment, not everything is equally 
relevant to the system’s purpose or survival.”52 Lawrence and Lorsch recognized that 
different parts of the organization may be facing different types of environment.53 
Therefore, it is necessary for an organization to understand the different characteristics of 
its environment to identify and manage the key influences in order to function effectively.   
                                                 
49William G. Ouchi and Alan L. Wilkins, “Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship Between 
Culture and Organizational Performance,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (1983): 468–481. 
50 Webster Dictionary, “Outputs,” Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, 2nd ed., (2002). 
51Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 2nd ed., (Cincinnati OH: South-
Western Educational Publishing, 2001). 
52Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 17. 
53Lawrence and Lorsch, Organization and Environment. The external environment is composed of 
two sectors: general and task environments. The general environment consists of those sectors that may not 
have a direct impact on the daily operations of an organization but will indirectly influence it while the task 
environment includes sectors with which the organization interacts directly and that have a direct impact on 
the organizations ability to achieve its goals. See Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 2001.  
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1. Characteristics of the External Environment 
The characteristics of the external environment include: complexity, diversity, 
uncertainty, hostility, routineness, high-velocity, equivocality, and rate of change.54  
These characteristics place constraints on organizations and are considered as measures 
of the environment. For this thesis, a four-dimensional typology: uncertainty, 
equivocality, complexity, and hostility, will be used to measure an organization’s 
environment because each of these addresses a different aspect of the environment and 
they can be operationalized for different components of an organization.   
a. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty refers to the extent to which environmental events are stable 
or unstable and the domain is simple or complex.55 According to Milliken, uncertainty is 
when “one does not understand how components of the environment might be 
changing,”56 or what the exact value of a particular variable is to the organization. 
Uncertainty decreases an organization’s ability to use existing procedures to predict 
external changes and increases the risk of failure in making appropriate responses. This 
requires increased capability to seek information or knowledge about the environment to 
forecast or adapt successfully.   
Daft notes that an organization can be structured to reduce uncertainty 
through boundary spanners or liaison personnel to link the organization with key 
elements of the external environment for increased information about changes in the 
environment and to send favorable information about the organization to the 
environment. Buffer positions can be established to absorb uncertainty from the 
environment. The organization can also increase planning and environmental forecasting 
to scan environmental elements and analyze potential moves or countermoves by other  
 
                                                 
54The problem of defining, describing, and measuring an environment is difficult and remains 
contentious. See Burton and Obel, 1998, 165–189.  
55Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 5.  
56Frances J. Milliken, “Three Types of Perceived Uncertainty About the Environment: State, Effect, 
and Response Uncertainty,” Academy of Management Review, 12 no. 1 (1987): 133–143.  
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organizations. Other responses to environmental uncertainty include the amount of 
differentiation and integration among the departments, organic versus mechanistic 
management processes, and institutional imitation.57   
b. Equivocality 
Equivocality is a “measure of the organization’s ignorance of whether a 
variable exists in the environment.”58 It is when a variable is too ill equipped to scan and 
attempt to monitor, and its importance to the organization is unknown; however, the 
organization is aware of its ignorance. Unlike uncertainty, this characteristic is related to 
something in the environment that the organization has not experienced before, for 
example, new regulations. “Greater equivocality requires broader scanning of the 
environment for heretofore unknown and unimportant environmental parameters.”59   
c. Environmental Complexity 
Environmental complexity refers to the number of diverse elements in the 
environment relevant to an organization that interact with and influence the 
organization.60 Increased complexity increases the number of variables and the amount  
 
                                                 
57According to Lawrence and Lorsch, increased uncertainty in the environment requires increased 
differentiation in the organizational structure for the organization to be efficient, which then requires 
increased integration to make the different departments work in cooperation. Organization differentiation is 
“the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among managers in different functional 
departments, and the difference in formal structure among these departments” while integration is the 
quality of collaboration between departments. See Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 3–
33. Integration devices typically include rules and procedures, configuration plans, the authority of the 
hierarchy, and decision-making committees. See Lawrence and Lorsch, Organization and Environment. 
Organic structure is characterized by low formalization and decentralization of authority and responsibility 
to lower levels, while mechanistic structure is characterized by high complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. Burns and Stalker believed that organic structure was needed for an organization to be 
efficient if the environment was unstable.  If the environment was stable, the mechanistic structure was the 
best. See Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, (London: Tavistok, 2001).  Also 
see Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 54–59. 
58Richard L. Daft, and Robert H. Lengel, “Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness 
and Structural Design,” Management Science, 32 no. 5(1986): 554–557. 
59Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 177.  
60Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 58.   
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of information that the organization has to monitor, assess the effects of and react to.  In 
most cases, this requires it to decentralize its decision-making process for proper 
alignment.   
d. Hostility 
Hostility refers to the extent to which an organization’s environment is 
supportive of or threatening to an organization’s existence or to its progress. Hostile 
environments are characterized by intense competition, a relative lack of exploitable 
opportunities, and a harsh or restrictive operating environment. The greater the hostility 
of the environment the more difficult it is for an organization to survive or achieve its 
purpose. According to Mintzberg, if an organization’s existence is threatened, decision 
making in the organization should be centralized regardless of the complexity of the 
environment to enable direct and decisive intervention to counter against the threat.61  
2. The Effect of the External Environment on an Organization 
Based on the aforementioned characteristics, a model of the effect of external 
environment on an organization is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Model of the Effects of External Environment on an Organization62 
 
From the proposition in quadrant G, for example, if the environment has high 
equivocality, high complexity, and high uncertainty, the organizational complexity 
should be low. Accordingly, the organization should have low formalization and low 
centralization. Similarly in quadrant B, the environment is relatively simple. Low 
equivocality means that we know what is important. Low complexity indicates that only a 
few variables describe the environment. Low uncertainty suggests that the values of each 
variable can be predicted with a high degree of certainty. The information processing 
requirements from the environment are small. Therefore, if the environment has low 
equivocality, low complexity, and low uncertainty, the organizational complexity is 
likely to be low. This may require some degree of formalization and centralization to 
align the organization in order for it to be effective. 
                                                 
62Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for 
Application, 180–189. 
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F. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
The concept of organizational effectiveness has been used in a variety of ways, 
and definitions vary as much as terminology does. In general, effectiveness has been 
defined as the “degree to which an organization achieves its goals” and as “a desired state 
of affairs which the organization attempts to realize.”63 It is typically viewed in terms of 
the outputs and outcomes of organizational activities. Despite some consensus, there is no 
universal agreement on the definition and operationalization of the concept.64 In the 
following discussions, four main theoretical approaches to organizational effectiveness 
are reviewed and evaluated, giving several views from relevant researchers and writers. 
By identifying a definition that can be broadly applied, a general framework for 
analyzing organizational effectiveness for this thesis can be developed. It is noteworthy 
that the terms ‘effectiveness’ and ‘performance’ are used interchangeably because 
problems related to their definition, measurement, and explanations are similar.65   
The four main approaches to organizational effectiveness are: goal-based 
approach, resource-based approach, internal process approach, and strategic-
constituencies (stakeholders) approach. The goal-based approach to organizational 
effectiveness is measured in terms of accomplishment of goals or desired outputs.66 The 
goals of the organization need be determined and assessed to ascertain whether the goals 
have been achieved. Sometimes identifying organizations goals may seem difficult 
because people in the organization may have difficulty stating the real goals. Different 
stakeholders may also have different goals for the organization. Moreover, organizations 
                                                 
63Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 6. 
64Kim S. Cameron, “Effectiveness as Paradox: Consensus and Conflict in Conceptions of 
Organizational Effectiveness,” Management Science 32 (1986), accessed February 3, 2010, 
http://pcbfaculty.ou.edu/classfiles/MGT%206293%20Strategic%20Management/Week%203%20What%20
is%20performance/cameron%2086%20ms%20perf%20effectiveness%20paradox%20class.pdf.  
65James G. March, and Robert I. Sutton, “Organizational Performance as a Dependent Variable,” 
Organization Science 8(6) 1997: 698–706, accessed February 23, 2010, http://www.jstor.org/pss/2635165. 
66Amitai Etzioni, “Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and Suggestion,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1960): 257–258, accessed February 23, 2010, 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2390780.  
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have not only official goals, but also operative goals.67 The resource-based approach 
defines organizational effectiveness “in terms of its bargaining position, as reflected in 
the ability of the organization, in either absolute or relative terms, to exploit its 
environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources.”68 This approach focuses 
on obtaining and successfully managing resources as the criterion for measuring 
organizational effectiveness.  
 On the other hand, the internal processes approach measures effectiveness as 
internal organizational health and efficiency or the efficient use of resources and 
harmonious internal functioning.69 This approach does not consider its relationship with 
the external environment and organizational output, but considers all departmental 
activities, which must be aligned with one another for the organization to be effective. 
The strategic-constituencies or stakeholders approach seeks to at least minimally satisfy 
the expectations of the various important constituents or stakeholders both within and 
outside the organization.70 Each stakeholder has a different criterion of effectiveness due 
to different interest in the organization. In this approach, organizational effectiveness 
becomes an assessment of how successful the organization is in meeting the expectations 
of the various constituencies critical to its continued existence. However, according to 
Daft, “[t]he stakeholders approach also handles several criteria simultaneously – inputs, 
internal processing, outputs – and acknowledges that there is no single measure of 
effectiveness.”71     
 Not all criteria for organizational effectiveness can be relevant to every 
organization. Some may be more important than others, especially because organizations 
                                                 
67Official goals, sometimes called the mission, are the formally stated goals, which typically describe 
the organization’s general statement of purpose and outcomes the organization is trying to achieve, while 
operative goals reflect activities the organization is actually performing. Official versus operative goals 
represent stated versus actual goals. See Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 18.  
68E. Yuchtman and S.E. Seashore, “A Systems Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness,” 
American Sociological Review, 32 (1987): 891–903. 
69Richard L Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 3rd ed., (New York: West Publishing Co., 1989).  
70Terry Connolly, Edward J. Conlon, and Stuart J. Deutch, “Organizational Effectiveness: A Multiple 
Constituency Approach,” Academy of Management Review 5, 1980, accessed February 12, 2010, 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/257430. 
71Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 28. 
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perform many different functions and their success depends on performance in a number 
of areas. Consequently, in agreeing with the argument that organizational effectiveness 
requires multiple criteria to evaluate and measure, this thesis adopts a hybridization of the 
goal and strategic-constituencies approaches. This thesis also adopts Robbins’ definition: 
“the degree to which an organization attains its short – (ends) and long-term (means) 
goals, the selection of which reflects strategic constituencies, the self interest of the 
evaluator, and the life stage of the organization.”72     
G. RELATIONSHIP AMONG ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, 
INTERNAL PROCESSES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Figure 4 illustrates the theoretical expectations of the alignment of the internal 
processes and the environment, and indicates the likelihood of an effective or ineffective 
organization. The environment has needs that the organization must satisfy, and also 
exerts constraints that must be managed in order to survive and be effective. This 
demands that critical elements within the organization be aligned and focused towards 
environmental demands. A good fit with the environment gives a high level of 
effectiveness. According to Hanna, “[a]n organization that ignores its environment will 
be characterized by several blind spots…, which are critical for its survival. In contrast, 
an organization that deeply recognizes its dependence on the environment for survival 
and growth will do whatever necessary to implement strategies and policies that 
accurately address key environmental expectations.”73 Therefore, to be better aligned, an 
organization may either control the environment or balance the needs between itself and 
the environment. 
                                                 
72Stephen P. Robbins, Organizational Behavior, 8th ed., (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998). 




Level of alignment of internal processes variables  






























Low High Low 
 
Figure 4.   Model of the Alignment of Internal Processes and Environmental Variables 
H. METHODS 
1. Data Gathering Methods 
This thesis utilized both qualitative and quantitative research methods.  Data was 
collected from archives, libraries, reports, seminar papers, executive summaries, and 
memoranda available through open sources. These include information reviewed from 
U.S. Government Accountability Offices (GAO) reports, AFRICOM posture statements, 
and relevant literature on the concepts of organizational effectiveness and environment, 
as well as relevant works on the African environment including activities of various U.S. 
agencies. The numerical data gathered for the quantitative research consist of statistical 
figures on African countries and populations as these relate to size, health concerns, 
funding, and military equipment, among others.    
2. Data Analysis Methods 
The model used for data analysis is a modification of the congruence model by 
Nadler and Tushman with some components from the McCaskey model as shown in 
Figure 5. Both the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman and the McCaskey model 
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sit firmly within the open system school of thought.74 Nadler and Tushman consider the 
transformation process as the heart of their model.75 However, their model lacks a few 
important components that are present in the McCaskey model, such as mission, 
technology, and outcomes. The modified version for this analysis considers every part of 
the system: input, transformation process, output, and outcome, equally important for an 
organization’s effectiveness. 
As depicted in the modified model, technology (one of McCaskey’s design factors 
in the transformation process) replaces the individual component in the Nadler and 
Tushman model, while the mission indicated in the input replaces history (the history 
component is embedded in the culture component). The outcome component from 
McCaskey’s model is also introduced into the Nadler and Tushman model. Worth noting, 
too, is that structure replaces formal organization, and culture replaces informal 
organization, but all retain the same meaning. The culture in the transformation process 
does not only infer interaction among internal organizational element, but also includes 
interactions among external environmental variables. 
                                                 
74The Nadler and Tushman congruence model views the organization as a system that draws inputs 
from both internal and external sources (strategy, resources, history, and environment) and transforms them 
into outputs (activities, behavior and performance of the system at three levels: individual, group and 
organizational).  The organization contains four key components: task; the individuals who perform the 
work; the formal organizational arrangements that provide structure and direction to the tasks; and the 
informal organization, sometimes referred to as the culture that reflects the values, beliefs, and behavioral 
patterns. See Nadler et al., Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases. 
75Oliver Wyman, “The Congruence Model: A Roadmap to Understanding Organizational 


















Figure 5.   After Modification Nadler and Tushman’s Model 
 Using the modified model, the data collected from the various sources were 
analyzed for information they reveal about the challenges and opportunities presented by 
the external environment, including the character or performance of the organization. 
Then, a comparison is made between the organizational performance and the desired 
performance given the nature of the environment, among other things, to determine the 
degree of fit and possible causes of problems so as to develop courses of action to 
mitigate them.  These processes can be analyzed through the following four steps:76 
• Determine the sectors of the environment that may indicate possible 
existence of problems or opportunities and examine the nature of those environmental 
elements. 
• Describe the basic nature of the four components of the organization with 
specific emphasis on their critical features including mission or goals, resources, strategy, 
and outputs (as desired according to the strategy and as actually obtained). 
• Conduct analysis to identify areas where there are significant and 
meaningful differences between desired and actual outputs and, to the extent possible, 
                                                 
76Nadler et al., Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases, 45.  
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identify costs associated with each problem. Determine relative congruence or fit among 
the organizational components (transformation process) as well as among the 
components, inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Generate and identify causes associated with 
specific problems.  
• Indicate possible actions to deal with the problem causes.  
Nadler suggests that “[i]t’s important to view the congruence model as a tool for 
organizing your thinking … rather than as a rigid template to dissect, classify and 
compartmentalize what you observe. It’s a way of making sense out of a constantly 
changing kaleidoscope of information and impressions.”77 
I. SUMMARY 
 In this chapter, gaps were identified in the literature regarding AFRICOM’s 
effectiveness. It was suggested that there are no specific linkages between AFRICOM’s 
effectiveness and its external environment, which raised the question about whose 
perspective or which constituency’s point of view is considered for evaluating 
AFRICOM’s effectiveness by some of the existing literatures. There was a gap in 
literature on specific factors that could adversely impact AFRICOM’s effectiveness from 
the perspective of the internal design, including an in-depth study of key influences, such 
as the organization’s internal processes. All of these, among others, raise the question 
about whether AFRICOM is effective in its current organizational design, which this 
thesis seeks to answer. 
As addressed in this chapter, an organization is considered to consist of a group of 
people working together to leverage their individual strengths within the group to achieve 
more than can be accomplished by the collective efforts of group members working 
individually. The organization is viewed from an open system perspective, which is an 
arrangement of interrelated and interdependent components of an organization interacting 
with its external environment to achieve a common purpose. According to this 
perspective, inputs are taken into the system, transformed into outputs, and then returned 
to the external environment that also influences the organization.  
                                                 
77Knowledge Management, “Nadler and Tushman, Congruence Model: Political, Organism,” accessed 
June 10, 2010, http://www.super-business.net/Knowledge-Management/853.html. 
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According to this chapter, the external environment of an organization includes 
everything outside its boundary, such as competitors, suppliers, human resources, and 
financial resources. Those sectors that may not have a direct impact on the daily 
operations of the organization but have an indirect influence are considered as the general 
environment, while the task environment has a direct impact on the organization’s ability 
to achieve its goals. Although there are several aspects of the external environment that 
place constraints on organizations, a four-dimensional typology (uncertainty, 
equivocality, complexity, and hostility) are being used in this thesis to measure an 
organization’s environment. While equivocality suggests an organization is ignorant of a 
variable that exists in the environment, hostility refers to how supportive or threatening 
the environment is to an organization’s effectiveness or achievement of its purpose. 
This chapter considered organizational effectiveness to be the degree to which an 
organization achieves its goals. Having identified four main approaches to organizational 
effectiveness: goal-based, resource-based, internal process, and strategic-constituencies 
(stakeholders), the definition adopted also takes into account short-term and long-term 
goals, with due consideration given to the interests of various stakeholders.  
The chapter described the data gathered and methods of data analysis, with the 
congruence model by Nadler and Tushman being modified by using some components of 
the McCaskey model. The thesis model thus captures all the important components of the 
system: inputs, transformation processes, outputs, and outcomes, and enables the 
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III. THE EXTERNAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF 
AFRICOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine various aspects of AFRICOM’s external 
operating environment to identify challenges and opportunities. As earlier noted, an 
environment includes everything outside the boundary of an organization, which the 
organization directly or indirectly interacts with and which has the potential to impact its 
ability to achieve its goals. However, because it will be difficult to examine every aspect 
of AFRICOM’s external environment due to time constraints, this study examines those 
aspects of the environment which the authors consider to be sensitive for AFRICOM. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on various aspects of the African operating 
environment, excluding U.S. organizations to be discussed in Chapter IV. This chapter 
covers geopolitical and demographic trends, transnational security challenges, health 
challenges, wars and conflicts, and competition for influence by other international actors 
operating on the continent. Additionally, regional perspectives on security challenges and 
mechanism for prevention, including an overview of Africa’s militaries, will be 
discussed.    
B. GEOPOLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
The geopolitical and demographic trends in Africa are complex and dynamic, and 
provide significant challenges as well as opportunities not only to Africans, but also to 
other stakeholders. Africa is the world’s second-largest and second most populous 
continent, after Asia, with an area of about 30.2 million km2 (11.7 million mi2) including 
adjacent islands. It covers six percent of the Earth’s total surface area and 20.4 percent of 
the total land area, and is about three and half times the size of the continental U.S. Africa 
is home to over one billion people in 54 countries, which accounts for about 14.7 percent 
(one seventh) of the world’s population. According to United Nation’s (UN) projections 
published in March 2007, Africa’s population is envisioned to at least double between 
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now and 2050. There are over 800 ethnicities and between 1500 and 2000 diverse 
African languages and dialects,78 representing many different cultures not only from one 
country to another, but also within individual countries.79 The religions in Africa include: 
Christianity; Islam; and African traditional beliefs.80 In essence, it is in the sheer 
vastness, wide diversity of cultures, religion and ethnicities that gives the African 
environment its uniqueness and complexity. 
In addition to a high population growth rate, Africa has increased unemployment, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which breeds frustration and the potential for 
criminality. “Today, two out of three inhabitants of this large region of Africa are under 
25 years of age … [and] two-thirds of its population still live in rural areas, [with 
prospects for] massive migration to the towns and cities…. At the present rate of rural 
exodus, half [s]ub-Saharan Africa’s population would be urban dwellers by 2030.”81 It is 
argued that the growth rate is the result of relatively high fertility and a decline in 
mortality due to continuing socio-economic improvement. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) already estimates that the unemployment rate in Africa will remain 





                                                 
78Nation Online, “Official and Spoken Languages of African Countries,” accessed June 18, 2010, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/african_languages.htm.   
79Encarta Encyclopedia, “African People and Cultures,” Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 
2000, accessed June 18, 2010, http://www.africaguide.com/culture/index.htm.   
80Islam is the most widely practiced and dominant in North Africa, Horn of Africa, the West African 
interior and far west coast of the continent as well as the coast of East Africa. North Africa has strong ties 
to Arab culture and are mainly French speaking; West Africa has a mixed Christian/Muslim population; 
Eastern and Central Africa have a mixed Christian/Muslim population; and South Africa has a 
predominantly Christian population.   
81ENN, “Sub-Saharan Africa: The Population Emergency,” Institute de Recherché Pour le 
Development, January 9, 2008, accessed June 14, 2010, http://www.enn.com/ecosystems/article/28940. 
82International Labor Organization (ILO), “Unemployment, Working Poor and Vulnerable 
Employment to Increase Dramatically due to Global Economic Crisis,” January 28, 2009, accessed June 
20, 2010, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--
en/WCMS_101462/index.htm.    
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sub-regional diversity and disparities within African countries, it is unlikely that any 
general proposals or strategies for reducing fertility to mitigate the situation on the 
continent will be successful.83 
As displayed in Figure 6, about two thirds of the continent (mostly the Sahel 
region, the Horn of Africa, and the Kalahari in the south) is desert or semi-arid with a 
sparse population. The same is true in heavily forested areas or near mangrove swamps. 
Herbst argues that because of the cost of building infrastructure posed by the nature of 
Africa’s political geography; African leaders find projection of government authority 
over substantial portions of their population to be difficult.84 For example, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) has a large population concentration around the capital, 
Kinshasa, and the border regions while the interior is relatively empty, making it costly to 
construct infrastructure (especially roads) through vast relatively under-populated areas. 
Herbst notes that “[i]t is therefore no wonder that Kinshasa, has had such an 
extraordinarily difficult time consolidating power and that many provinces have formally 
seceded.”85 However, he also argues that many African leaders confronting vast 
territories will engage in patronage politics in the densely populated cities and let those 
outlying areas, especially those that want to threaten the state, to remain relatively 
ungoverned rather than spend limited resources on roads to secure their authority.    
         Against the background of population explosion and unemployment, as well as 
challenges posed by political geography, lie some of the complexities and uncertainties 
associated with the African environment. The UN argues that these factors constitute the  
                                                 
83The high fertility rate has to do with a combination of cultural and socio-economic factors such as 
reproduction at young ages (age at marriages is early); lack of birth control or limited use of contraceptives; 
high demand for children due to tradition, religion, or the need for more children to assist in food and 
livestock production; and high infant mortality.  See UN Economic Commission for Africa/Food Security 
and Sustainable Development Division (ECA/FSSD), “The State of the Democratic Transition in Africa,” 
Report, accessed June 24, 2010, 
http://unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/icpd/fourth/FC4-
03a.%20Doc%20Demo%20Transit_full%20report.htm.  
84Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18–19. 
85The countries in the Sahel such as Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania that are exceptionally large and 
sparsely populated are almost impossible to govern. Given the poverty in these countries, it is difficult for 
any government to be able to exert effective control. See Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative 
Lessons in Authority and Control, 145–159.     
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major causes of deadly conflicts and socio-economic instability that undermine the very 
foundations for securing sustainable livelihoods, economic growth, and poverty 
eradication.     
 
 
Figure 6.   From the Encyclopedia Britannica, Africa: Population Density86 
C. TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Africa has a very wide range of transnational security challenges that impact 
diverse areas of human behavior. These challenges include organized criminal activities 
such as terrorism and violent extremism; maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea 
including theft of natural resources; as well as illegal trafficking in drugs, persons, and 
                                                 
86Encyclopedia Britannica, “Africa: Population Density,” accessed July 13, 2010,       
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7924/Africa/37206/Population-distribution.  
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small arms and light weapons (SALW).87 The occurrence of these security challenges 
varies across the different countries and regions as discussed below.  
1. Terrorism and Violent Extremism 
One of the pressing security challenges in Africa is the threat posed by terrorism 
and violent extremism or militancy. The litany of transnational terrorist activities by al-
Qaeda-affiliated groups in Africa, including social conflicts in which combatants or 
militants use terrorist tactics, underscores the presence of local, regional, and worldwide 
terrorism on the African continent. Such activities range from the terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998; Casablanca, 
Morocco in 2003 and 2007; and more recently in Uganda. In addition, challenges posed 
in Nigeria by Islamists in the north and militant groups in the southeast and al-Shabaab 
militancy in Somalia return focus towards the African continent. Despite many successful 
host nation security efforts and U.S.-supported military interventions against these 
aforementioned groups (among others), terrorists or violent extremists continue to 
function actively in Africa.  
It is argued that Africa’s vast ungoverned spaces, including porous borders in 
Northern Africa, the Trans-Saharan region and Somalia, especially badly governed areas 
or those with the lack of state capacity or political will to exercise control elsewhere, 
offer sanctuary to extremists and insurgent groups to recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, 
transit, and mount operations including smuggle and traffic in drugs, persons and 
weapons.88 It is suggested that although “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
                                                 
87The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which came into force in 
200, contains no precise definition of “transnational organized crime,” nor a select list of the kinds of 
crimes that might fall under this heading. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The 
Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” 2010, accessed June 19, 
2010, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.  The 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime will be referred to as UNODC for the remainder of the paper. 
88The Trans-Saharan region’s remoteness and harsh desert climate discourage effective assertion of 
central government control. As such, terrorist organizations are constantly on the move in the area, but they 
maintain less permanent facilities and a more small scale presence in sparsely populated areas. See U.S. 
Department of State (DoS), Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Washington DC: Office of the 
Coordination of Counterterrorism, 30 April 2008, accessed June 22, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf; and Ahmed Zaied, “The Influence of Al-Qaeda 
in the West African Sahelian Countries of Mali and Niger,” Report for Washington DC: Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, January 2009. 
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formerly Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) focused its major 
attacks on Algeria, [it] continued to operate [almost uninterrupted] in [the vast 
ungoverned] Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist 
operations in the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations outside the region.”89   
Similarly, the large areas in Somalia where the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
lacks capacity to exercise control offers uninterrupted sanctuary to al Shabaab to focus on 
carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union (AU) 
peacekeeping forces.  
While terrorism is just one tool used by global insurgents, “[a]l-Qa’eda and 
similar groups feed on local grievances [supporting many local causes that have little to 
do with the objectives of the global jihad], integrate them into broader ideologies, and 
link disparate conflicts through globalised communications, finance and technology.”90 
Such groups include Boko Haram (which literally means non-Islamic education is a sin), 
a Nigerian Islamist group that is opposed to the influence of Western education and seeks 
the imposition of strict Islamic law throughout the country as its ideology.91    
In his 2010 posture statement, General Ward notes that “enhancing security [to 
respond to terrorism and violent extremism] depends upon regional cooperation and the 
development of stable and growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of 
violent extremist organizations.”92 Yet, considering the long history of international 
efforts especially by the U.S., has there been any demonstrable regional capacity for 
cooperation and development to respond to this challenge?  
                                                 
89U.S. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 13. 
90David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Executive Summary, Version 2.2 (November 30, 
2004): 16, accessed June 20, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf.  
91Vangaurd, “Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad,” August 14, 2009, accessed August 3, 
2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/200908140646.html. 
92AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” March 2010, accessed May 
15, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf. 
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2. Maritime Challenges 
Africa’s rich resource laden and highly commercial maritime environment, 
especially in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the waters off the 
coast of Somalia, have been undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional, and 
international challenges. These challenges have destabilizing consequences both for the 
economies of the littoral nations and the international community, and they occur because 
of vulnerabilities in the littoral states. Some of these challenges discussed below include 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, oil theft, poaching, and environmental degradation, as 
well as human and narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of SALW.    
a. Piracy, Armed Robbery and Sea and Oil Theft 
Until 2007, maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea have been largely 
concentrated in Asia.93 Between January and June 2009, Africa ranked higher with about 
66 percent of the world’s 240 reported incidents. The Gulf of Aden had 86 incidents, and 
became the world’s epicenter for maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. Other places 
in Africa are Somalia – 44 incidents, Red Sea – 14 incidents, and Nigeria – 13 incidents, 
including Tanzania and Kenya.94 Despite the strong international naval presence along 
the transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere around East Africa, pirates have 
conducted attacks beyond the 200 nautical miles (n miles) Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). For example, one incident occurred on November 29, 2009 at about 800 n miles 
off the Somali coast where pirates hijacked Maran Centaurus, a Greek-flagged very large 
                                                 
93Africa dominated in 2007 with about 120 actual and attempted attacks, South America had 21, 
South East Asia had 70, the Indian Sub-Continent had 30, the Far East had 10 and there were about 12 in 
the rest of the world. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC - IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2007 (UK, London: International Maritime 
Bureau, January 2008), accessed July 9, 2010, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/ICC-IMB-PRC-
2007.pdf.  
94While a majority of these incidents in Nigeria were against vessels at anchorage or berth, those in the 
Gulf of Aden, Somalia, Red Sea and Tanzania were mostly against vessels underway, and largely involved 
the boarding of vessels, the use of sophisticated weaponry and taking of hostages, indicating sophistication 
in these areas. See ICC-IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.”  
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crude carrier (VLCC) containing two million barrels worth $162 million.95 About $7 
million in ransom was paid for the release of the vessel and hostages, and with the 
availability of this ill gotten money, weapons and private armies among others become 
easily funded. Also, the international shipping industry becomes affected thanks to high-
risk insurance premiums, among other costs. 
Oil theft and oil infrastructure sabotage are also a significant feature in the 
resource-laden GoG,96 particularly in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta area. The oil is stolen by 
criminals either attaching secondary pipelines to the main pipelines of an oil company, 
blowing-up pipelines, or through connivance with government and oil company officials. 
According to the UN Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), about 10 percent of oil in 
Nigeria is stolen every year, reducing the production capacity to about two thirds when 
sabotage and violence are included.97 The result is an upward surge in oil prices, 
including pollution of the waterways by spillages caused by sabotage. In addition, as with 
piracy, criminals acquire sophisticated weapons with which to challenge the security 
agencies. These activities destabilize the economy of the region with implications far 
beyond the Niger Delta. Unfortunately, the agitation in the Niger Delta has provided a 
convenient smokescreen for persons intent on personal enrichment through oil theft.     
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97Oil theft and loss through sabotage costs the sub-region around $1.2 billion every year in lost 
revenue. Estimates are from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Topical Seminar on Energy and 
Security in Africa: Program Highlights,” (Washington, DC: Africa Center, 2005); and UNODC, “Oil Theft 




b. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
In addition to armed attacks on fishing vessels, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing otherwise called poaching, constitutes a significant challenge 
in the EEZs and on the high seas.98 It is suggested that the worldwide total loss of 
between 11 and 26 million tons of fish from poaching, costing between nine and 24 
billion dollars per year, is particularly prevalent in developing countries, especially across 
sub-Saharan Africa.99 Studies between 2003 and 2004 in ten African countries suggest a 
loss of about 372 million dollars to IUU fishing by vessels from Asia, Europe, and other 
parts of Africa.100 Apart from the loss of revenue to the littoral states, there are 
losses/environmental damages to the ecosystem caused by overfishing and consequent 
reduction in availability of sea food in local markets. There is also the loss of 
employment, including the loss of fishing gear or human lives arising from encroachment 
by industrial fishing vessels into zones reserved for artisanal fishing, which often results 
in conflicts. Additionally, the UN estimates that about 38 percent of Africa’s coastal 
ecosystem is under threat from pollution.101 
c. Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and SALW 
Coupled with the above concerns is trafficking in illicit drugs and SALW 
with their attendant consequences. West Africa is a major transit route for cocaine 
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trafficking into Europe from Latin America, much as East Africa is for heroin and 
cannabis resin from Asian producing countries. It is estimated that about 50 to 60 tons of 
cocaine, worth about two billion dollars, transits the West African region annually and 
about 20 to 30 tons of Afghanistan heroin is trafficked into East Africa.102 As a result of 
the volume of seizures in West Africa, it is suggested that the region may not just be “a 
transit area but a stockpiling logistics base for drug trafficking.”103 
The seriousness of drug trafficking to Africa’s security and stability is, in 
part, linked to the value of the drugs passing through the region. The worth of drugs 
being trafficked is in some cases greater than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of some 
countries like Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.104 Aside from the possibility that the proceeds 
could be used to challenge or bribe law enforcement agencies as well as corrupt financial 
officers to launder the proceeds through the financial system, this traffic prevents licit 
commercial activities and the growth of the already weak African economies.105 





                                                 
102Since the mid-1990s, trafficking in hard drugs became a booming business in Central and West 
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105The economic weight of the flow of illegal and unsafe money could create a “Dutch Disease” 
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potential risk of widespread addiction and a cycle of dependence, trafficking also has the 
potential to fuel crime and local violence, as well as increase the school dropout rate with 
the belief that you can get rich quick.106   
Africa also has a long history of trafficking in SALW due to its long 
history of numerous armed conflicts. “The traffickers themselves are a diverse group, 
with some originating in countries with large arms supplies, some in regions with 
stability problems, and some from the wealthier nations.”107 A UNODC report suggests 
that most military arms trafficking into Africa takes place under a veneer of legality, 
using the mainstream mechanisms for shipping legitimate goods: land, sea or air 
depending on the location of the buyer and commercial concerns. African maritime 
nations have been vulnerable to these problems.  
Beyond the lack of capability to monitor and affect arrest, is the lack of 
necessary legal mechanisms (criminal justice systems) or political will to support 
prosecutions for effective deterrence against these maritime crimes. For example, “the 
police in many West African countries are rated as the most corrupt sector of the 
society.”108 Additionally, the UNSC report indicates that “captured pirates with powerful 
links have continued to avoid prosecution notwithstanding increased international focus 
on the need for accountability.”109 This report suggests that in the Horn of Africa and 
East African region, only Kenya and Seychelles accept pirates captured by other 
countries to be tried in their courts, although Kenya recently revoked this agreement.  
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All these maritime challenges reflect the heightened level of insecurity in 
the maritime environment of the continent, which underscores the relevance of proactive 
regional mechanisms for improved maritime security.   
D. HEALTH CHALLENGES 
The public health sector in Africa is inundated with many challenges, namely; 
inadequate human resource capacity and laboratories, limited drug supplies, weak 
healthcare infrastructure, limited public financing, and poor management and planning, 
including lack of integrated systems.110 However, the major public health concerns are 
malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS). It is estimated that over 8,500 people in Africa die 
every day from these three preventable and treatable diseases. However, HIV/AIDS 
remains the major global health problem and Africa is the epicenter of the pandemic.111 
Based on 2008 estimates, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 72 percent of the 2 million 
global AIDS-related deaths, with new HIV infection at 1.9 million of the global total of 
2.7 million, surpassing the numbers in treatment.112 As of December 2009, sub-Saharan 
Africa accounted for 67 percent of the 34.4 million HIV positive people worldwide (for  
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details see Appendix 1).113 Obviously, since the vast majority of those infected are 
between the ages of 15 and 49, in the prime of their working lives, the needed workforce 
will become depleted.   
It has been argued that African militaries and peacekeeping forces are within the 
HIV/AIDS high risk population group.114 The military is not only most vulnerable to 
HIV infection, but is also most likely to spread the virus. It is suggested that for a variety 
of reasons, including the amount of time stationed away from their families due to high 
mobility, stressful and difficult operating conditions, and a willingness to take risks, 
members of the military often wind up as clients of sex workers, indulging in unsafe 
sexual activities, thereby increasing their chances of contracting or spreading HIV.115 
This practice is especially evident “[i]n environments of conflict and violence, where 
people are displaced and livelihoods are lost, [and] women and girls are also forced to 
exchange sex for protection, food, water and basic necessities.”116  
Although statistics and the extent of impact are difficult to collate, especially 
because of the military’s culture of concealment, available estimates indicate that HIV 
prevalence is abnormally high in most African countries. For example, according to 
South African government figures, seven out of 10 military deaths in 2002 were AIDS 
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related.117 In Nigeria, a study of returning soldiers conducted by Civil Military Alliance 
to Combat HIV/AIDS (CMA), found that infection rates are more than double that of the 
country’s total estimates and that a soldier’s risk of infection doubled for each year spent 
on deployment in conflict regions, suggesting a direct link between duty in a war zone 
and HIV transmission.118  
Although the prevalence of this pandemic and the number of people dying varies 
significantly from country to country in both scale and scope, the above statistics are 
unlikely to change overnight. The combined impact of losses, absences on extended sick 
leaves, and financial constraints has implications, not only for national security, but also 
on military readiness for peacekeeping operations across the continent, which 
increasingly depends on African armed forces.   
E. WAR AND CONFLICTS 
Despite a recent decline in the number of wars or conflicts in Africa, due largely 
to the efforts of African governments, the UN and other members of the international 
community, statespersons and civil societies, Africa is still home to the world’s most 
complex conflicts and most demanding UN peacekeeping operations. These conflicts 
have caused deaths, terrible human suffering, the spread of disease, gross violations of 
human rights, and they have undermined economic growth and stability, as well as 
proved a breeding ground for transnational organized crimes.   
A snapshot of deaths in African conflicts was exemplified in DRC. Since the 
outbreak of the conflict in 1998, considered to be the world’s deadliest conflict since 
World War II, about 5.4 million people have died. It is suggested that “[t]he vast majority 
actually died from non-violent causes such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and 
malnutrition - all typically preventable in normal circumstance, but [came] about because 
of the conflict.”119 In other conflict environments, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, both 
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criminal and terrorist organizations profited from illegal trade in precious gems and arms 
sales. Thanks to conflict, the continent has recorded some of the highest numbers of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. For example, out of the world’s 27.1 
million IDPs in 2009, Africa had the most, with 11.6 million IDPs in 21 countries, about 
40 percent of the world’s total.120  
African conflicts have also incurred tremendous human resource and financial 
costs for peacekeeping. For example, as of March 31, 2010, the UN has deployed about 
75,423 uniformed peacekeepers in the seven peacekeeping missions in Africa. That is a 
large percentage of the estimated 101,000 uniformed peacekeepers in 14 peacekeeping 
missions worldwide.121 Out of the $7.75 billion approved for the period from July 1, 
2009, to June 30, 2010, for the 14 UN peacekeeping missions, including the AU Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM), African missions cost about $5.7942 billion.122 This excludes 
hundreds of millions of dollars spent on humanitarian relief and support to the AU and 
regional militaries by the U.S., and other governments and nongovernmental 
organizations.    
While corruption, politics, limited resources, and the lack or failure of supporting 
institutions have been adduced as reasons for Africa’s conflicts, some of these conflicts 
are rooted in the legacy of colonial rule. Colonial rule transformed the entire African 
continent and arguably left a permanent European footprint. The creation of African 
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states with artificial boundaries by the colonial rulers in their scramble for Africa brought 
many different ethnic groups within areas that could not easily accommodate so much 
cultural or ethnic diversity.123 Unable to exercise physical control over their territories, 
the colonialists had to rely on local power structures that were eventually exploited by 
various groups within the societies to gain positions in their communities. The 
colonialists in turn exploited this and applied various techniques to achieve their own 
ends, such as creating dominant minority societies. The African leaders that followed 
soon after independence inherited these same structures, improving on the colonialists’ 
discrimination against minority, ethnic, or religious groups. Many African conflicts, such 
as the ones in Uganda and Rwanda, are rooted in this history of colonial rule.   
In Uganda, “the British colonial policy emphasized ethnic divisions.”124 The 
British set-up the southern Bantu-speaking ethnic group to benefit from economic, 
political and western-style education, as well as to provide the bulk of Uganda’s civil 
servants, while the northern Acholi and Langi ethnic groups were mainly recruited into 
the prisons, army, and police. By exploiting linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences 
between these groups, the divide and rule policy created tensions between them and 
helped to maintain British rule. The conflicts that followed independence were largely 
fuelled by this ethnic or tribal division.125 In Rwanda, for instance, the French and 
Belgians excluded the Hutus from power, replaced Hutu chiefs with Tutsis, and made the 
Hutu ethnic groups the work force to serve the Tutsis. In addition, they issued identity 
cards to differentiate between Rwandans’ ethnic identities. This created divisions and 
enmity between the Hutus and Tutsis.126 However, as the Tutsis asserted their influence 
and sought autonomy to break away from colonial rule in the 1950s, the Belgians 
switched their support in favor of the Hutus. The manipulation and politicization of these 
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two ethnicities and cultures, exacerbated by decline in socioeconomic conditions, 
engineered several conflicts that would later culminate in the genocide of 1994.127 As 
with other African countries affected by similar colonial misrule, the scars of the 
Ugandan and Rwandan conflicts still exist today, as do the divisions planted long ago.   
 The above descriptions bear witness to the fact that many people in Africa have 
not achieved national awareness. To them, the meaningful world starts and ends with the 
village, clan, or tribe. According to Connor, such people pursue their daily business and 
obey laws and the like, while living within a political system to which they do not ascribe 
legitimacy because of a mélange of fear, habit, apathy and/or inertia, or political and 
cultural isolation.128 Arguably, legitimacy is not needed for a state to function in Africa. 
This, in part, also testifies to the widespread failure of governments to induce their 
citizenry to transfer their primary loyalty or allegiance from an informal and unstructured 
sub-division to ties that bind them to the formal and legalistic state structure in which 
they find themselves.  
F. COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
ACTORS 
In the search for resources, many external actors like France, Britain, China, 
India, Japan, and Brazil, along with several Gulf States and European countries, including 
several international corporate organizations, have established a foothold in Africa. 
“[Some of the activities of these groups] may have consequences not only for access to 
African resources but perhaps more importantly for the pursuit of important U.S. 
objectives of good governance, protection of human rights, and sound economic 
policies.”129 For example, it has been generally suggested that China’s activities in 
Africa, present an important challenge to U.S. interests and values.  
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China is actively engaged in almost every part of Africa: gaining control of 
natural resources; contributing to infrastructure development projects; and providing soft 
loans and other incentives.130 It imports about 30 percent of its oil from Africa, mostly 
from Angola, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea.131 Due to 
its growing demand for oil and political influence, the largely state controlled Chinese oil 
companies have underbid and secured exploration and drilling rights in over 15 African 
countries, including Angola, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Sudan. Economic cooperation extends beyond the oil sector and includes 
trade, development assistance in the form of low-interest loans, debt relief and 
cancellation, educational training, and military support. China’s bilateral trade with 
Africa has improved remarkably from about $55.5 billion in 2006 to $106.8 billion in 
2008, surpassing trade with Britain and France; China has become Africa’s second 
largest trading partner,132 indicating a tremendous rate of growth in export and imports.  
The widespread Chinese development effort in Africa strongly suggests a long-
term approach to promoting African economic growth and security. African governments 
almost universally welcome Chinese development assistance on the continent, which 
complements as well as offers an alternative source of development, financial assistance, 
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10% a year and its need for energy is projected to increase by 7.5 % per year, seven times faster than the 
U.S. To sustain its growth, China requires increasing amounts of oil. See Gal Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: 
China’s Race into the Oil Market,” The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004, accessed August 
1, 2010, http://www.iags.org/china.htm. 
132Trade Africa, “Africa-China Trade passes $100 billion mark in 2008,” February 2009, accessed 
July 31, 2010, http://www.tradeafricablog.com/2009/02/africa-china-trade-passes-100-billion.html. 
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and political support, especially when Western countries are not forthcoming.133 
However, some concerns have been raised about China’s support of corrupt or rogue 
regimes and exploitative economic practices, among other issues.134  
One of the challenges to U.S. objectives in Africa is China’s willingness to use its 
seat on the UNSC to protect allegedly corrupt or rogue countries from international 
pressure for reforms and China’s offering alternative source of support. China has offered 
support to such countries as Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and Zimbabwe. With the 
withdrawal of Western oil companies (Chevron and Talisman of Canada) because of 
concerns about Sudan’s ties with extremist groups, China, as well as Malaysia and India, 
quickly filled the gap rather than support international efforts to exert pressure against the 
Sudanese government. Similarly, in 2004, following threatened oil sanctions against the 
Sudanese government unless it discontinued its support for belligerent militia groups in 
Darfur, China used its position on the UNSC to frustrate resolutions for sanctions which, 
in part, also protects its interest.      
Especially troubling in Africa are arms sales to nations regarded by the West as 
rogue states. The availability of weapons in Africa has made conflict possible and their 
continuing availability fuels the protraction of conflicts, diverting economic investment 
and energy from normal productivity, and sucking up resources otherwise available for 
domestic services and infrastructure.135 For example, the wars in Sudan, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone have destroyed both physical and social capital, as well as the economic 
well-being of these impoverished countries. While the proliferation of weapons in Africa 
threatens internal stability, it also presents an increasing threat to U.S. global security 
interests in Africa. It poses threat to commercial shipping as well as to U.S. naval vessels  
 
                                                 
133Vivien Foster, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen, and Nataliya Pushak, “Building Bridges: China’s 
Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa,” accessed August 2, 2010, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/BB_Final_Exec_summary_English_July08_W
o-Embg.pdf; and Shinn, “Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent,” 4.    
134Todd A Hofstedt, “China in Africa: An AFRICOM Response,” Naval War College Review, 
Summer 2009  62. No. 3, accessed February 11, 2010, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/China+in+Africa%3A+an+AFRICOM+response.-a0203279662. 
135Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2.  
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and allied forces operating in the Suez Canal including the waters adjoining other African 
nations. It also limits the ability to ease humanitarian sufferings in conflict-infected 
regions without risks.     
Some practices of the Chinese in Africa have also had consequences for local 
African markets, industries, and the environment. For example, while Chinese consumer 
goods have provided variety in African markets, low cost imports of cheap Chinese 
textiles have virtually shut down the growth of most uncompetitive African textile 
industries. This practice has incited protests in places like Nigeria and South Africa 
which, in 2007, prompted the South African president to warn of the danger of Africa 
becoming a Chinese colony.136 Also, in 2006, the Gabonese government suspended a 
Chinese oil firm’s operations due to unsafe environmental practices. From an African 
perspective, these practices are not particularly limited to China, but include other 
countries doing business in Africa, though arguably to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, some 
corrective measures are being applied, as evidenced by responses of African governments 
and peoples.  
G. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY CHALLENGES AND 
MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTION 
 Within the broad concept of regionalism embodies the idea of dealing with 
regional peculiarities such as regional economic development, regional cooperation, and 
integration and security.137 What, then, are the different regional actors’ perspectives on 
security challenges in Africa, and how have they responded to these challenges? Since, 
while the objectives across the region are similar, they differ in respect to capabilities. 
Accordingly, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the 
                                                 
136Hofstedt, “China in Africa: An AFRICOM Response.” 
137“Countries that are located in the same geographical area, sharing common social, cultural, 
political, and historical affinities often have some sense of neighborliness among them…, [which] leads to 
some form of mutual cooperation.”  See Joy U. Ogwu, “ECOWAS and Regional Security Challenges,” 62, 
in Hans Günter Brauch et al, Globalization and Environmental Change: Reconceptualizing Security in the 
21st Century, Hexagon Series on Human and environmental Security and Peace Vol. 3. (New York: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008), accessed July 22, 2010,  
http://www.springerlink.com/content/n430q1l61470646w/fulltext.pdf    
 53
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),138 the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC) will be 
examined, but starting with an overview of the AU. 
1. African Union 
Unable to fulfill the objectives of its founders, to promote cooperation and 
integration on the continent while addressing the multifaceted socio-economic and 
political challenges mitigating the attainment of peace, security, and stability, the 
erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU in 2002.139 
In its quest to achieve its objectives, the AU has adopted several strategic programs, such 
as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to resolve the paradox of 
poverty in the midst of abundant resources, the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) for good governance, and several structures/bodies and mechanisms to prevent 
and resolve conflicts and to fast track the process of regional integration, such as the 
establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) to serve as a permanent African 
peacekeeping force.140 
The AU explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state in 
circumstances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as provided by 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.141 Accordingly, it has been active in addressing 
various crises on the continent through the creation of AMISOM and other peacekeeping 
missions in Darfur, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Comoros.142 
                                                 
138In French it is called Communauté Économique des États D’afrique Centrale and in Portuguese, 
Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central, CEEC.  
139The AU is an intergovernmental organization of 53 countries (excluding Morocco). For the 
objectives of the AU see AU, “African Union in a Nutshell,” accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/aboutau/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm. 
140ASF is intended as a quick response force to enable Africa to deal with regional crises quickly or at 
least to contain them until a stronger international force can be deployed, as well as for mobilization in case 
of natural disaster or other emergencies. 
141African Union, “The Constitutive Act,” accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article4. 
142Jakkie Cilliers, “The African Standby Force: An update on progress,” ISS paper 160, March 2008, 
12, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER160.PDF. 
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Generally, through its various legal instruments, the AU has provided guidance to its 
member states on collective responses to matters of concerns.  
  Despite its progress so far, the AU is beset with tremendous financial and human 
resource challenges in the face of endemic poverty and the conflicts among many of its 
member states, which renders it donor dependent. Another concern is its preoccupation 
with peacekeeping with no peace to keep, rather than developing a capacity for peace-
enforcement with a mandate to disarm.143 Although the AU is a work in progress, given 
its accomplishments in its short life as well as its strong political will to act, it has the 
prospect to deliver on its commitments to peace and security when provided with 
adequate political, technical and material support from the international community.    
2. ECOWAS 
Generally, the ECOWAS region is faced with underdevelopment and is 
recovering from numerous prolonged conflicts and insurgencies within and across the 
borders of its member states, with the consequent proliferation of SALW. There is 
prevalence of malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS, as well as drug and human trafficking. As 
noted earlier, oil theft, piracy, and armed robbery at sea are also prevalent in some littoral 
states. With the exception of countries in the Sahel, Nigeria, and Senegal, West Africa 
confronts few obvious terrorist threats. However, this could be because ECOWAS has 
focused considerable attention on the full spectrum of transnational crimes, including 
conflict management and preventive issues that lead to proliferation and cross-border 
transfer of SALW.  
In addition to different measures to accelerate economic and social development, 
ECOWAS has established ‘the Mechanism’ for conflict prevention, management, 
resolution, and peacekeeping and security, which prescribes enhancement of cooperation 
in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, and control of 
cross-border criminality and international terrorism, including the proliferation of 
                                                 
143It has been argued that a preoccupation with peacekeeping doomed the Darfur peace agreement in 
2006. See John Prendergast and David Sullivan, “Irresolution: The UN Security Council on Darfur,” July 
24, 2008, accessed July 31, 2010, http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/irresolution-un-security-
council-darfur. 
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SALW.144 This Protocol provided for the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force 
(ESF) as one of the five regional commands of ASF. To its credit, many achievements 
have been recorded by ECOWAS including its interventions in Liberia (1990 and 2003), 
Sierra Leone (1997), and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.145 
While ECOWAS has recorded successes, the results have so far been sobering. 
ECOWAS has identified that its interventions have at times been characterized by weak 
internal coordination, underutilization of limited instruments, and misdirection of existing 
human capacities, including a late response to crises.146 It has also been observed that 
many of its key conventions have yet to be ratified by member states despite being 
adopted, and only a few are being implemented. For example, it is suggested that most 
member countries consider the Convention on SALW, ammunition, and other related 
materials to not be legally binding. Although progress has been made recently, its 
implementation is still hampered by a lack of resources and requisite specialists.147 
Obviously, these developments bring to the fore the wide gap between rhetoric and 
follow-through at all levels of governance, requiring the development of effective and 
durable cooperative intervention strategies.  
                                                 
144ECOWAS. “The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,” Regulation MSC/REG.1/1/08, 
accessed July 21, 2010, http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf. 
145The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Côte d’Ivoire were classic military operations designed to stop wars or monitor cease-fires, to enable peace 
negotiations and humanitarian operations, and to allow subsequent deployment of larger UN peacekeeping 
and international humanitarian missions. 
146ECOWAS, “The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,” 6. 
147Ilhan Berkol, “Analysis of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and 
recommendation for development of an action plan,” Note d’Analyse du GRIP, April 1, 2007, accessed 
March 17, 2010, http://www.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g1071en.pdf. 
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3. ECCAS 
The challenges facing member countries of ECCAS148 are similar to those in 
ECOWAS, but to a greater degree. Endemic instability has plagued the region in the last 
two decades, resulting in proliferation of SALW and large numbers of refugees as well as 
IDPs.  Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and DRC barely emerged from one of Africa’s worst 
and protracted conflicts, while CAR, Chad, and some other member states remain 
unstable or mired in cross border armed conflicts which significantly increase the 
proliferation of arms and massive human suffering. While economic underdevelopment is 
a general concern in the ECCAS region, the resolution of conflict including proliferation 
of SALW and IDPs are important considerations.149     
ECCAS was established to promote of regional economic co-operation in the 
region and raise the standard of living of its population, while the Council for Peace and 
Security in Central Africa (COPAX) was established for the promotion, maintenance, and 
consolidation of peace and security.150 The ECCAS peace and security architecture is 
similar to those of ECOWAS and SADC. It has the Central African Brigade or Force 
Multinationale de l’Afrique Central (FOMAC), which was formed in December 2004 as 
one of the five regional commands of ASF, but only recently stood-up amidst serious 
underfunding and substantial conflicts in the region. FOMAC was recently involved in 
                                                 
148ECCAS members include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Chad, Rwanda, DRC and Sao Tome and Principe. ECCAS has overlapping membership 
with the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC). Chad, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe have dual membership in ECCAS and CEMAC, 
while Angola, Burundi, DRC and Rwanda also belong to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). Angola and the DRC are also members of SADC, and Angola is also a contributing 
member to the Southern African Brigade (SADBRIG). See Sebastiene Ntahuga, “Economic Community of 
Central African States: Peace and Security Architecture,” ECCAS/CEEC Secretariat BP 2112, December 9, 
2008, accessed July 30, 2010, 
http://aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/Economic_Community_of_Central_African_States_(ECCAS)_%E2%8
0%93_Peace_and_Security_Architecture. 
149The high poverty rate and social inequality in the midst of vast mineral wealth and poor governance 
has exacerbated conflict and deepened instability, including political and economic stagnation in the 
region.   
150COPAX was formed in June 2002 with three key technical organs: the Central African Early 
Warning System (MARAC), which collects and analyzes data for the early detection and prevention of 
crises; the Defense and Security Commission (CDS), a technical planning and advisory body made up of 
chiefs of staff and Commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces of each member state; and the 
FOMAC, which comprises contingents made up of military, police, and civilians from each ECCAS 
member state. 
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the “Kwanza 2010” military exercise from May 22 to June 5, 2010.151 However, 
according to experts, there is still a lack of political will at the highest levels of ECCAS, 
partly due to the lack of a hegemon in the Central African region that can push the 
ECCAS agenda forward and take the lead in funding its operation, such as Nigeria does 
ECOWAS and South Africa does SADC. 
4. SADC  
The SADC member states152 are faced with considerable health challenges, 
transnational criminal activities such as trafficking in SALW and drugs, environmental 
disruption from floods and famine, and resource exploitation (especially in the Congo). 
However, SADC considers HIV/AIDS as its most significant security challenge as 
suggested in the statistics on HIV/AIDS prevalence and per capita expenditure; this 
exceeds other challenges in the region.153 “SADC has also designated drug trafficking as 
a ‘public security challenge,’ whereas the proliferation and trafficking of SALW is 
considered a defense and public security challenge.”154 Beyond these issues is another 
important concern about how to develop the region’s economy. 
To address some of these challenges, several protocols have been ratified, 
including the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Southern African 
region, and the SADC Protocol on Health which adopted a multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS 
strategic framework and program of actions. These measures fall under SADC’s 
objectives to achieve development and economic growth through increased regional 
                                                 
151ANGOP, “‘Kwanza 2010’ military exercises officially end today,” Angola Press, July 25, 2010, 
accessed July 25, 2010,   http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/en_us/noticias/politica/2010/5/22/Kwanza-
2010-military-exercises-officially-end-today,3c3788aa-c809-4b6e-908b-48184de589dd.html. In January 
2000, Gabon hosted a regional peacekeeping exercise. 
152Member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
153Maurizio Carbone, “Regional Integration and Development: the Challenges Facing SADC,” 
March-April 2003, accessed October 22, 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier197/en/en_003.pdf. 
154Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, “Transnational Challenges, Security Cultures and Regional 
Organizations,” End of Award Report, RES 223-25-0072, Swindon: ESRC, January 31, 2008, accessed July 




integration, including its focus on conflict mediation, preventive diplomacy, and 
peacekeeping through its Organ for Defense, Politics, and Security.155 As in other 
regions, the establishment of the SADC Standby Brigade (SADBRIG) on August 17, 
2007 is in line with AU’s mandate.156 While the regional economic development leg of 
SADC is generally well established, the political, defense and security cooperation legs 
have sadly been lacking in commitment from a number of SADC member states.     
As is apparent today, “[m]any of the participant countries … do not share, to a 
sufficient degree, a common consensus around the political values which are reflected in 
the SADC Treaty,”157 beyond the desire to ensure regime survival. It is argued that 
because of criticisms for perceived authoritarianism, intolerance, and shared beliefs about 
anti-imperialism, some member heads of states have been reluctant to support programs 
that would facilitate democracy and elections that might backfire on them. For instance, 
Swaziland is perceived to be non-democratic and Zimbabwe has been accused of being 
undemocratic in election-related practices, yet members have remained committed to 
non-interference and nonintervention. Nevertheless, factions within SADC have 
intervened in Lesotho and Congo in 1998 on invitation,158 and suspended Madagascar’s 
membership after the coup d'état led by the former mayor of Antananarivo.159 Clearly, 
the region suffers from a lack of consensus regarding the political values that the SADC 
Treaty so obviously endorses.   
                                                 
155African Union, “Profile: Southern African Development Community,” accessed on July 21, 2010, 
http://www.africa-union.org/Recs/SADCProfile.pdf.  
156SADC 2010, “Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] member states on the 
establishment of a [SADC] Standby Brigade,” September 4, 2007, accessed on July 30, 2010, 
http://www.sadc.int/archives/read/news/1114.    
157Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, “SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future 
Development,” Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa, Occasional Paper No 19, 
March 1997, accessed July 24, 2010, http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/paper_19.pdf. 
158In its military interventions in Lesotho and DRC, it is argued that SADC acted under questionable 
legal mandates, which sharply divided the population and had a limited impact on the political impasse, 
thereby prolonging the war and weakening its approach to peacemaking. See Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, 
“Regionalism into Globalization? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS Compared,” African Security 
Review Vol. 10 No. 2, 2001, accessed July 30, 2010, 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/10No2/Vannieuwkerk.html,  




The EAC160 is faced with security challenges similar to those of other regions, 
including increased burglary, hijacking, poaching in the game parks, banditry/robbery, 
and cattle rustling in the rural areas. In the last two decades, the most serious challenge 
was from intra-state conflicts compounded by poor governance, unemployment and 
underdevelopment.161 Although these issues are still relevant today, according to EAC 
Secretary General Juma Mwapachu, the current most important security challenges are 
piracy and terrorism.162 Additionally, the Secretary General notes that the region, and 
Kenya and Tanzania in particular, are emerging as major drug trafficking routes.  
 Although its priority is economic cooperation, the EAC plays a role in enhancing 
regional stability. It has put in place an institutional framework to provide direction and 
guidance for cooperation in areas of defense, inter-state security, as well as foreign policy 
formulation so as to enhance peace, security, and governance initiatives in line with the 
dictates of the Treaty establishing the EAC. In particular, the EAC is in the process of 
creating its own standby force that will work parallel to the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) and the East African Standby Brigade (EASTBRIG). The 
EASTBRIG was meant to have about 15 member states: Kenya, Eritrea, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Djibouti, Comoros, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Madagascar, Seychelles, 
Uganda, and Mauritius, but it currently has 10 member countries because Tanzania, 
Mauritius, and Madagascar, who had previously been members, are now active in 
SADC.163   
                                                 
160The EAC comprise the five east African countries of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Kenya. See Kapyas Kipkore, “EAC Institutional Arrangements in Relation to the TBPA Process,” accessed 
July 22, 2010, 
http://www.tbpa.net/workshops/InWent/Febr2003%20Mweka%20Workshop/Mweka%204.1.pdf.  
161Beatrice B. Kiraso, “EAC Integration Process and the enabling Peace and Security Architecture,” 
A paper presented by the Deputy Secretary General, East African Community at the EAC Peace and 
Security Conference - Kampala, Uganda, October 5, 2009.  
162Africa Business, “EAC Secretariat Condemns Kampala Bombing,” accessed July 22, 2010, 
http://africabusiness.com/2010/07/16/eac-secretariat-condemn-kampala-bombing/. 
163Fred Oluoch, “EA Standby Force to be ‘Operational’ by Nov,” The East African, March 21, 2009, 
accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/549050/-/item/1/-/9aglyv/-
/index.html. 
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To add to the complexity of divisions in this region is the fact that members of 
EASTBRIG belong to different economic blocks:  EAC - 3 members, IGAD164 – 7 
members, and the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) – 13 
members. These divisions, including an overlap in activities, are already presenting 
problems as a result of the unwillingness or inability of some members to contribute to 
EASTBRIG and at the same time meet their obligations to other regional groups. For 
example, “[n]on-IGAD members do not want to contribute to EASTBRIG, so the three 
EAC states, Ethiopia, and Rwanda are the only contributors.”165 In addition to a lack of 
an all-encompassing composition of all members from the region, especially with regards 
to funding, is the lack of cooperation between two very important states, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, as well as daunting challenges posed by the ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Eritrea, 
and Somalia.   
H. AFRICA’S MILITARY 
 The military in most African countries consists of an army, navy and air force. 
The military is typically relatively small in relation to each country’s population or by 
global standards and, arguably, is above average in terms of funding and level of 
professionalism. The armies are generally better funded, equipped, and thus more 
targeted for professionalization than the other services, not only because of the 
overwhelming reliance on the army for both internal and international deployments, but 
due to armies being historically highly politicized. Currently, most of Africa’s militaries 
are undergoing transformations aimed primarily at fostering greater efficiency and 
professionalism.     
                                                 
164IGAD was created in 1996 for development and drought control in the region and consists of 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea. See Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), “Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD),’” accessed July 31, 2010, 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/igad.htm. The organization as a regional body has often consulted 
on defense matters, the most recent being the defense chief’s plan of action to deploy about 2,000 
peacekeepers to Somalia. See Tesfa–Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia: IGAD Defense Chiefs Consult Somalia Action 
Plan,” Sudan Tribune, July 23, 2010, accessed July 31, 2010, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35738. 
165Stephen Burgess, “Africa and the North-South Divide,” paper presented at the annual meeting of 




Generally, most African armies maintain a presence in the country’s regions that 
corresponds to national administrative areas to assist civilian authorities suppress 
insurrection and restore order, and to protect the country’s territorial integrity against 
external threats as well as support international deployments for peacekeeping. In most 
countries, if not all, the army is by African standards relatively well-funded and well-
equipped, and has developed useful combat expertise through various interventions, 
including multinational military training and exercises. Regardless of relative power and 
experience, almost all the armies in Africa have participated in peace support operations 
and/or other regional tasks. Yet, without exception, their effectiveness in both internal 
and external military commitments has been limited by relatively low funding, including 
ageing, unserviceable, and inappropriate mixes of equipment (as can be seen in the 
equipment holdings listed in Appendix 2). While there is manpower available, the 
inability of African countries to indigenously produce or externally procure adequate 
equipment for their armies limits some countries’ commitment to regional and 
international peace support operations.  
2. Navies 
The roles and capabilities of navies are generally defined in terms of their 
military, policing, and diplomatic functions. The first two functions, especially maritime 
policing, otherwise called coast guard duties, are principally concerned with maritime 
law enforcement and protection of socio-economic activities. Given the predominance of 
maritime security challenges and the demand for policing capabilities, it is apparent from 
the collated data on African navies summarized in Appendix 2, that many African navies 
lack effective capacity for policing duties. Exercising effective and sustained security 
over a vast maritime domain is a daunting challenge for the littoral states. For instance, 
using a quantitative coverage index of the total number of naval vessels, including 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) per length of coastline, only a few countries, such as 
Mauritius, DRC, Cameroon, Djibouti, Eritrea, Nigeria and Gambia, can provide coverage 
of at least one vessel for every 10 n miles length of coastline. The acute policing 
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deficiencies become more glaring when examined in relation to the totality of each 
country’s maritime area (using 12 n miles territorial sea and 200 n miles EEZ limits). In 
qualitative terms, the coverage estimates are expected to be much lower, considering age, 
endurance, and maintenance factors.  
Furthermore, in looking at the inventory of acquisitions within the past 10 years, 
only a few countries like Algeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius and 
Djibouti have demonstrated fairly significant acquisition priorities towards policing 
capability.166 Despite their acquisitions, only three of the littoral countries can provide a 
vessel for every 1,500 square (sq) n miles coverage of their maritime area (see Appendix 
2). The ongoing efforts by sub-regional leaders towards collective maritime security (for 
example, the GoG Commission) represent an important sub-regional focus. However, 
good intentions are being limited by many factors, including weak infrastructure, poor 
resource bases, and limited Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) across Africa.167     
3. Air Forces 
Generally, African air forces like the navies, are much worse off than its armies. 
The air forces also suffer from obsolete or ageing equipment, lack of training, and 
underutilization. Aside from the air forces in a few countries like Nigeria, Libya, and 
Ethiopia, none have made contributions to UN or African peace support operations 
(except as observers) and are not known to have participated in any major training 
exercises, either at the national or multinational levels. Nevertheless, some countries like 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana have demonstrable air force capabilities. From 
the collated data on African air forces summarized in Appendix 2, it is apparent that  
 
                                                 
166Between the seventies and eighties, a few navies, such as those of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, 
Nigeria and South Africa acquired limited offensive and out-of-area capabilities, but this tempo had since 
abated. With the exception of the South African Navy, African navies have not achieved significant 
renewal of credible military capabilities. Rather, recent acquisitions reflect dwindling funding and 
dependence on external support. 
167Basic maritime infrastructure such as surveillance systems, and maritime patrol craft to include 
those trained to use them are either lacking, obsolete, in need of repair, upgrading or replacement. Most 
African countries have always been dependent on foreign sources for equipment, spare parts, and training.  
Obviously, these factors largely restrict remote surveillance and crime detection within the fringes of 
territorial waters.  
 63
majority are now operating a small number of ageing (combat and non-combat) aircraft, 
with much emphasis placed on basic transport and utility operations for very important 
persons and in support of small ground forces.    
The undesirable situation of the air forces can be illustrated by the fact that some 
countries like Burkina Faso have assumed several paramilitary subsidiary roles, such as 
providing charter air services to private customers and engaging in rain-seeding 
operations rather than conducting their core statutory roles. It has been argued that 
because of the land-centric approach to security on the continent, the majority of littoral 
states have systematically neglected providing their air forces with maritime capable 
aircraft to support maritime operations. 
Obviously, the attainment of effective security at the regional and sub-regional 
levels is necessarily predicated on having the required capabilities, including efficient 
coordination and appropriate procedures at the national levels. This requires the political 
will to see militaries revitalized in terms of professionalism and adequate logistics 
support for sustained operations, including the development of common operating 
procedures and information sharing networks among individual services and militaries 





about 14.7 percent of the world’s population with potential to at least double between 
now and 2050, including its multiplicity of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions 
spread across 54 countries. The challenge posed by worsening unemployment, especially 
with the growing number of unemployed youths amidst rural-urban migration and 
difficulties projecting government authority as a result of inhospitable political 
geographies also illustrate the complexity, uncertainty, and perhaps even hostility of the 
African environment. 
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In addition to the above, this chapter identified terrorism/violent extremism, 
trafficking in persons, drugs, and SALW, including maritime challenges, as some of the 
transnational security challenges in Africa. It was suggested that Africa’s vast 
ungoverned areas including areas where state capacity or the political will to exercise 
control is lacking, offers sanctuary to Islamic extremists and militant groups to recruit, 
train, and mount operations. These activities are evidenced in the actions of AQIM and al 
Shabaab in Somalia. The absence of effective policing capabilities have also raised 
concerns for the littoral countries in the GoG, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the waters off 
the coast of Somalia, which are among the worst in terms of piracy, armed robbery at sea, 
IUU, and illegal trafficking in drugs and SALW. Nigeria is particularly impacted by oil 
theft and oil infrastructure sabotage. Unfortunately, all of these challenges have 
implications far beyond the immediate littoral countries.   
Africa remains the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and this has been 
compounded by inadequate human resource capacity and laboratories, limited drug 
supplies, weak healthcare infrastructure, and limited public financing. Africa’s militaries 
are also considered to be among the HIV/AIDS pandemic high risk population group. 
The consequences for HIV/AIDS in the military are its impact on vulnerable groups in 
conflict areas where peacekeeping forces deploy, financial constraints on military 
budgets, and limitations to readiness/availability of forces for peacekeeping operations.  
Although several reasons have been adduced for the causes of wars and conflicts, 
this chapter identified the legacy of colonial rule as one of the enduring causes of 
conflicts in Africa. The scars of misrule by colonialists are still visible judging from the 
nature of conflicts that are fought along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. The involvement 
of  international actors in Africa for development and assistance to mitigate the 
challenges found in Africa also have their unintended consequences as suggested in 
China’s support to some countries alleged to be undemocratic and, perhaps, in pursuit of 
its national interests.   
The perceptions of Africans about the challenges and opportunities on the 
continent vary across regions and individual countries. As for the AU, its concerns range 
from challenges in individual countries to the readiness of the ASF to support 
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peacekeeping efforts. ECOWAS, like the other regional organizations faces several 
challenges, such as: malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS; trafficking in SALW, drugs and 
persons; and oil theft, piracy and armed robbery at sea in some littoral countries. ECCAS 
has, in the last two decades, been unstable due to conflicts and, consequently, is faced 
with problems of proliferation of SALW, IDPs, and refugees, in addition to enduring 
poverty in many areas. SADC considers HIV/AIDS as the most significant security 
challenge, in addition to drug trafficking and proliferation and trafficking of SALW. The 
region also suffers from a lack of consensus regarding political values beyond the desire 
to ensure regime survival. Countries like Swaziland and Zimbabwe are perceived to be 
non-democratic, yet members have remained committed to non-interference and 
nonintervention in some instances. The EAC is faced with similar challenges, with the 
most prominent being piracy and terrorism.  Another major challenge is considered to be 
the complexities arising from the proliferation of different economic and security 
arrangements that results in unwillingness or inability of members to meet their 
obligations.  
The military is generally viewed as a unifying entity for most African nations. 
Although the armies are considered to be better trained and supported than their sister 
services, the navy and air force, they are all generally underfunded and ill equipped to 
appropriately respond to the growing challenges on the continent. Sadly, it could be 
argued that most African militaries largely rely on non-African nations to develop their 
capabilities, including multinational interoperability. Like other assistance rendered by 
many foreign nations, the U.S. through AFRICOM and other agencies has partnered with 
African countries on several initiatives in support of its objectives. It is suggested that the 
ongoing U.S. efforts would see Africa’s militaries better trained, equipped, and prepared 
to meet Africa’s security needs, as well as to participate more easily in regional and 
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IV. AFRICOM’S INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work 
with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to 
the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not 
limited to those inspired by violent extremism, [among other security 
challenges], threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left 
unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to 
the United States, [its] allies, and friends. 
 
                                                                —2008 National Defense Strategy168 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the multi-dimensional influences of the external environment on 
AFRICOM, identified in Chapter III, are of strategic concern to the U.S.: Africa’s 
population explosion and unemployment; transnational challenges, such as violent 
extremism, and threats posed by ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and 
contested areas; armed conflicts; and HIV/AIDS. Although other elements exist in 
AFRICOM’s external environment, the U.S. agencies discussed in this chapter play a 
central role in the U.S.’s whole-of-government approach. These U.S. agencies exist in the 
task environment with which AFRICOM interacts on a fairly regular basis.   
This chapter primarily examines the internal environment of AFRICOM – the 
focal organization of this study. AFRICOM was created to assume responsibility from 
the three COCOMs previously engaged on the continent with the aim of providing a more 
strategic, holistic focus for all DoD activities that address U.S. interests on the 
continent.169 AFRICOM’s area of responsibility covers 53 African countries, and does 
not include Egypt, which falls under CENTCOM. Unlike the three COCOMs, AFRICOM 
integrates other U.S. agencies into the structure of its Command headquarters in critical 
leadership and decision-making positions. Its activities also represent a shift from the 
                                                 




traditional war fighting to nontraditional mil-to-mil crisis prevention programs in 
collaboration with other U.S. agencies to strengthen capabilities of African partners and 
bring peace and stability to the continent.170   
Since AFRICOM’s nontraditional activities required collaboration with other U.S. 
agencies to achieve DoD objectives on the African continent, its intra-agency and 
interagency relationships to include the overall impact of its efforts, cannot be established 
without knowing something about the programs and activities of the partner U.S. 
agencies, as well as overall U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Africa. Hence, this 
chapter discusses U.S. foreign policy and programs toward Africa, and the main U.S. 
implementing agencies, before examining AFRICOM’s internal processes, such as its 
mission, strategy, and resourcing. Finally, this chapter highlights the transformations and 
outputs produced by AFRICOM.   
B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROGRAMS TOWARD AFRICA   
For too many years, Africa in the minds of many Americans has been 
regarded as a remote and mysterious continent which was the special 
province of the big game hunters, explorers and motion picture makers... 
There must be a corresponding realization throughout the executive 
branches of government, throughout the congress and throughout the 
Nation, of the growing importance of Africa to the future of the United 
States and the Free World and the necessity of assigning higher priority to 
our relations with the area.  
 
—Vice President Richard M. Nixon, speech after returning 
from a twenty-two-day tour of African continent in 1957171 
Recognizing the growing importance of Africa on the international scene, 
especially beginning with the Cold War era, several U.S. administrations embarked on 
bold policies and foreign assistance initiatives for Africa, although with limited interest 
                                                 
170Milady Ortiz, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking,” The Institute of Land Warfare 
National Security Watch NSW 08-1, March 13, 2008, accessed March 23, 2010, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AUSA_AFRICOM_newwayofthinking.pdf. 
171Arthur M. Schlisinger, Jr., Dynamics of World Power, A Documentary of United States Foreign 
Policy 1945-1973, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers in association with McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1973), 580. 
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focused on specific African issues until recently.172 Current U.S. foreign policy priorities 
for Africa include the following areas of U.S. national interests: 
1. Security Assistance and Capacity Building 
‘Security assistance and capacity building’ is one of six U.S. policy priorities for 
Africa. It is geared toward providing security assistance and advisors to help end armed 
conflict and secure the objective of a peaceful African continent. The USG works closely 
with African partners to build capacities, not only at the level of the AU, but at the sub-
regional and individual states levels as well. Programs include: the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the East Africa Counterterrorism 
Initiative (EACTI), Africa Partnership Station (APS), as well as equipment and logistics 
support.173   
2. Building Strong and Stable Democratic African Governments 
The U.S. is engaged in development assistance intended to strengthen the capacity 
of governments on the continent to govern justly and promote the consolidation of 
democratic systems and practices toward enhancing stability. In this regard, the U.S. 
works with African partners, the international community, and civil societies in critical 
areas of good governance and accountability to control corruption, protect civil rights, 
and strengthen the rule of law.174 It also undertakes supportive efforts in African regions 
                                                 
172In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policies towards Africa were geared to stem Soviet expansion or 
maintain strategic balance.  See. Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: 
Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.  For more insight 
into the history of U.S. foreign policy relationship with Africa, see Peter J. Schraeder; and Donald S. 
Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review Vol. 21 No. 1 (Winter-Spring 
2001), 179–211.  
173Philip Carter, III, “US Policy in Africa in the 21st Century,” African Centre for Strategic Studies, 
Washington D.C, February 9, 2009, accessed September 23, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326.htm. 
174Carter, III, “US Policy in Africa in the 21st Century”; and Johnnie Carson, “U.S.-Africa Policy 
Under the Obama Administration,” Harvard University Africa Focus Program, (Washington, D.C.: April 
5, 2010), accessed August 26, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/139462.htm.  
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that have a minimal government presence.175 Some of the programs include training and 
support in democracy and governance for elected officials, as well as civil-military 
relations programs for both civilian and military personnel. 
3. Supporting Socio-Economic Growth and Development 
The U.S. works with African partners and the international community for the 
promotion and advancement of broad-based and sustainable fiscal and market-led 
economic development and growth on the continent.176 The U.S makes target 
investments, stimulates private sector development, focuses on suitable trade policy and 
fiscal reforms key to development, and reduces entry barriers for businesses in order to 
increase competitiveness and integrate African nations into the global economy. Other 
socio-economic activities include agricultural and educational assistance and capacity 
building programs that focus on science and technology advances to reduce poverty and 
hunger, infrastructure construction, small enterprise loans, and credit guarantees.177 Some 
of the relevant programs include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
Global Hunger and Food Security Initiatives ($3.5 billion food security initiative, Feed 
the Future), and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).178  
                                                 
175USAID Sub-Saharan Africa, “Overview of U.S Foreign Assistance to Africa,” July 9, 2010, 
accessed September 23, 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/; and U.S. GAO, 
“Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership,” Report GAO-08-860, July 31, 2008, accessed August 26, 2010, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf. 
176Carter III, “US Policy in Africa in the 21st Century”; and Carson, “U.S.-Africa Policy Under the 
Obama Administration.” 
177USAID, “USAID Primers: What Do We Do and How We Do it,” February 3, 2009, accessed 
September 23, 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html. 
178The MCC was established in early 2004 to concentrate U.S. resources in low-income countries that 
have demonstrated a strong commitment to political, economic, and social reforms. The fund aims to 
support the best performers to accelerate economic growth and lower the poverty level of the people. See 
Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service report 98-916, April 15, 2004, accessed July 8, 2010, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf.  
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4. Strengthening Public Health 
The USG is committed to solving health challenges on the African continent by 
working with African governments, civil society, and the international community to 
ensure that quality treatment, prevention, and care are easily accessible to communities 
throughout Africa. In addition, the U.S. invests significantly in public health 
infrastructure and the training of medical professionals through programs under the 
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), and the Global Health Initiative (GHIS).179   
5. Transnational Challenges 
A priority for the U.S. in Africa is to address transnational challenges by 
bolstering African maritime security through the APS; supporting the fight against 
violent extremism through programs under the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of 
Africa (CJTF-HOA), TSCTP and EACTI; and meet the challenges posed by narcotics 
trafficking, and trafficking in persons and SALW. The U.S. also seeks to meet the 
challenges of climatic change and building sustainable clean-energy.   
6. Humanitarian Assistance 
The U.S. also seeks to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises across the 
African continent as one of its Africa policy priority focuses. As a preventive strategy, 
the U.S. works with various African stakeholders to raise awareness and to support 
improved disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response capacity. The response 
strategies include emergency relief and rehabilitation with programs such as Foreign 
                                                 
179GHI is a U.S. government six-year, $63 billion initiative to meet public health challenges 
throughout the world.  Its particular focus is on improving the health of women, newborns, and children 
through programs that target infectious disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis), nutrition, maternal 
and child health, and safe water, which are closely related to several Millennium Development Goals. See 
The White House, “The U.S. President's Engagement in Africa,” accessed 20 August, 2010, 
www.africom.mil. 
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Disaster Assistance (FDA), Food for Peace, and Ocean Freight Reimbursement.180 This 
long time U.S. humanitarian effort has been supported by several international 
governmental and non-governmental actors. 
C. PRIMARY ACTORS IN U.S.-AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY AND 
PROGRAMS 
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa have long been carried out by multiple 
U.S. government agencies. The primary actors are DoS; USAID; DoD; and country 
ambassadors. Other agencies include: Departments of Health and Human Services; 
Justice; Treasury; Energy; Commerce; Agriculture; Homeland Security (DHS); Trade 
and Development Agency (TDA); National Institute for Health (NIH); Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC); and Millennium Challenge Corporation.181 The three main 
agencies of DoD, DoS, and USAID represent defense, diplomacy, and development 
which, according to the National Security Policy, comprise three key elements of the U.S. 
foreign policy apparatus. DoS oversees several programs that relate to democracy 
promotion, narcotics control and international law enforcement, terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, and non-UN peacekeeping operations, including oversight of PEPFAR 
through the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. “USAID is responsible for most of the 
bilateral development assistance, including economic growth, global health, and 
democracy programs, [and] Title II of P.L. 480 food assistance….”182 DoD is responsible 
for foreign military financing and training programs, support for international 
peacekeeping operations, healthcare, and humanitarian assistance, among others.   
                                                 
180USAID Sub-Saharan Africa, “Overview of U.S. Foreign Assistance to Africa,” July 19, 2010, 
accessed September 23, 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/. For details on U.S. 
humanitarian assistance programs see USAID, “Humanitarian Assistance,” February 09, 2009, accessed 
September 23, 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/.  
181Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, “Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination,” 
Congressional Research Service Report Number R40756, August 7, 2009, accessed July 8, 2010, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40756.pdf.   
182For more information on U.S. agencies and their foreign related assistance programs/activities see 
Lawson and Epstein, “Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination,” 21-22.  
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These programs are mostly bilateral in nature (country specific) rather than 
multilateral (combined with contributions from other donors). Individual agencies are 
largely responsible for bilateral programs, which often have considerable overlap. The 
multilateral programs are also intended to accomplish many of the same objectives as the 
bilateral assistance, although through different channels. Although all programs are under 
the policy guidance of DoS and, in some cases, under its direct authority,183 the diverse 
and sometimes related objectives of the many implementing aid agencies operating 
within the African environment raises questions about whether these agencies are 
working at cross-purposes or duplicating each others’ work.184    
As the establishment responsible for all DoD activities on the African continent, 
AFRICOM focuses its efforts toward the attainment of overall U.S. foreign policy 
objectives in Africa. This new concept dates back two years since AFRICOM took full 
responsibility for existing U.S. missions on the continent, and thus remains a work in 
progress. However, since the purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which the 
Command is aligned with various elements it is interacting with, it will be necessary to 
examine different variables such as its mission, structure, and its range of activities as 
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
D. AFRICOM MISSION/OBJECTIVES 
United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government 
agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security 
engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored 
activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and 
secure African environment in support of US foreign policy. 
             
             —Mission statement approved by the Secretary of Defense May 2008185 
 
                                                 
183At the country level, the Ambassador exercises full responsibility for security, coordination and 
supervision of all USG executive branch employees, including personnel permanently assigned to 
embassies, such as Defense Attaches and Security Assistance Officers. See GAO-08-860, 23. 
184Lawson and Epstein, “Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination.” 
185AFRICOM. “About U.S. Africa Command,” accessed May 24, 2010, 
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.  
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“Between February 2007 and May 2008 AFRICOM’s mission statement went 
through several iterations that ranged in its emphasis on humanitarian-oriented activities 
to more traditional military programs.”186 Arguably, these changes were as a result of 
concerns raised that AFRICOM would engage in activities that are traditionally the 
mission of civilian agencies and NGOs, including assuming leadership over directing all 
USG efforts, as well as concerns about militarization of U.S. foreign policy. So far, the 
current mission has stood the test of time. 
AFRICOM’s primary objective in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and 
national security objectives is to create, sustain, and support opportunities to assist 
African partners in their efforts to build enduring security capacity to prevent or mitigate 
the effects and costs associated with instability, conflict, transnational threats, and 
humanitarian disasters.187  Specifically, AFRICOM’s  theater strategic objectives are to: 
(1) defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations and its associated networks; (2) ensure 
peace operations capacity exists and continental peace support operations effectively 
fulfill mission requirements; (3) cooperate with identified African states in the creation of 
an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and expertise; (4) improve security sector 
governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, 
and enduring USG efforts in designated states; and (5) protect populations from deadly 
contagions.188 
The pursuit of these objectives “support efforts to consolidate democratic 
principles and good governance by fostering transparency and accountability in the 
military, which historically has been one of the most important institutions in modern  
 
 
                                                 
186GAO-08-947T, 15. 
187AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander, “March 17-18, 2009, 10, accessed February 19, 2010, 
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf. 
188The 2010 AFRICOM posture statement outlined four defense-oriented goals, which are similar to 
the 2009 objectives.  See AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command.”  
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African societies.”189 It is suggested that when these objectives are realized, it will enable 
the U.S. to engage its forces elsewhere. To accomplish these objectives, AFRICOM 
employs several strategies.   
E. AFRICOM STRATEGY 
  The overall strategy of AFRICOM is based on “active security” or “persistent 
and sustained security engagement.” This strategy emphasizes long-term capacity 
building of partners at theater, regional, and state levels, with a primary focus on conflict 
and crisis prevention rather than reaction.190 This serves the interests of the U.S., the 
African partners, and other U.S. allies. To that end, AFRICOM’s strategy does not only 
focus on cooperation with the African partners, but also focuses on collaborative 
engagement with other international stakeholders and non-governmental organizations 
within its operating environment, such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and France; and provides support to broader national efforts, in coordination 
with U.S. interagency partners such as DoS and USAID. The interagency coordination is 
built into the Command’s structure, which is critical to maximizing the effectiveness of 
AFRCOM’s capacity building in different locations on the continent.    
F. AFRICOM’S LOCATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
As earlier stated, AFRICOM’s area of responsibility covers all of Africa except 
Egypt - about 53 countries. Yet, while some administrative and operational components 
of the Command are located on the African continent, the headquarters of the Command, 
including its service components, are located elsewhere around the world.  
1. Location 
AFRICOM is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and has a small U.S. military 
and civilian presence in various African countries, including Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, 
which houses CJTF-HOA which provides support for U.S. military operations in the Gulf 
                                                 
189AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command.”    
190AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 40.  
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of Aden and Yemen;191 DoD personnel assigned as senior defense officials/defense 
attachés (SDO/DATT) to U.S. Embassies and diplomatic missions to coordinate DoD 
programs supporting U.S. diplomacy; as well as Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs) 
or Security Assistance Offices (SAO) in many African countries, which report to the 
ambassador and COCOM to strengthen existing mil-to-mil relationships.192 AFRICOM 
also has military liaison offices (LNOs) at the headquarters of the AU in Ethiopia, and 
ECOWAS in Nigeria, as well as at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana. “[AFRICOM] also has access to a number of air bases and 
ports in Africa and has established [bare-bones] facilities [which DoD refers to as 
Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs)], maintained by local troops in several 
















Figure 7.   From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM’s Locations in Africa194 
                                                 
191Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in 
Africa,” Congress Research Service Report for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2010), accessed 
September 7, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf. 
192U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, “FACT SHEET: United States Africa Command,” October 
18, 2008, accessed September 27, 2010, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.  
193For more on AFRICOM’s Cooperative Security Locations see Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. 
Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 9. 
194Mike Snodgrass, “USAFRICOM Command Brief,” 2008, accessed April 3, 2010, 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/50846934/USAFRICOM-Command-Brief.  
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While the decision on AFRICOM’s final headquarters location has been 
postponed to 2012, AFRICOM has expanded its footprint on the continent and is making 
additional efforts to establish new offices including four new OSCs in Cameroon, Chad, 
Libya, and Rwanda.195 Therefore, it could be argued that AFRICOM’s footprint on the 
continent including the location of its headquarters is still an ongoing developmental 
process. Obviously, the ongoing expansion will also impact the Command’s structure.   
2. Organizational Structure 
As earlier noted, from inception, AFRICOM was structured with a greater 
interagency involvement and coordination with the DoS, USAID, and other government 
agencies, including a larger non-DoD civilian staff, than has been traditional with other 
COCOM’s.196 The organizational structure in Figure 8 establishes the chain of command 
from which information and decision making flows, and also indicates the flow of tasking 
and operational control to the Commander.   
Below the position of the AFRICOM Commander, are the Deputies to the 
Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) and for Military Operations (DCMO). 
The DCMA is a non-DoD civilian (a Senior Foreign Service Officer) who directs 
AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs in support of other U.S. agencies’ 
activities, including policy development, resourcing, program assessment, and 
implementation of various security cooperation initiatives consistent with U.S. foreign 
policy objectives. The DCMO is the DCMA’s military equivalent, responsible for the 
implementation and execution of the command’s military-to-military programs and 
operations. While both Deputies exercise supervisory authority for the civilian and 
military personnel in their respective offices, the DCMO will also exercise command 
                                                 
195Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 9 
and 13. 
196Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 7. 
SOUTHCOM, like AFRICOM, also supervises programs that are non-combat related.   
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authority in the Commander’s absence.197 Further down the hierarchy of the 
organizational structure are the levels of authority and tasking of other personnel 
including seven Directors who oversee various departments of the command. 
 
Figure 8.   From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM Headquarters  
Organizational Structure198 
Other AFRICOM subordinate elements not shown in Figure 8 comprise four 
service component commands: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) located in Vicenza, Italy; 
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) in Naples, Italy; U.S. Air Forces, Africa 
(AFAFRICA) in Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa 
(MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany; as well as one sub-unified functional command, 
                                                 
197AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, “AFRICOM on New Co-deputies of U.S. Africa Command,” 
October 29, 2007, accessed September 28, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2007/October/20071029124738SztiwomoD0.5084345.html; and Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: 
U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” October 2, 2009, 8, accessed May 14, 
2010, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34003_20091002.pdf.  
198Snodgrass, “USAFRICOM Command Brief.” 
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U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA); and the CJTF-HOA.199 
These elements contribute to AFRICOM’s mission through bilateral and multilateral 
application of the full spectrum of their forces capabilities, including civil affairs, 
information operations, crisis response, campaign planning, and conduct of Theater 
Security Cooperation (TSC) activities, among others.200   
Perhaps, in line with its unique organizational structure, AFRICOM’s decision 
making and coordination mechanisms are based on variations of simple, divisional, 
professional, and adhocracy configurations of diverse elements (some of which are 
permanent, standing, on-call, or ad hoc) at different levels of the structure. For example, 
the direct supervision and strategic guidance provided by the commander depicts a simple 
configuration at the AFRICOM headquarters level. The divisional configuration is 
depicted in the arrangement of the service components, including SOCAFRICA, CJTF-
HOA, and other elements that are semiautonomous with the AFRICOM Commander 
exercising operational control over their activities through their individual 
commanders.201 These components execute their functions based on their expertise and 
in line with standard operating procedures (SOPs). Professional configuration is 
expressed by DoD health professionals who rely on their skills for coordination. As for 
adhocracy, the Civil Affairs assets work in a highly flexible way in meeting new and 
rapidly changing reconstruction projects to match the desires of host nations. Despite 
these configurations and coordination mechanisms, the U.S. Ambassador exercises 
overall leadership and authority, including providing some resources in terms of 
manpower and funding for the implementation of AFRICOM’s activities in each of the 
partner countries.   
                                                 
199AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 32-36; and AFRICOM, 
“United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM 
Commander,” 31–33.   
200For more information on the tasking for each service component see AFRICOM, “2010 Posture 
Statement United States Africa Command,” 32-36; and AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 
Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM Commander,” 31–33.  
201AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 31. 
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G. RESOURCING AFRICOM 
1. Manpower 
A U.S. GAO report indicates that as of July 2010, AFRICOM and its service 
components had about 4,400 assigned personnel and forces. About 2,400 of these 
personnel were based in Europe, and the remaining 2,000 personnel (400 staff and 1,600 
forces) were assigned to CJTF HOA in Djibouti. In addition, AFRICOM estimates 
between 3,500 to 5,000 rotational forces deploy on the continent during a major 
exercise.202 In essence, AFRICOM, including the service components, has no assigned 
forces, but relies on the Global Force Management (GFM) and Request for Forces 
System (RFS) administered by DoD for any additional forces.203 General Ward notes that 
between 80 and 85 percent of requests for forces are being satisfied by DoD, which is 
commensurate with what happens in other COCOMs.204 He has acknowledged that 
because AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces to complement the shortfall, its 
operations are affected to some extent.   
2. Funding 
The funding allocation for AFRICOM has increased exponentially, but budget 
cuts have impacted some programs.  AFRICOM’s start-up cost was about $50 million in 
                                                 
202GAO-10-794, 4, and  Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. 
Military in Africa.” Ploch notes that as of January 2010, AFRICOM headquarters had 1,140 of the 1,300 
staff projected for the Command while its four service components had about 1,300 (However, AFRICOM 
reports that as at September 1, 2009, more than 1,200 have been assigned to the Command headquarters).  
Some of the exercises necessitating the rotation of U.S. military include the annual communications 
interoperability exercise African Endeavor; counterterrorism operations, such as the OES-TS; TSC 
activities such as APS; and various conferences and meetings. See Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic 
Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 12. The USG also contracts out military functions, 
such as the training of peacekeeping forces to private military contractors (PMCs) who are answerable only 
to the host country ambassadors. See Stephen Roblin, “AFRICOM: Washington’s New Imperial Weapon,” 
September 2010, accessed October 3, 2010, http://www.zcommunications.org/africom-washingtons-new-
imperial-weapon-by-stephen-roblin. 
203AKO, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress,” March 9, 
2010, accessed October 7, 2010, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/09/35595-africom-posture-statement-
ward-reports-annual-testimony-to-congress/.  
204AKO, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress.”   
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Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, $75.5 million in FY 2008, and $310 million for FY 2009.205 For 
FY 2010, DoD’s budget for AFRICOM is approximately $295.5 million, excluding 
approximately $80 million funding allocation to CJTF-HOA operations (classified as 
Overseas Contingency Operations), funded through emergency supplementary 
appropriations. AFRICOM’s funding for FY 2010 covers both existing and new 
activities, including funding for four new OSCs.206 However, it is suggested that budget 
cuts to some activities such as cuts to AFRICOM’s counternarcotics operations and the 
COCOM’s Information Operations, which affected the budget for AFRICOM’s 
Operation Objective Voice (OOV), has had a potential impact on the accomplishment of 
AFRICOM’s tasks.   
H. CULTURE 
 As earlier noted in Chapter I, the authors were unable to interview any staff of 
AFRICOM, hence did not assess the culture of the Command. Despite the fact that the 
authors are also in the military, a determination as to the interplay between AFRICOM’s 
culture and its external environment could not be made due to the deeper levels of an 
organizations’ culture that is somewhat hidden. 
I. TASKS AND TECHNOLOGY 
As earlier noted, when AFRICOM became fully operational on September 30, 
2008, it inherited the DoD programs and activities in Africa that had previously been 
shared by its predecessors. However, the programs and activities represent a shift from 
traditional war fighting toward building the security capacity of partner African militaries 
to provide security for their own countries and the continent as a whole, which furthers 
U.S. foreign policy objectives. These programs and activities include U.S. support to 
                                                 
205AFRICOM Public Affairs. “Fact Sheet: United States Africa Command.” 
206 For FY 2009 budget request, DoD sought funding for the establishment of between two to five 
regional offices, but the plans were postponed and funding cut by Congress. See U.S. DoD, “U.S. 
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification,” February 4, 2008, 
accessed September 30, 2010, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/FY2009_Budget_Request_Justification.pdf. For more 
information on funding allocations to various activities and programs see Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: 
U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 12–14.  
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countering transnational and extremist threats, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-
Sahara (OEF-TS), CJTF-HOA, and OOV; Africa Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance (ACOTA) under the GPOI; building maritime security capacity through the 
APS; IMET; Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
programs; HIV/AIDS programs, and Humanitarian Assistance (HA).207 
Some technologies used as integration mechanisms are: controlling management 
systems (communication systems that connect DoD to DoS and other USG agencies), 
performance measurement systems for evaluations, resource allocation procedures used 
to request for forces, and fiscal responsibility processes for contracting office. Other 
technologies used for its Information Operations including website initiatives such as 
Maghrebia.com and the AFRICOM’s OOV to counter extremist messaging. 
J. TRANSFORMATIONS AND OUTPUTS IMPLEMENTED BY AFRICOM 
AFRICOM’s use of resources, including transformation processes and outputs, 
are impressive, but may have misalignments. Perhaps the resources may be insufficient 
for the desired execution or the frequency and intended services may be inadequate or not 
delivered as designed.  The succeeding paragraphs explain how AFRICOM transforms its 
resources into outputs.   
In its efforts to plan and implement the wide range of programs and activities 
from its widely dispersed geographical locations, AFRICOM applies various resources in 
coordination with other U.S. agencies, its African partners, and other international 
stakeholders. Although AFRICOM executes several important programs and activities on 
the African continent, six bilateral programs and activities as well as some regional ones 
were selected for analysis to determine how various inputs have been or are being 
transformed into outputs. These include programs and activities to prevent HIV/AIDS 
among African militaries, and to support the fight against violent extremism through 
OEF-TS, IMET, the GPOI-funded ACOTA program, APS, and FMS and FMF. The 
regional programs and activities include Exercises PHOENIX EXPRESS, AFRICA 
                                                 
207For more on AFRICOM’s programs and activities see AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United 
States Africa Command,” 12–31. 
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ENDEAVOR, and NATURAL FIRE.  These programs and activities were chosen for 
several reasons, including the considerable involvement of interagency and international 
partners, wide coverage, their history, and because they also raise important questions for 
this study. 
1. Preventing HIV/AIDS Among African Militaries 
African militaries have been identified as high HIV/AIDS-risk populations. As 
part of its effort to combat the impact of the pandemic, and to improve the state of 
readiness and increased availability of Africa’s militaries for peacekeeping duties, DoD 
established the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) in 2001 under the 
administrative direction of the Naval Health Research Centre (NHRC) in San Diego.208 
Through preventive care, treatment, and sustainability programs provided by DHAPP to 
service members, including families infected or affected by the disease, AFRICOM has 
achieved unprecedented successes. The successes have been made possible by the U.S. 
“whole-of-government” approach to health assistance,209 including efforts by African 
governments and other international actors. The integration and coordination of efforts 
are reflected in the support from various U.S. agencies, including DoS’s Office of the 
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator using PEPFAR, the HIV/AIDS Military Health Affairs 
FMF program, and Congressional supplemental funding provided through the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Defense Health Program.210  
DHAPP has supported training in HIV treatment and care to military medical 
professionals from many African countries, acquired laboratory equipment and 
supporting reagents and supplies related to the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, 
initiated seminars and communication methods to promote messages towards behavioral 
changes that may help reduce HIV transmission, provided Prevention of Mother-to-Child 
                                                 
208U.S. DoD, “2008 Annual Report: DHAPP,” March 2009, accessed July 14, 2010, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504808&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf  
209USAID, “U.S. Government Support for Global Health Efforts,” June 18, 2010, accessed July 13, 
2010,  http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2010/pr100618.html  
210AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 16. The direct funding from DoD to DHAPP is very limited and mostly directed 
towards education and awareness programs. 
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Transmission (PMTCT) services, and antiretroviral therapy (ART), including HIV 
counseling and testing.211 As an implementing partner of PEPFAR, DHAPP concentrates 
on 12 African countries that have been hard hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.212 Overall, 
however, DHAPP supports about 39 countries as indicated in the statistics in Appendix 1. 
As a result of the collaborative efforts over the course of its operations from 2001 to 
2009, it is estimated that DHAPP has reached over 497,000 African troops and family 
members with prevention messages, including testing and counseling services for over 
102,000. It has trained over 12,000 individuals, and is providing ART treatment to over 
19,000 individuals.213 Due to these efforts, AFRICOM has been able to contribute to the 
overall success of PEPFAR far and above its stated goals.214  
2. Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) 
As with the EACTI and CJTF-HOA in East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
respectively, OEF-TS is the DoD component of TSCTP aimed at addressing violent 
                                                 
211In FY 08, about 39 participants from 6 countries: Benin, Gambia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Uganda, and 
Zambia, were sponsored by DHAPP for different courses at the Infectious Disease Institute (IDI) at 
Makerere.  See U.S. DoD, “2008 Annual Report: DHAPP,” 5–6. 
212PEPFAR was signed into law with special attention to be focused on 15 hard hit focus countries: 
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia. With the exception of Vietnam, the other countries are 
named in the Leadership Act.  Although, the U.S. has been involved in efforts to address the global AIDS 
crisis since the 1980s and, historically, has been focused on public health programs in Africa, the 
establishment of PEPFAR marked a significant increase and attention to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. See 
United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 7601-7682; 
and Jen Kates, Julie Fischer and Eric Lief, “The U.S. Global Health Policy Architecture: Structure, 
Programs, and Funding,” Executive Summary April 2009,  accessed July 26, 2010, 
http://www.kff.org/globalhealth/upload/7881_ES.pdf.  
213AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 16-17. The 2010 Posture Statement indicates different figures with – 117,000 
reached with a prevention message, 114, 430 provided with counseling and testing, and 3,024 have been 
trained as of the first half of FY2009. 
214PEPFAR’s initial goal was to support the prevention of 7 million HIV infections; treatment for 2 
million with HIV/AIDS with antiretroviral therapy (ART); and care for 10 million people infected and 
affected by HIV/AIDS, including orphans and other vulnerable children. See United States Leadership 
against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, P.L. 108-25, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.; and 
OGAC, 2004.  As of September 30, 2009 at the expiration of the initial authorization, PEPFAR reports that 
it has supported ART for more than 2.4 million, care for nearly 11 million, including 3.6 million Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children (OVC), and, enabled nearly 340,000 babies of HIV-positive mothers to be born 
HIV-free, as well as supported HIV counseling and testing for nearly 29 million people, providing a critical 
entry point to prevention, treatment, and care. See U.S. DoS, “World AIDS Day 2009: Latest PEPFAR 
Results,” December 2009, accessed July 27, 2010, 
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/133033.pdf.  
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extremism and defeating terrorist organizations in countries within the pan-Sahel, the 
Maghreb, and sub-Saharan regions of Africa.215 Specifically, OEF-TS programs provide 
mil-to-mil capacity building and engage in advice and assist activities and information 
operations, to deny safe havens to terrorists, improve border security, deter piracy and 
prevent, narcotic and human trafficking. Another aim is to reinforce regional and bilateral 
military ties. Through AFRICOM, OEF-TS activities are closely coordinated with 
USAID and DoS as the program lead, but also the Departments of the Treasury and 
Justice who conduct limited counterterrorism activities in the TSCTP partner countries. 
As always, in each of the partner countries, the U.S. Ambassador exercises overall 
leadership and authority over a country team for the implementation of TSCTP activities.   
The erstwhile Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) operated with a budget of $17.5 million 
for the period between November 2002 and March 2004. This increased to $16 million in 
FY 2005 under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and subsequently 
to $100 million annually for five years until 2011.216 Since the commencement of the 
TSCTP program in 2005, U.S. Special Operation Forces and Marine Corps units have 
                                                 
215Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and in recognition of apparent and potential 
terrorist threats arising from unstable regions within Africa, the U.S. introduced the Pan-Sahel Initiative 
(PSI) in 2002 to increase border security and counter-terrorism capacities of Mali, Chad, Niger, and 
Mauritania.  The initiative involved equipment support, as well as military training provided by U.S. Army 
Special Forces to at least one company-size quick reaction force (about 150 soldiers) in each of the 
participating countries of Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The TSCTP (initially known as the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative) was established in July 2005 as follow-on to the PSI and was launched 
with Exercise FLINTLOCK. Generally, TSCTP is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations within 
countries in regions of the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger), the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia) and sub-Sahara (Nigeria and Senegal) by strengthening individual country and regional 
counterterrorism capabilities, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, reinforcing 
bilateral military ties with the U.S., and enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the security 
forces of the countries in the regions. See Lianne Kennedy Boudali, “The North Africa Project:  The Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” The Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, accessed August 31, 
2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA466542; 
Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 23; J. Peter 
Pham, “Milestone in Partnership to Counter Terrorism in the Sahel,” The Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, September 12, 2007, accessed August 31, 2010, 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11780384&Itemid=0; 
and AFRICOM, “The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” accessed August 25, 2010,  
http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp. Burkina Faso was included among the TSCTP countries in 2009.  See 
U.S. DoS, “Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region),” November 17, 
2009, accessed September 1, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2009/132062.htm. 
216Jessica R. Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview,” 
Strategic Insights VI, no. 1(January 2007), accessed July 2, 2010, 
http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01928.pdf. 
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provided training to the OEF-TS partner countries “on marksmanship, operational 
planning, communications, first aid, land navigation, communications, and patrolling 
…[geared towards] hunting down, capturing or otherwise eliminating terrorist 
groups.”217  Obviously, this assistance has helped in the capture or killing of a number of 
extremists. 
3. International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
The IMET, including Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), programs218 are components of 
U.S. Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) to build long-term relationships with 
foreign military and civilian leadership through a variety of education and training 
activities. They are implemented by DoD through the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA), but under the policy authority of DoS. Overall objectives of IMET: 
[t]o further the goal of regional stability through effective, 
mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in 
increased understanding and defense cooperation between the 
[U.S.] and foreign countries; [p]rovide training that augments the 
capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support 
combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and 
increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to 
instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally 
recognized human rights in their own government and military.219  
IMET activities include formal instructions involving over 4,000 courses in 
approximately 150 DoD and U.S. military service schools and installations, with U.S.  
 
 
                                                 
217 Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview.” 
218IMET is provided on a grant basis with funding from the International Affairs budget of the DoS to 
enable foreign military officers from countries incapable of paying for training under the Foreign Assistant 
Act to be availed of such opportunities. The E-IMET expanded the focus of IMET to provide courses on 
defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice to both the 
military as well as civilian personnel working on military matters. See FAS, “IMET,” accessed October 5, 
2010, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html. 
219AFRICOM, “International Military Education and Training,” accessed September 30, 2010 
http://www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20091019124205. As listed in the Security Assistant 
Management Manual (SAMM), DoD objectives are to develop rapport, understanding, and 
communications link; develop host country training self-sufficiency; including to develop host country 
ability to manage its defense establishment; and skills to operate and maintain U.S.-origin equipment.  
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military personnel; on-the-job training; orientation tours for key senior military and 
civilian officials; and mobile education teams which take the curriculum to the host 
countries.220 
From a budget of $50 million appropriated in FY2000,221 IMET program funding 
increased to about $85 million for FY2008, with $17.9 million benefiting participants 
from 46 African countries; $93 million (including a supplemental of $2 million) spent in 
FY2009 to train over 8,000 students from over 100 countries, of which $18.3 million was 
to benefit 49 African countries.222 Based on DSCA reporting as of September 30, 2008, 
about $467.5 million had been expended to fund IMET education and training programs 
to train approximately 162, 329 personnel from 49 African countries between 1950 and 
2008.223 General Ward suggests that graduates of IMET funded training fill key positions 
in many African countries, as evidenced in the positions held by 11 of 14 serving General 
Officers of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) who are graduates of IMET-funded 
programs. Furthermore, the AFRICOM Commander suggests that IMET-funded training 
contributed to the excellent reputation the Senegalese military have earned during 
numerous peacekeeping operations deployments, including the military’s positive and 
responsible involvement in civil affairs.224 Despite these good intentions and successes, 
some IMET recipient countries engaging in anti-democratic practices are being denied  
 
 
                                                 
220DSCA, “International Military Educational Training (IMET)”  November 28, 2007, accessed 
October 5, 2010, http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm; and  
DSCA, “Introduction to Security Cooperation,” accessed September 30, 2010,  
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/DR/01b%20Chapter.pdf.   
221IMET was established in 1976 as a follow-on to the Military Assistant Program (MAP) and FMS 
program established by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. See Nina M. Serafino, et al., “The 
Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” 
CRS Report for Congress, RL34639, August 25, 2008, 57, accessed February  13, 2010  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAC093.pdf; and U.S. DoD, “IMET, 2009,” accessed October 8, 2010, 
http://www.allgov.com/Agency/International_Military_Education__Training__IMET.  
222DSCA, “Introduction to Security Cooperation,” 1–4; and AFRICOM, “International Military 
Education and Training.”    
223DSCA, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security 
Cooperation Historical Facts As at September 30, 2008,”127–130 and 138–141, accessed October 5, 2010, 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/FactsBook08.pdf.  
224AKO. “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress.”  
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training as a way to deal with the governments of such countries. However, this “comes 
at a cost in terms of lost influence and access, which policy makers and the military 
believe is often crucial in times of crisis.”225   
4. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Funded Africa 
Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program 
The GPOI is a DoS-led program primarily designed to train and equip 75,000 
military and security forces from developing nations by the end of 2010 to be able to 
participate in international peacekeeping. It is also intended to foster development of 
transportation and logistics support systems to facilitate deployments and the sustainment 
of peacekeeping forces in the field. In addition, GPOI provides assistance to the Centre of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and 
interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations.226 ACOTA, which 
became a part of GPOI in 2004, is the successor program to the African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI), providing Peace Support Operations (PSO) training, including in light 
infantry and small unit tactics, to African troops. In support of ACOTA training, DoD 
through AFRICOM provides small military teams for special mentoring and training 
assistance but, overall, training is largely provided by PMCs employed by the DoS.227 
Funding allocations and numbers of peacekeepers trained, including the number 
of countries involved in the program, have significantly increased from about 16,000 
troops from 10 African countries under the ACRI/ACOTA between FY1997 and up to 
                                                 
225FAS, “IMET.” 
226Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
CRS Report for Congress RL 32773 last modified June 11, 2009, 4, accessed October 6, 2010, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA501410. GPOI was 
established in 2004 with emphasis to expand and improve on DoS’s peacekeeping train and equip program 
in Africa.  The U.S. initially provided training in peacekeeping skills through the African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI).  For more information on GPOI objectives see U.S. DoS, “U.S. Department of State 
Surpasses Target of 75,000 Trained Peacekeepers by 2010,” July 23, 2009, accessed October 2, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126396.htm; and Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations 
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.” 
227Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 22–
23. 
 89
early FY2005.228 As at January 31, 2009, with a total of about $480.38 million spent 
beginning in FY 2005, the GPOI program has provided training for about 57,595 
personnel (54, 245 peacekeepers and 3,350 peacekeeper trainers). From these figures, 
GPOI funding to ACOTA programs was responsible for the training of about 52, 110 
personnel (49,254 peacekeepers and 2,856 peacekeeper trainers) in sub-Saharan 
Africa.229 As at July 23, 2009, DoS claimed over 81,000 peacekeepers have been trained 
in addition to over 2,000 stability/formed police unit trainers.230 Apart from training, 
ACOTA has provided non-lethal equipment support to many African countries, including 
to Ugandan and Burundian forces for AMISOM.231 Obviously, these accomplishments 
have been crucial to support of U.S. national objectives of promoting military 
professionalism and stability in Africa.    
5. Foreign Military Sales and Financing Programs (FMS/FMF) 
Like the GPOI program, FMS and FMF programs are important components of 
DoD assistance to foreign militaries, including African partners approved by the U.S. 
Congress to acquire weapons and associated military equipment and training to enhance 
security capacity building. According to General Ward, both programs are fundamental 
to U.S. long-term strategy to increase interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency for 
preventive rather than just reactive responses.232 As a matter of national policy, these 
programs are administered by DSCA for DoD under the oversight and guidance of DoS. 
Under FMS, defense articles and services are procured through Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) by a country or through USG-sponsored assistance on behalf of the foreign 
                                                 
228It is suggested that under ACRI, the U.S. initially provided field and classroom training in 
traditional peacekeeping skills where there was an existing cease-fire or peace accord.  With the 
introduction of ACOTA in 2002, peacekeeping training included tasks in more hostile environments, 
including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics.  Funding provided for 
ACRI/ACOTA from DOS PKO account totaled $83.6 million during its six years of operation (FY1997 – 
FY 2002), excluding funding support through FMF program. See Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations 
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5–6.  
229Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” 2, 13–18. 
230U.S. DoS, “U.S. Department of State Surpasses Target of 75,000Trained Peacekeepers by 2010.”  
231AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command. “  
232AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 14. 
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country. Under FMF, articles and services are obtained on a grant basis or through low-
interest loans approved by the U.S. Congress using FMS or DCS.233 In some instances, 
the U.S. government has waived FMF repayment of loans.  
The FMS to African countries has increased from $39.2 million in FY2005 to 
$59.8 million in FY2006, but fell to $27.9 million in 2007.234 On the other hand, funding 
for FMF has significantly increased. For example, the Obama administration raised the 
total amount for arms sales from $8.3 million in FY2009 to $25.6 million in FY2010.235 
As indicated by the programs funding details in the DSCA FY Series report as of 
September 30, 2009, many African countries have obtained military equipment to support 
their militaries in pursuit of common security objectives with the U.S. For example, 
through the EDA, the Senegalese military has been supplied with trucks to enable it to 
deploy troops in support of peacekeeping operations in Darfur.236 Similarly, through the 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) EDA transfers, and FMS, Nigeria, Ghana, and Tunisia 
                                                 
233Although all sales of defense articles must undergo same monitoring, retransfer agreements and 
Congressional approval before final delivery, unlike with Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that allows the 
country or customer to negotiate directly with the private company,  the government-to-government 
purchase through FMS guarantees that the articles procured by the country (using its own funds) are 
standardized with those of U.S. forces; administrative services are provided that may not be available 
through the private sector; and it helps to lower cost. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 
“The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About Foreign Military Sales,” accessed October 12, 
2010.   http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/fmsadvantagev2.pdf. FMF credit to African partners is 
issued in the form of DoD direct loans, which require repayment, or FMF grants which do not require 
repayment. Additionally, African countries benefit from the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program 
where articles that are excess to DoD requirements are transferred to foreign countries at the original 
acquisition cost. See DSCA, “Fiscal Year Series,” last modified September 30, 2009, iv, accessed October 
12, 2010,   http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/Fiscal_Year_Series_2009.pdf.  
234Daniel Volman, “U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2007,” accessed October 
13, 2010, http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010822.pdf. 
235Daniel Volman, “Obama Administration Budget Request for AFRICOM Operations and for 
Security assistance Programs in Africa in FY 2010,” African Security Research Project, March 2008, 
accessed October 10, 2010, http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=18. As 
of FY 2008 FMF was approximately $18.7 million for the 53 African countries, with most of the financing 
going to Tunisia and Morocco. 
236AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 14. 
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acquired some 25-foot Defender Class response boats, including 210-foot Reliance Class 
cutters.237 Obviously, these deliveries have helped to improve African partners’ capacity. 
6. Regional Programs and Activities 
 AFRICOM implements a collection of programs across the five regions of Africa 
geared towards fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability 
in the various areas of counterterrorism, border, and maritime safety and security (MSS), 
including communication and disaster responses. Some of these programs and activities 
include APS, exercises PHOENIX EXPRESS, AFRICA ENDEAVOR, and NATURAL 
FIRE.238 The APS is AFRICOM’s initiative using sea-based training platforms to build 
maritime security capabilities of African partners in areas such as law enforcement 
operations and response capabilities (e.g., boarding, search, seizure and arrests, small 
boat training, anti-terrorism/force protection), MDA, port facilities management, 
seamanship/navigation, and the use of AIS. Through APS, AFRICOM has successfully 
deployed a number of vessels such as USS FORT MCHENRY, USS NASHVILLE, and 
HSV-2 SWIFT to several countries in the West, Central, and the East African regions,239 
including partner nations in the West Indian Ocean. Several EU partners, NGOs, and 
USG agencies, and USCG, have also partnered with the Navy to use the APS for their 
own training and development initiatives.240AFRICOM suggests that the effectiveness of 
its engagements is demonstrated in about 18 African countries that now share 
unclassified AIS data through the maritime Safety and Security Information Systems 
                                                 
237U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard’s Foreign Military Sales Program delivers 200th vessel,” January 
29, 2009, accessed October 13, 2010, http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/251286/.   It is suggested that 
the transaction through the USCG is building enduring partnerships that enhance capabilities to pursue 
cooperatively shared maritime safety and security goals.   
238Joint and combined exercise programs are conducted under the auspices of the CJCS exercise 
program, and are dependent upon funding from the Combatant Commander’s Exercise and Engagement 
and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program. See AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States 
Africa Command,” 37. 
239MDA provides participating states the capability to network maritime detection and identification 
information with appropriate national defense and law enforcement agencies. 
240Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 23.  
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(MSSIS) to achieve MDA,241 the boarding and freeing of a pirate tanker by the Benin 
Navy without loss of life, and the arrest of about five fishing vessels by the Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces Maritime Wing.242  
AFRICA ENDEAVOR is another regional exercise designed to improve 
communication and information systems interoperability between U.S. and African 
partner militaries243 to enable coordination in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian 
and disaster relief operations. AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2009, held in Gabon, brought 
together about 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and 
ECCAS). Through the exercise, communications links were developed with the U.S., 
NATO, and other countries. As for Exercise NATURAL FIRE, it is intended to improve 
interoperability and help build African partner forces capacity to provided humanitarian 
aid and respond to complex emergencies. This exercise has been ongoing since 1998 in 
the East African region, with three exercises carried out prior to 2009. Exercise 
NATURAL FIRE 10, held in Uganda in 2009, brought about 550 U.S. personnel and 650 
soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda together along with 
USAID, World Health Organization (WHO), International Red Cross, and partner states 
civil organizations.244 To a large extent, these regional programs are fostering capacity 
building and long-term regional integration, interoperability, and collaboration among the 
African partners and the U.S.   
                                                 
241NAVAF is also assigning Maritime Assistance Officers (MAOs) to U.S. embassies to assist country 
teams in planning for maritime security cooperation activities. See AFRICOM,”United States Africa 
Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM Commander,” 32. 
242AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 14 and 16. Like the APS, 
PHOENIX EXPRESS is a naval exercise involving NAVAF and the North African navies, along with 
navies from several European countries. This exercise is intended to contribute to MSS, focusing on 
maritime interdiction, communication, and information sharing. The first in a series is PHOENIX 
EXPRESS 2008 that involved the U.S. SIXTH Fleet, along with some North African navies (Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania), as well as navies from the European countries of Malta, Turkey, Greece, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. See AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture 
Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM Commander,” 22; and AFRICOM, “2010 Posture 
Statement United States Africa Command,” 25. 
243AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, 
AFRICOM Commander,” 25.  
244GAO-10-794, 52; and AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 13. 
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K. SUMMARY 
This chapter primarily focused on the internal characteristics of AFRICOM by 
explaining its mission, strategy, tasks and technology, including its structure, 
transformations, and outputs. A broader perspective of U.S. foreign policy objectives 
toward Africa and how various government agencies are positioned to address U.S. 
overall interests on the African continent were discussed. The purpose was to offer 
insight into how AFRICOM relates with other U.S. agencies or how it can better relate 
with them in support of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Africa. 
 It was pointed out that U.S. foreign policy priority towards Africa had been 
generally benign, especially as it relates to DoD activities, until recently when 
AFRICOM was established to give it focused attention. The chapter described several 
programs and activities, such as IMET, GPOI, TSCTP, APS, and PEPFAR that were 
designed to meet six identified U.S. policy priorities, such as security assistance and 
capacity building to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict; the building of strong and 
stable democratic institutions; the strengthening of public health; and addressing 
transnational challenges in Africa. These programs are being implemented by multiple 
USG agencies. It was suggested that the accomplishment of these U.S. objectives 
required effective interagency collaboration.  
In addition to the uniqueness of AFRICOM integrating various U.S. agencies into 
its structure, the Command’s programs and activities were designed along nontraditional 
lines of war prevention rather than war fighting, which differentiates it from its 
predecessors, the three erstwhile COCOMs. Although considered a work in progress, 
AFRICOM had nonetheless made remarkable progress towards the realization of its 
objectives. While it has continued to improve its resource base and expand its presence 
and activities on the continent, some misalignments were noticeable. These concerns are 













V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Organizations, too, suffer insult and injury from their environments or 
conflict because of contradictory goals and purposes. Like individuals, 
they can be self-destructive. At times it becomes necessary to assess both 




The purpose of this chapter is to determine the extent to which some of the key 
variables examined in AFRICOM’s internal environment are aligned with one another 
and with the different variables found in the external environment in order to determine 
the effectiveness of the Command. The model used for this analysis is a modified version 
of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman described in Chapter II. This model is a 
useful tool for understanding and analyzing AFRICOM’s interactions and 
interrelationships. It offers a combination of ten key components that are critical for 
determining alignments: resources, mission, tasks, strategy, structure, technology, 
culture, outputs, outcomes, and environment. A mismatch amongst these components 
suggests low performance or organizational ineffectiveness in the areas analyzed. 
Assessment indicators for this analysis are observable from changes that have 
occurred over time from the inputs, outputs, and outcomes, a system perspective. 
Evaluations will focus on many areas such as the need for a program or activity, the 
adequacy of design and resources to accomplish objectives intended, if what the 
organization seeks to accomplish meets what it is actually doing, and the desirability of 
the services or goals being achieved from the recipients’ perspective. As a consequence 
of what recipients’ desire, the extent to which the environment impacts the organization 
will also be examined. While AFRICOM may be new (only about two years old), it 
already has a commendable track record. Nor is, a steep learning curve unexpected 
                                                 
245Harry Levinson, “Organizational Assessment: A Step-By-Step Guide To Effective Consulting,” 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2002, xii, 4–5, accessed August 22, 2010, 
http://www.hrmproducts.ir/downloads/books/03faa04ac331ad65817ed9828b2989e4.pdf.  
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considering that it is a work in progress. The succeeding paragraphs of this chapter will 
thus locate areas of misalignment and opportunities yet to be leveraged by AFRICOM.  
B. MISSION ALIGNMENT 
In the course of our research, we were struck by the noticeable positive shift from 
the lukewarm acceptance and hostility over AFRICOM’s perceived ill-conceived initial 
concept and mission. In contrast to its earlier days, AFRICOM’s mission has gained 
clarity, especially when considered from the perspective of its ever-increasing 
relationships and demonstrable commitments to strengthening domestic and regional 
capacities of its African partners. However, it is not a fait accompli. Apprehension still 
exists in Africa over exactly what AFRICOM wants to do. This could limit AFRICOM’s 
ability to develop key partnerships and extend its influence. Perhaps the unresolved 
location of AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa may be suggestive of Africa’s 
apprehension over the Command’s mission.246  
Generally, perceptions about U.S. foreign policy towards Africa are framed by 
U.S. antecedents and actions around the world. In fact, the Command has offered 
changing and sometimes conflicting rationales for its establishment. To many Africans, 
AFRICOM represents a U.S. intention to maintain its power and hegemony in Africa as 
suggested by its unilateral actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.247 Also, past U.S. 
involvement in Africa tended to be episodic, brief, and largely defined by U.S. national 
security interests and, arguably, without consideration of Africans’ interests, as evidenced 
during the Cold War era (when the superpower rivalry was expressed through proxy wars 
                                                 
246Apart from President Ellen J. Sirleaf of Liberia and probably a few others that are favorably 
disposed to the idea of AFRICOM, it cannot be determined with certainty that all African leaders are or 
will eventually be similarly disposed to the idea.  
247Greg Mills, Terrance McName, Mauro De Lorenzo and Matthew Uttley, “AFRICOM and African 
Security: The Globalisation of Security or the Militarisation of Globalisation?” Brenthurst Discussion 
Paper 4/2007, www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org. 
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and regime change), and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).248 These events have 
continued to shape the Africans’ attitudes and to raise questions about AFRICOM’s true 
mission in Africa. While AFRICOM is a sound concept that can succeed, the concern is 
how to build trust with its African partners. Having sold AFRICOM as an organization 
focused on non-kinetic missions, will the U.S. act unilaterally to kill or capture high 
value targets in Africa should there be need based on a U.S. national interest? If the 
reason for such an action is due to the lack of capability of African partners, will that not 
raise questions about their training and equipping? What if the lack of capability is due to 
unwillingness of Africans to act? Will such an action align with AFRICOM’s stated 
mission and Africans’ interests?  
C. STRUCTURE ALIGNMENT 
The current structure and footprint of AFRICOM on the continent raises questions 
about its ability to process adequate information from the environment and whether the 
command’s concept of developing enduring interagency coordination, relationships and 
partnerships can be achieved. It is suggested that “DoD has not yet reached agreement 
with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of 
AFRICOM’s presence in Africa.”249 This is despite the fact that AFRICOM’s presence 
within Africa has been identified as important because it will provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the African environment and Africans’ needs. In addition, it will help 
build relationships and partnerships with African nations, regional economic 
communities, and associated regional standby forces.  
                                                 
248James J.F. Forest and Rebecca Crispin, “AFRICOM: Troubled Infancy, Promising Future,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (April 2009), 5–27. The counterterrorism operation in Somalia, in 
league with Ethiopia, also represents U.S. use of proxies and intent on regime change. The U.S. also has 
some conditions that are non-negotiable, such as the exemption from International Criminal Court (ICC) 
prosecution for U.S. personnel working for the Command, which is not in sync with African governments. 
See ICC exemption, or “bilateral or non-surrender agreements,”  this is a provision of Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute (1998) of the International Criminal Court that the U.S. uses in negotiating Status of Force 
Agreement (SOFA).    
249GAO-08-947T, 4. At the country level, senior defense officials/defense attachés (SDO/DATT) 
serve as military liaisons at embassies and also serve on interagency embassy Country Teams, led by the 
U.S. ambassador in each country. 
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Although the thought of a large U.S. footprint on the continent generates mixed 
reactions, AFRICOM’s lack of effective representation is suggested by the fact that there 
are only about 17 OSCs and 30 DATTs covering the 53 African countries (excluding 
Egypt).250 How effective can AFRICOM be in achieving its mission with such minimal 
representation on the continent? The absence of AFRICOM’s presence in so many 
countries is a recipe for information overload and underload. For example, in cases where 
an SDO/DATT or OSC is overseeing more than one country, there can be difficulties 
understanding and processing too much information (deciphering the needed information 
from disinformation or misinformation) from the environment for effective decision-
making, especially when time is of the essence. Also, in a country without any 
representation, there is the obvious possibility of not having access to specific 
information needed to accomplish tasks. Although AFRICOM has non-DoD agencies 
embedded at all levels in the Command that could reach out to other USG agencies in 
partner countries, an absence of AFRICOM’s presence in certain countries limits 
planning and execution of its plans, programs, and activities, and slows down 
collaboration with the USG agencies and African partners at the regional level. The 
shortfalls in personnel already being experienced by DoS and USAID necessitate 
AFRICOM’s presence, at the very least where there are U.S. embassies on the continent.    
D. ALIGNMENT OF TASKS, PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES 
The programs and activities examined here are: DoD HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs, OEF –TS counterterrorism program, equipment support through FMS and 
FMF, GPOI-funded ACOTA, as well as IMET programs. Some of the common 
indicators specific to these programs and activities include: input - the adequacy of  
 
 
                                                 
250Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 8. 
U.S. DoS covers 47 African countries with an Embassy, Consulate or absentee coverage by another 
Embassy, or Diplomatic Mission, for more information see U.S. DoS, accessed November 10, 2010, 
http://www.usembassy.gov/. USAID covers only 23 African countries. See USAID, accessed October 15, 
2010, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/. These agencies have their own mission and 
strategies, which differ from AFRICOM’s mission and strategy.  
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needed resources; output - the number of personnel trained or receiving health assistance, 
and amount of equipment transferred; outcome -improvement in the problem being 
targeted by the program or activity.  
1. Addressing HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
Whilst the intent and accomplishment of DHAPP in mitigating HIV/AIDS among 
Africa’s militaries cannot be minimized, this study established that DHAPP’s focused 
attention on 12 of 53 African countries due to PEPFAR legislation to include limited and 
delayed funding support to DoD, undermined AFRICOM’s ability to improve the state of 
readiness and availability of African troops for peacekeeping duties. At a general level, a 
policy that excludes countries that are equally at risk from the impact of HIV/AIDS has 
unintended consequences.251 For example, “[b]etween 2004 and 2007, the difference in 
the annual change in the number of HIV-related deaths was about 10.5 [percent] lower in 
the [12] focus countries than in the [29] control countries [receiving minimal 
support].”252 Obviously, it is the pervasiveness of this disease and the lack of treatment 
that multiplies its effects to the point that it becomes a security issue.   
Based on PEPFAR funding to DHAPP (as indicated in Appendix 1) and DHAPP 
activities in Africa including frequency of other funding support (as detailed in the 2008 
DHAPP Annual Report), DHAPP support to Africa over the years has been irregular and 
many countries are not catered for by PEPFAR. Some of the countries affected, such as 
Benin, Burundi, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and Togo, are either 
contributors or potential contributors to peacekeeping operations, which raises important 
questions for AFRICOM.  For example, as of March 2009 in Gambia, apart from the 
training of two health practitioners and the upgrade of one health center in basic 
                                                 
251Some have suggested that “[a]lthough the criteria for selecting focus countries were not explicit, 
they were related to the burden of disease, the focus countries’ government commitment to fighting HIV, 
administrative capacity, and a willingness to partner with the U.S. government.” See Eran Bendavid and 
Jayanta Bhattacharya, “The President’s emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa: An Evaluation of 
Outcomes,” Annals of internal Medicine by American College of Physicians Vol. 150 no. 10, 688–695, 
accessed July 28, 2010, http://www.annals.org/content/150/10/688.full  
252Most of the neglected and control countries are among the poorest on the continent with a lack of 
capacity to mitigate HIV/AIDS spread.  See Bendavid and Jayanta, The Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. 
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laboratory services for counseling and testing, DHAPP provided only prevention 
messages and condoms to the Gambian military.253 Although the size of the military may 
be small and the impact of HIV/AIDS unclear, the general prevalence of the pandemic in 
the country as indicated in the increase in number of people living with HIV/AIDS 
(PLWHA) from 6,800 in 2003 to 8,200 in 2009 (see Appendix 1), suggests the need for 
more attention to the military.254  
Although statistics on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the military are rare, it has 
been suggested that the pandemic is significantly higher than among civilian population. 
This means large numbers of personnel will remain on extended sick leave and become 
unfit for active duty, thereby significantly weakening military operational capacity and 
capability. Another concern is that the costs of replacing personnel and managing the 
disease are very high, with consequences for military budgets. Therefore, with the 
irregular support to many African countries, including selective engagement of only a 
few countries that are assumed to be hard hit by the pandemic, the realization of 
AFRICOM’s desired goals to reduce HIV/AIDS and improving the military state of 
readiness and availability for peacekeeping duties will be negated. 
2. Countering Extremism Through OEF-TS 
Despite the pioneering intent behind its establishment as an interagency program, 
the TSCTP program has morphed into a seemingly unilateral military fight against 
terrorism, virtually overshadowing other agencies’ efforts, including DoS responsibility 
to coordinate the public image of the interagency partnership. The overwhelmingly 
military public image and the unbalanced allocation of funds between the three main U.S. 
                                                 
253 U.S. DoD, “DHAPP 2008 Annual Report.”   
254 Most of these militaries receive little or no external assistance. Despite their participation in some 
of the neglected countries, most of the stakeholders providing assistance work independently of each other. 
There is a lack of coordination which often leads to duplication and/or contradictory assistance programs 
that undermine efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency in the distribution of scarce funds. With 
PEPFAR’s current focus on program sustainability and expansion in prevention, treatment, and care, as 
well as strengthening partner government capacity towards ownership, the dream of addressing the 
pandemic will be absent will be absent in the neglected countries to include their militaries, which will 
have severe consequences to those neighboring them (even when they are receiving considerable support). 
As noted by Salim Andool Karim during the VXIII International AIDS Conference held in Vienna in July 
2010, the pandemic is a misnomer given the different subtypes of the virus in different countries or regions, 
thus necessitating equal attention and shared responsibility.  
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TSCTP agencies suggest that the TSCTP program is primarily a military endeavor. This, 
in turn, suggests that the U.S. military shapes, rather than supports U.S. foreign policy 
priorities on the continent through AFRICOM, thus raising concerns about 
misperceptions of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The military face of TSCTP 
through OEF-TS could, over the long-term, undermine the legitimacy and potential 
success of the program.   
AFRICOM’s proactive publicity about OEF-TS activities has been featured more 
prominently in websites and other news media than those of most other partner 
agencies.255 This public image is further enhanced by AFRICOM’s incomparably larger 
personnel footprint than that of its agency partners.256 In terms of funding, except for 
FY2005, the overall TSCTP funding allocation to DoD has been over three times the 
amount allocated to DoS and USAID combined,257 which contrasts with the stated 
organization and objectives of the program. In Niger, for example, funding allocations 
increased for USAID’s TSCTP budget from $750,000 in FY 2005 to $5million in FY 
2008, OEF-TS received over $8.5 million in FY 2007.258 
Without doubt, with these resources the OEF-TS component of TSCTP has 
provided partner African militaries with the means and methods to combat domestic 
terrorism. Many AQIM members have been arrested or killed, including the recent killing 
of six militants in a raid to free a 78-year-old French citizen.259 Unfortunately, U.S. 
                                                 
255Emily Hunt, “Islamic Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United 
States?”  The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #65, February, 2007, 13, accessed 
September 7, 2010, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus65.pdf.  
256FLINTLOCK 2005 had over 1000 U.S. military personnel sent to some countries in North and 
West Africa for counterterrorism exercises, while in FLINTLOCK 2007 over 350 U.S. Army Special 
Forces were in Mali for counterterrorism exercises with many more military personnel from the TSCTP 
partner countries including military forces from France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Daniel 
Volman, “AFRICOM: The new US military Command for Africa,” Pambazuka News, Issue 327, July 11, 
2007, accessed September 7, 2010, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/44273.  
257GAO -08-860, 10.   
258There are other funding allocations to USAID and DS that complement their TSCTP programs.  
For example, a non-TSCTP and TSCTP fund for development assistance in FY 2008 was $18.5 million, 
with $15 million in non emergency-food assistance. See Collin Thomas-Jensen and Maggie Fick, “Foreign 
Assistance Follies in Niger,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 31, 2010, accessed 
August 31, 2010, http://csis.org/blog/foreign-assistance-follies-niger. 
259Bruce Crumley, “France Questions Raid that Led to a Hostage’s Death,” Time Magazine, July 26, 
2010, accessed October 17, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2006463,00.html. 
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efforts have also given many governments good reason to be inflexible, preferring police 
and military responses to resolving conflict. In Niger, military actions have led to more 
violent extremism and general banditry, making life increasingly difficult for people in 
the region, including the few humanitarian agencies working there.260 They have also 
helped Tuareg extremists gain support from large numbers of people in northern Niger, 
and it is suspected that alliances have been formed with rebel groups in Mali. These 
outcomes are undesirable, and perhaps suggest a need for a more balanced interagency 
approach to tackling Niger’s challenges.  
Sadly, even U.S. diplomats have viewed most violent extremism in Africa from 
the military lens and ignored holding Africa’s governments responsible for their long-
term failure to adequately address the root causes of grievances. For example, in Niger, 
DoS TSCTP activity focuses on law enforcement counterterrorism training of the 
government’s civilian security and law enforcement personnel on police procedures, as 
well as public diplomacy “to communicate messages among vulnerable populations to 
isolate and marginalize violent extremists…”261 This public diplomacy emphasizes 
marginalization rather than dialogue with African governments to address underlying 
concerns. From the standpoint of the U.S., “[n]egotiations grant legitimacy to terrorists 
[or extremists] and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political 
change through peaceful means. Negotiations can destabilize the negotiating 
government’s political system, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set 
a dangerous precedent.”262 The unintended consequences of the U.S. decision not to 
                                                 
260Many structures have been destroyed; medical clinics and schools have been closed; and food 
supplies and basic necessities have become difficult to get or have been cut off due to the conflict and 
government ban on humanitarian aid. The “state of emergency” imposed by the government restricted the 
flow of goods and people in the north, and enabled the military to arrest and detain people at will.  This 
may suggest military occupation, which is a significant driver of violent terrorism.  
261GAO -08-860, 14.  
262Darrell Puls, “Should We Negotiate With Terrorists – A Counterpoint,” accessed August 30, 2010, 
http://www.mediate.com/articles/puls.cfm. “The [recent] U.S. Supreme Court decision in ‘Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project…confirms that it is illegal for U.S. citizens or organizations receiving U.S. 
funding to support negotiated peace settlements by training or advising a conflict party that is on the `U.S. 
State Department’s terrorist list.” The U.S. Supreme Court ruling is at odds with increasing 
acknowledgement of a political settlement of disputes by various governments, including in Mali, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia. See Andy Carl and Sophie Haspeslagh, “Why criminalise dialogue with 
terrorists?” July 22, 2010, accessed September 1, 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/sophie-
haspelagh-andy-carl/how-can-we-promote-peace-with-one-hand-tied-behind-our-back. 
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support dialogue toward peace settlements makes the mediation process much harder 
between governments and aggrieved parties;263 it also helps contribute to increased 
population displacement and costs lives due to the use of violence by the military.264 
Perhaps, as with many other countries, the history behind Niger’s underlying 
conditions have not been given due consideration. The Tuaregs are not Islamic 
extremists, but have practiced a moderate form of Sufi Islam for centuries. For a long 
time, the Nigerien government sought Tuareg passivity rather than allegiance. Violence 
began to intensify in the 1990s and culminated in extremism in 2005 as a result of the 
Nigerien government’s failure to uphold its pledge for more focused development in 
northern Niger; it also failed to strengthen local government. However, the Tuaregs’ 
genuine grievances have been adulterated with terrorism, trafficking in persons, drugs, 
and cigarettes.265 The government has branded the Tuareg extremists as “bandits,” and 
has consistently refused to dialogue with them despite efforts for peaceful settlement 
initiated by opposition parties and members of the ruling government. This changed 
recently when a ceasefire agreement was reached with three main rebel groups in Tripoli 
                                                 
263Beginning a dialogue with terrorists is often a necessary first step on the road toward a political 
settlement and an end to the violence. However, the conditions for progress are often lacking, and the 
initiation of talks may strengthen terrorists and anger allies. Nelson Mandela, Yasir Arafat, and Jerry 
Adams are among those once branded terrorists whom the U.S. and other countries have engaged in the 
hopes of bringing a lasting peace to strife-torn lands. Yet, the experiences of these three individuals have 
been mixed. Potential rewards and risks abound. According to Daniel Byman, Director, Centre for Peace 
and Security Studies, paying the price of recognizing a terrorist group might be worthwhile if there is a 
guarantee of success in the end, especially in transforming a terrorist group into a legitimate political actor 
or driving it out of the terrorism business altogether. See Daniel Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with 
Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1521-0731  29,  no. 5, 2006, 403–
414. 
264Berschinski argues that the emphasis on counterinsurgency has disrupted traditional trade networks 
and allowed local governments to neglect the need for finding negotiated solutions to concerns of the 
Tuareg and people in other neglected regions. See Berschinski, “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War 
on Terrorism,’ and ‘Capacity Building,’ ‘Humanitarianism,’ and the ‘Future of U.S. Security Policy in 
Africa.’”  
265The Tuaregs recognize that security and stability in the region are inextricably linked to their 
economic livelihood; hence, they have persistently called for development and reintegration into the larger 
Niger society. The northern Agadez region of Niger is one of the world’s largest sources of uranium, but 
high levels of unemployment and chronic food shortages persist. The Tuareg in this region have taken to 
such tactics as a way to express their frustration due to the lack of government attention. See Discussion 
Paper by the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union Brussels, Belgium, 3. 
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(without U.S. or UN input).266 The peace process remains fragile because it failed to 
include all stakeholders (e.g., several rebel groups) and consequently the government has 
made no formal plans to discuss or negotiate the claims that motivated the extremism in 
the first place.267 The Tuaregs’ unresolved claims provide AQIM an opportunity to fill 
gaps created by the government, thus making Tuareg grievances more challenging to 
resolve later.268  
According to Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, “[i]f a door [to 
negotiation] is shut, attempts should be made to open it; if it is ajar, it should be pushed 
until it is wide open.  In neither case should the door be blown up at the expense of those 
inside.”269 There will always be a temptation to continue on the narrow military 
approach, even when this path is widely recognized to be self-defeating. However, it 
should be noted that “the need to use force will be necessary where the door of peaceful 
progress to freedom is clammed shut and bolted.”270  
                                                 
266According to Jessica Piombo, in sub-Saharan Africa, there are a number of organizations that are 
labeled “terrorists” by their governments, but the U.S. is reluctant to recognize the groups as such, because 
they may be opposition groups, which the government tries to gain support to combat. See Piombo, 
“Terrorism and U.S. counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview.” 
267Taureg Culture and News, “Recent Progress Towards Peace in Niger,” IMAJAGHAN Temust d-
Islam – Educational Website June 5, 2009, accessed Sep 2, 2010, 
http://tuaregcultureandnews.blogspot.com/2009/06/update-niger-conflict.html. The three main rebels 
groups are Le Mouvement des Nigérienes pour la Justice (MJN), Front des Forces de Redressement (FFR), 
and Front Patriotic Nigérien (FPN). The situation in Mali is different from the situation in Niger. Under the 
deal reached in Algeria, many former rebels in Mali have been integrated into the army, and those who 
have deserted are said to be behind ongoing attacks. Reuters, “Niger’s Government, Tuareg’s rebel pledge 
peace,” Reuters – AlertNet, accessed September 1, 2010, April 7, 2009, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SODA-7QVPVD?OpenDocument.  
268It has been suggested that Niger has had limited problems in the north with AQIM and some 
speculate that AQIM’s active interest in the area is linked to Tuareg claims that are yet to be resolved. See 
Tobi Archer and Tihomir Popovic, “The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on 




269Julius Kambarage Nyerere, from his Stability and Change in Africa speech given to the University 
of Toronto, Canada, October 2, 1969, accessed October 17, 2010, 
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/biography/a/qts-Nyerere01.htm.  
270Quoted in Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945 – 1968: Nyerere and the 
Emergence of a Socialist Strategy (London: Cambridge University Press), 1976. 
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3. Equipment Support 
The provision of critical U.S. military equipment and services to African partners 
through FMS and FMF programs is laudable. Apart from helping to meet gaps in 
equipment needs, these programs have improved existing security capacities of the U.S.’s 
African partners. However, despite increased funding for equipment support, there is still 
a noticeable gap between what is being provided by the U.S. and what is generally 
needed. Although in comparison to other regions of the world, Africa has consistently 
received the least FMF support as indicated in DoS FMF funding summaries from 
FY2006 through FY2010, including FY 2011 requests,271 the concern is not only to 
better meet equipment requirements, but to ensure the military equipment provided will 
have beneficial or intended effects. 
Generally, across Africa, there is too little of the right technology to effectively 
execute and sustain often difficult, expensive, and extended military operations given 
limited economic capacities without having to call on the international community. 
Despite financial constraints, many African governments have made remarkable 
contributions to bridge the gaps in interoperable U.S. equipment.272 However, the 
procurements as depicted in Appendix 2 suggest they are largely for conventional warfare  
 
 
                                                 
271According to DoS FMF account summaries for FY2006 to FY2010, East Asia and the Pacific 
received a total of $245.6 million, Europe and Eurasia received $596.6 million, the Near East (including 
Israel and Egypt) received $20.7 billion, South and Central Asia received $1.5 billion, the Western 
Hemisphere received $869.4 million, while Africa received $64.5 million. FMF FY2011 requests for Africa 
are about $23.8 million as against $46.5 million for East Asia and the Pacific, $162.1 million for Europe 
and Eurasia, $4.8 billion for the Near East, $306.6 million for South and Central Asia, and $96.1 million 
for Western Hemisphere. The funding gap in Africa is further worsened by the fact that the U.S. focuses 
most of its support on a few countries, especially Tunisia and Morocco. For example, in FY2008, of the 
$18.7 million for the 53 African countries, General William E. Ward’s AFRICOM 2009 Posture Statement 
indicates that most of the amount was to Tunisia and Morocco. See U.S. Department of State, “Foreign 
Military Financing Account Summary,” June 23, 2010, accessed October 14, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm.  
272For example, from FY2006 to FY2009 the total FMS sales and commercial exports deliveries cost 
African governments about $295.5 (about $79.3 million and $216.2 million respectively) to complement a 
total of $45.7 million in FMF deliveries to Africa. African governments also procure military equipment 
from other sources outside the U.S., such as from Israel, Russia, China, and the U.K. Furthermore, some 
African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, also manufacture some military equipment. See 
DSCA, “FY Series,” As of September 30, 2009, 278–279. 
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rather than for meeting contemporary asymmetric challenges. Also, most of the 
equipment countries possess is aged and is not sufficiently operational to effectively meet 
security challenges.    
It is noteworthy that despite acquisition of vessel tracking facilities, such as 
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), radar, and cameras largely through APS 
assistance, there are still coverage challenges beyond the littorals and against detection of 
vessels below 300 gross registered tons, many of which are usually involved in piracy 
and other maritime crimes.273 Interoperability is difficult due to the proliferation of 
tracking devices, such as AIS and the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 
system, requiring vessels to carry multiple transponders. Similarly, while an increase in 
the number of military assets, such as the USCG EDA transfers of naval vessels to 
Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria, will help reduce the acute maritime policing deficiencies of 
these countries, the endurance and interdiction capability of such vessels, including 
maintainability and sustainability factors, are a requirement for their effective presence. 
Similar deficiencies also exist among the other services. One difficulty in tracking 
extremist groups with the attendant high cost of supporting large military forces in the 
vast trans-Saharan region for extended periods reflects the dire need to acquire an 
appropriate force level for policing operations. Thus, U.S. support in terms of equipment 
assistance programs must be matched by the appropriate force levels to meet the 
contemporary nature of challenges on the continent.  
4. GPOI 
The DoS and DoD have achieved tremendous accomplishments, having surpassed 
the GPOI objective to train and equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010. They have 
successfully facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 UN and 
regional PSOs, and trained over 2,000 stability/formed police units trainers. The U.S.’s 
African partners have been the greatest beneficiaries of this support. This feat is beyond 
the expectations of a GAO report to Congress in June 2008 that predicted the 
                                                 
273Adejimi Adeniyi Osinowo, “Right-Sizing African Navies for Maritime Security,” a paper presented 
at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies Conference, April 18-23, 2010 in Dar es Salam. 
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unlikelihood of meeting the goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010.274 
Nevertheless, some of the challenges highlighted in the report, such as delays in 
providing timely delivery of equipment in support of training and missions, assessing the 
proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training, and 
accounting for the activities of trained instructors, persist. In addition, there are 
noticeable misalignments between the supports being provided to effectively meet the 
challenges in the African peacekeeping environment. 
While armies have been the focus of GPOI-funded ACOTA training and 
equipment support, common knowledge suggests that peacekeeping operations are a joint 
effort, which means that the other services also have an important role to play in 
peacekeeping environments. For example, in Darfur, the lack of utility and tactical 
helicopters to effectively carry out UNAMID and AMIS mandates was apparently due to 
the absence of African air forces that typically operate this equipment.275 The gap in 
integrating other services into the GPOI training and equipment support needs to be 
bridged.  
5. IMET 
Many GAO reports have acknowledged that the proficiency of trained African 
partners is not being assessed against standard skills taught in training. Generally, 
assessments of IMET programs have focused on purely objective outputs, such as the 
number of students trained; money spent on training or on number of visits and 
equipments provided, excluding assessments of whether the programs influenced and 
helped build capabilities, and capacities needed by the African partners and AFRICOM. 
In addition, the prevailing situation on the African continent suggests that implementation 
of training agreements between host partner governments and the USG are not being 
assessed. To a large extent, IMET-funded trained students are utilized based on the host 
                                                 
274GAO-08-754. 
275Save Darfur, “Fact Sheet: UNAMID Helicopters,” accessed November 11, 2010,   
http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/policy_paper/fact_sheet_unamid_helicopters/. Ethiopia provided some 
tactical helicopters to support UNAMID. See News Dire, “UNAMID Prepares for the arrival of Ethiopian 
Tactical Helicopters,” January 18, 2010, accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.newsdire.com/news/165-unamid-prepares-for-arrival-of-ethiopian-tactical-helicopters.html.  
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country’s requirements. However, we were unable to establish whether AFRICOM 
monitors how IMET-funded students are utilized upon return to their home countries in 
the skills for which they were trained in accordance with SAMM, Chapter 10, as agreed 
by both governments. With such a gap, AFRICOM will be unable to determine the 
outcome of its programs. 
In addition, according to DoD’s objective for the IMET program, providing 
African partners “with a firsthand knowledge of America are expected to make a 
difference in winning access and influence for both US diplomatic and military 
representatives in foreign countries.”276 Unfortunately, such relationships are largely 
understood and invoked at the highest levels of government, but are not being nurtured at 
all levels. Considering the fact that IMET provides the U.S. military with important 
opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign military and civilian officers, do U.S. 
counterparts under training understand that they are a tool in this program? With the 
number of Africans that have been trained in the U.S., one would have expected a greater 
level of interaction and understanding.   
E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ALIGNMENT 
It has earlier been suggested that although everything outside the system is its 
environment, not everything is equally relevant to the system’s purpose or survival. This 
section analyzes how AFRICOM collaborates with other U.S. agencies, international 
partners, and the African regional organizations to determine how the Command balances 
its needs with those of other actors in the environment.  
1. Interagency Collaboration 
Integrating interagency personnel in AFRICOM has been viewed by DoD as 
critical to synchronizing the command’s efforts with other USG agencies in its 
interagency collaboration. Despite this concept and the waning of initial misgivings about 
its establishment, several GAO reports, among other publications, have identified that 
                                                 
276Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “US International Security Assistance Education and 
Training.” accessed October 1, 2010, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training.html.  
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interagency collaboration is a work in progress.277 However, because of the interests of 
individual agencies and their employees, as well as cultural differences, one should not 
expect interagency collaboration to mature overnight. For example, a GAO report 
suggests that disagreements about whether DoS should have authority over DoD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP in the African partner countries has 
hampered the implementation of some activities.278 Also, military culture’s desire for 
autonomy and dominance and short-term focus has often limited effective collaboration. 
On the other-hand, those outside of the military stereotype military personnel and are 
resistant to collaborate.  
2. International Collaboration 
 International collaboration is a force multiplier. As evidenced in many of its 
activities, such as FLINLOCK multinational exercises, counter-piracy operations in East 
Africa and the greater Indian Ocean region through the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, 
and APS, AFRICOM synergizes efforts of many international partners. However, in 
many areas, the rhetoric has been less about collaboration and more about competition 
with powers like China in particular.     
 In the countries of West Africa and the Sahel, for example, the UN, EU, and U.S. 
have increasingly played significant roles in improving counterterrorism capacity 
fostering cooperation across the wider region. However, while their goals may be similar, 
some international partners have collaborated less. Some observers have argued that the 
presence of the U.S. military along with France have served to stoke anti-Western 
sentiments and cynicism regarding Western motives. This suggests the need for a broader 
holistic and integrated framework to internationalize the efforts already undertaken by the 
EU and U.S., to include the states in the region, the UN, AU and efforts by other 
international partners.    
                                                 
277It is suggested that AFRICOM still has difficulty integrating interagency personnel into the 
Command’s structure. See GAO-09-18, 2; and GAO, “National Security: Interagency Collaboration 
Practices and Challenges at DoD’s Southern and Africa Commands”, GAO-10-962T, July 28, 2010, 
accessed September 28, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10962t.pdf.  
278GAO-08-860, 4.  
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As has been suggested in Chapter III, the U.S. and its allies are finding their 
interests and vision of a prosperous Africa governed by democracies that respect human 
rights and the rule of law, and which embrace free markets, being challenged by 
expanding Chinese influence.279 China claims it tries to separate politics from business. 
However, is there any convergence of U.S. and Chinese interests in Africa? What if 
interests diverge and China becomes more willing to challenge the U.S. and other 
international partners to protect its interests, or the U.S. and its allies decide to act 
similarly? Where does Africa fit in this situation?   
 Despite such concerns, China has provided considerable development assistance 
to Africa. As has been suggested, African governments almost universally welcome 
Chinese development assistance since, in their eyes, its unconditionality respects 
sovereignty, avoids protracted negotiation processes usually associated with the West,280 
and offers alternative support, especially when a country is under international sanctions. 
However, as with assistance programs from elsewhere, some of China’s assistance has 
often been challenged by recipient countries due to its undesirable impact (see Chapter 
III), which suggests even African countries have their interests to protect. The conflict of 
interest between China, on the one hand, and the U.S. with its allies on the other, is 
reminiscent of the Cold War era. Already, this has played out in Zimbabwe and Sudan. 
The U.S.-influenced withdrawal of Western oil companies from Sudan and the limitation 
of aid to as well as investments in Zimbabwe due to human rights violations have been 
counterbalanced by China, weakening U.S. influence in those countries and heightening 
China’s. Although AFRICOM is not an intervention force and is not structured to 
compete for influence with foreign powers like China, any temptation to withdraw its 
services or apply direct pressure to China will be counterproductive to the long-term U.S. 
security objectives in Africa. 
                                                 
279Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 
Backgrounder, No. 1916, published by The Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2006, 1, accessed June 12, 
2010, www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1916.cfm.  
280Hofstedt, “China in Africa: an AFRICOM Response.”  
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3. Regional Collaboration 
Through partnerships with Africa’s regional organizations in various programs 
and activities, AFRICOM has developed awareness of the strengths and weaknesses 
relating to the interoperability of its African partners, and it has helped to strengthen 
regional stability and security (see Chapter IV). However, different perceptions of 
regional security issues pose challenges which, in some instances, result in U.S. programs 
and activities that African partners do not consider a top priority; hence, African 
participation becomes a matter of courtesy. Also, there is the problem of competing 
interests in the exercise of influence between regional hegemons and AFRICOM in the 
various regional spheres of influence, which causes hostility towards the Command. 
Obviously, with these concerns, collaboration towards regional developments becomes 
difficult to realize.  
In West Africa for example, “[m]any continue to view terrorism as a 
predominately Western problem and counterterrorism a Western-imposed priority, and 
rightly argue that many more people in the [region] are directly affected by disease, 
crime, poverty, and hunger, than by terrorism.”281 Nevertheless, in the words of Martin 
Luther King Jr., “[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”282 Accordingly, 
despite not being seen as a top priority for the West African region as a whole, several 
countries in the region have taken steps to strengthen their capacities to prevent and 
combat terrorism based on recognition that terrorism is a shared concern. Yet, with 
different priorities in shared security concerns, how committed are the African partners in 
their engagements?    
AFRICOM considers Morocco an important player in the war against terrorism in 
the region, but Algeria’s interest in exercising its influence as a regional hegemon, 
including its lack of collaboration with Morocco, hampers efforts to secure the North 
Western area and the Sahel. Algeria politically, for example, excluded Morocco from a 
meeting held in Algeria to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the region and 
                                                 
281Discussion Paper by the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union Brussels, 
Belgium, 4.  
282Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, accessed November 10, 
2010, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.  
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tried to force an unrealistic military strategy to counter and eradicate terrorism in the 
region. The ongoing relationship between Morocco and U.S. is seen by Algeria as a 
hindrance to local ownership of security efforts.283 Obviously, AFRICOM is not content 
with this development because Algeria’s actions run against the U.S.’s overall strategic 
approach of security cooperation efforts to promote stability in support of U.S. foreign 
policy and national security objectives. One has to wonder, despite the fact that every 
nation has an interest to protect, is Algeria’s concern for local ownership of security in 
the region a genuine concern that needs AFRICOM’s attention?  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter again noted that despite AFRICOM being in its infancy and despite 
the fact that current initiatives are threatened by inadequate funding and insufficient 
interagency coordination, it has registered significant achievements.  
Previous U.S. involvement in Africa tended to be episodic, brief, and largely 
defined by U.S. national security interests, and led to a negative perception and 
encouraged Africans to question AFRICOM’s true mission. This view was reinforced by 
the fact that AFRICOM has established OSCs in some countries while being completely 
absent in others. Overall, AFRICOM only maintains continuous engagements with a 
small number of countries. In addition, whilst the intent and accomplishment of DHAPP 
in mitigating HIV/AIDS among Africa’s militaries cannot be discounted, the focused 
attention on only 12 of 53 African countries undermines AFRICOM’s ability to improve 
the state of readiness and availability of African troops for peacekeeping duties.  
This chapter has also noted that because the TSCTP program has been turned into 
a seemingly unilateral military fight against terrorism, it has virtually overshadowed other 
agencies that have also been involved. This suggests that the U.S. military, through 
AFRICOM’s shaping techniques, projects its own programs in Africa rather than 
performing a supporting role for U.S. foreign policy priorities, thus raising concerns 
about misperceptions of militarization of U.S. foreign policy. While the IMET program is 
the most widely-used military assistance program, there are suggestions that it is not 
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being utilized effectively to cultivate the aim of building a lasting relationship with its 
African partners. Also, interagency collaboration is still yet to be effected. International 
collaboration is another that needs to be explored. Although AFRICOM is not an 
intervention force and is not structured to compete for influence with foreign powers like 
China; yet, any temptation to withdraw its services or apply direct pressure on China 
would be unsuitable and even counterproductive to the long-term U.S. security objectives 
in Africa. 
Understandably, AFRICOM has been evolving since its inception, and this 
analysis should assist the Command in focusing resources in areas of interest that have 
been neglected. Chapter VI provides the conclusion of the diagnosis with 
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VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER 
AREAS OF RESEARCH 
 This chapter summarizes the research by highlighting the areas of interactions 
between AFRICOM’s external environment and its internal processes, as well as 
misalignments that could encumber its effectiveness. This chapter also recommends areas 
for AFRICOM’s consideration, to assist it in taking steps towards mitigating the 
highlighted misalignments. In addition, some areas of further research are identified. 
A. CONCLUSION 
 This research examined the interactions of external and internal organizational 
variables of AFRICOM to determine the effectiveness of its current organizational 
design. The research used a modified version of the congruence model by Nadler and 
Tushman with added components from McCaskey’s open systems model to determine 
AFRICOM’s organizational performance and the degree of alignment between its 
internal system components such as: mission; resources; strategy; tasks; structure; and 
technology, in addition to the challenges and opportunities in the Command’s external 
environment. The conclusion of the research indicates that AFRICOM has some 
misalignments in its interactions that could use improvement in order for it to effectively 
reach its desired goals, as well as meet the expectations of its external environment. 
Nevertheless, the Command is rightfully deserving of commendation in its singularly 
bold effort towards partnering with other USG agencies to help strengthen security 
cooperation with African nations and bring peace and stability to the continent.  
The history of DoD’s responsibility in the African operating environment has 
been marked by the division of the continent between three COCOMs with activities that 
tended to be episodic and largely defined by U.S. national security interests rather than 
placing emphasis on Africans’ interests. The establishment of AFRICOM was a 
realignment of U.S. efforts in recognition of the growing significance of shared security 
concerns. Within the African environment, high population growth rates, worsening 
unemployment, and a pandemic of HIV/AIDS have added to instability created by 
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terrorism and extremism, maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, wars and conflicts, 
and undesired consequences of some activities of international players. The efforts by 
African governments to mitigate these challenges have been hampered by misallocation 
of resources, underdevelopment, inadequate regional cooperation, lack of political will, 
and limited military capacity arising from ageing equipment. 
The USG has invested enormous resources into several programs and activities of 
AFRICOM enlisting other government agencies to support African governments’ efforts 
towards mitigating the challenges and leveraging opportunities in line with U.S.-Africa 
foreign policy objectives. The various programs and activities executed by AFRICOM 
through interagency collaboration include: GPOI-funded ACOTA program; OEF-TS 
component of TSCTP; FMS and FMF; IMET; and PEPFAR funding to DHAPP to solve 
health challenges. This also includes other regional activities and exercises such as: APS; 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; FLINTLOCK; and NATURAL FIRE. However, 
apprehensions about AFRICOM’s true mission in Africa have continued to shape the 
positive reception of these programs as has the establishment of the Command’s 
headquarters on the continent, which necessitates trust building efforts with the U.S.’s 
African partners.  
Areas of misalignment in the execution of these programs, which are important to 
AFRICOM’s effectiveness, are wide-ranging. First, the minimal representation of 
AFRICOM in many partner African countries limits the Command’s ability to cultivate 
relationships (even with other USG agencies) or to develop capacity to obtain the much 
needed information for effective decision-making. The complexity and diversity across 
and within each of the 53 African countries in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility makes 
it essential to devise a method to establish relationships. Second, DHAPP’s focused 
attention on 12 of 53 African countries due to PEPFAR legislation undermines 
AFRICOM’s ability to improve the state of readiness and availability of African troops 
for peacekeeping duties. Third, AFRICOM’s incomparably large public image and 
seeming dominance of the TSCTP program eclipses the exposure and support given by 
other partnering agencies. This eclipse raises concerns about the militarization of U.S. 
foreign policy and has the potential to undermine the legitimacy and success of the 
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program. Success of the TSCTP program cannot be measured only by the number of 
terrorists or extremists captured or killed. This approach treats the symptoms rather than 
the causes, requiring a reevaluation of this approach if the overall objective of the 
program is to be achieved.  
Fourth, there is a gap between the mix of interoperable U.S. equipment provided 
by AFRICOM and the needs of African partners. The difficulty in sustaining operations 
given vast ungoverned land and maritime environments requires improved technologies. 
Fifth, the GPOI-funded ACOTA training and equipment support program is largely 
army-focused, which suggests a gap in integrating other services into the program. The 
exclusion of equally important players, like the African air forces, that play a significant 
role in providing air assets, limit effective peacekeeping operations. Sixth, it is suggested 
that most IMET-funded students are utilized on return to their respective countries based 
on operational requirements by the country and do not necessarily apply the skills in 
which they were trained. The gap in assessing implementation of IMET training 
agreements between host partner governments and the USG limits AFRICOM’s ability to 
ascertain the effectiveness of its programs. In addition, relationships between foreign 
students and U.S. counterparts are not adequately cultivated while they are undergoing 
training in U.S. schools to enable long-term friendships in line with IMET objectives.  
Lastly, AFRICOM’s collaboration with other USG agencies, international 
partners, and African regional organizations has remained a work in progress. Generally, 
the competing interests among the different stakeholders operating in the African 
environment limit effective collaboration. Obviously, effective collaboration cannot be 
developed by AFRICOM alone; it takes two to tango. Addressing these misalignments 
and challenges will enhance the effectiveness of AFRICOM; otherwise, the costs of the 
Command’s programs and activities on the continent will outweigh the benefits.       
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 To effectively implement AFRICOM’s programs and activities and align them 
with its mission, clarify stakeholders’ perceptions and expectations, make effective use of 
resources, and better identify programs outcomes, it is recommended that AFRICOM 
should: 
1. Demonstrate Consistent and Predictable Actions That Are Congruent 
With Its Mission and Seek African Partners’ Perspectives in Order to 
Build Trust and Enduring Partnerships 
While effective strategic communication is essential to correct misinformation, 
disinformation, and rumor about AFRICOM’s mission, a problem arises when 
AFRICOM fails to consider the interests of Africans, who view both the messenger and 
the message with suspicion and fear. AFRICOM should also ensure that its actions are 
predictable and consistent – being both transparent about its intentions and motives for 
actions - and are congruent with its stated mission. Furthermore, AFRICOM should 
ensure it seeks African partners’ perspectives rather than relegating them to the 
background as passive recipients; after all, Africans have a greater stake on the continent. 
In the words of Henry David Thoreau, “[t]he greatest compliment that was ever paid me 
was when someone asked me what I thought, and attended to my answer.”284 Overall, 
AFRICOM should empower Africans and allow them to drive the train; Africa’s 
problems took several decades to create, and it will take time for the concerns raised by 
the African partners to subside. 
2. Leverage Technology as a Force Multiplier and Use This 
Comparative Capability to Offset Security Challenges in the African 
Environment 
 Considering the acute deficiencies in policing capabilities coupled with limited 
economic capacities to exercise effective and sustained security over vast porous borders, 
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inhospitable territorial and maritime domains, it is worthwhile to leverage technology as 
a force multiplier to provide increased situational awareness, such as via Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAV).  Continuing with current forms of support, although 
commendable, will in the long-term become too costly and may not adequately improve 
the capability of African militaries to address the sophisticated nature of their 
contemporary challenges. Although technology acquisition may seem expensive, it is 
considered that over the long-term, the costs would be reasonable relative to the enormity 
of the benefits.  In addition, AFRICOM should integrate other services into its GPOI-
funded ACOTA training and equipment program and focus support in those areas where 
African militaries have a comparative capability. For example, a country that has 
strategic lift or helicopter gunships should be supported to serve as a hub to enhance the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, particularly since the U.S. long-term objective 
is to empower the African partners to take ownership of their security without having to 
call on the international community for support.  
3. Synergize Resources and Efforts with Other International Partners to 
Bridge Gaps in Training and Equipment Support to Africa’s 
Militaries in Order to Have More Effective Outcomes 
Looking at the costs associated with training and equipment support, as well as 
the gaps in meeting the African militaries’ ever increasing competing demands, it is 
apparent from a security standpoint that no one country can go it alone in the current 
environment. The interdependencies of today’s globalized community require a synergy 
of efforts among all of the international partners. Unfortunately, the operational coalition 
and capacity building in the Horn of Africa, to include APS, have not led to a perceived 
increase in security capacity against the menace of pirate attacks, for instance. Yet, the 
interests of the global community are at stake. Although this may sound like a cliché, the 
synergy of efforts between AFRICOM and other international partners should go beyond 
rhetoric and towards putting aside competing national interests, national pride, and 
cultural differences to foster trust.    
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4. Create Feedback Mechanisms to Determine the Outcomes of 
AFRICOM’s Training and Equipment Support 
Although the U.S. does not have control over its African partners’ use of 
personnel in the skills for which they were trained, including its use of equipment 
transferred with U.S. funding, it is necessary to establish linkages between the outputs 
and outcomes to determine when and whether programs and specific activities should be 
continued as is, altered in some way, or discontinued due to insufficient performance. 
The OSCs are better positioned as a “looking glass” into host nations to serve as a 
feedback mechanism for AFRICOM’s training and equipment support efforts. 
AFRICOM could also harness new concepts to receive appropriate information from 
sources operating in the environment. 
5. Develop a Process Whereby U.S. Training Institutions and Personnel 
Cultivate Enduring Relationships With Foreign Military and Civilian 
Partners While Undergoing Training to Foster Cooperation 
 Building enduring, mutually beneficial relationships that culminate in increased 
understanding and defense cooperation between the U.S. and foreign countries evolves 
from contacts at institutional and individual levels and seldom happens overnight. It is 
often said that “true friendship isn’t about being there when it is convenient: it is about 
being there when it is not.”285 The important opportunities provided by IMET programs 
should be leveraged by the U.S. military to cultivate enduring relationships through its 
schools. While the schools should regularly maintain contacts with its alumni, there 
should be an awareness program for U.S. personnel to educate them on the importance of 
IMET’s objectives.  
                                                 
285 “Quotation,” accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://te.thinkexist.com/quotes/like/true_friendship_isn-t_about_being_there_when_it-s/346488/.  
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6. Conduct Adequate Evaluation of the Full Range of Causal Factors for 
Extremism in Each Country to Avoid Generalizations in Other 
Countries That Unintentionally Promote Disorder and Societal 
Disagreement 
The complexity and diversity of the African environment make generalizations 
very risky. A solution to a problem in one country may not be applicable in another 
country. The apparent military face of TSCTP across the Trans-Saharan region, 
especially in a country like Niger, says much about the U.S.’s understanding of Africa’s 
real concerns. The focus should be on the causes of terrorism, rather than the symptoms, 
i.e. building trust and enabling the government rather than placing emphasis on securing 
ungoverned areas. Therefore, all of the instruments of national power should be applied 
evenly and appropriately in the operating environment. 
7. Leverage Existing Resources Under the UN and the Regional 
Organizations, Such as ECOWAS, SADC and Others to Reinforce 
Legitimacy and Credibility 
 To help build public support for and ownership of ongoing programs and 
activities at all levels, AFRICOM should increasingly engage or use the existing 
frameworks under the UN and regional organizations. The UN is present in virtually 
every part of Africa and commands respect and support from almost every African 
government and people. To the extent that AFRICOM is perceived as supportive of the 
UN, this has the potential to mitigate anti-Western sentiments and enhance trust.    
C. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
 This thesis has undertaken analysis of AFRICOM’s effectiveness in its current 
organizational design and highlighted areas of misalignment that have the potential to 
encumber its effectiveness. However, because of the complexities and dynamic nature of 
the African environment, there are areas of further research that could contribute to 
continued improvement of AFRICOM’s organizational effectiveness. The following are 
the suggested areas of further research: 
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1. Optimizing Budget Cycles in Support of AFRICOM’s Engagements 
As earlier suggested, DHAPP indicated in its 2008 Annual Report that it lacks the 
flexibility necessary to appropriately respond to emerging environmental challenges. 
DoD notes that its “traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept 
to execution.”286 This begs for leadership at the highest levels of government to develop 
effective methods to meet and sustain programs that are critical to U.S.-Africa foreign 
policy objectives. It is expected that this new area of study would review the extent to 
which current budgetary cycles affect AFRICOM’s programs, and identify policy and 
regulatory changes needed for the Command to operate effectively. 
2. Considering Competing Interests and Differences in Priorities, as 
Well as Perceptions of Shared Security Concerns, Examine to What 
Extent Are African Partners Committed to Their Engagements 
 Competing interests and priorities, as well as different perceptions of common 
security concerns between AFRICOM and other stakeholders on the African continent -
for example, between the Command and a regional hegemon like Algeria - suggest there 
could be commitment problems. Where do U.S. and African security interests diverge? 
To what extent is there a commitment problem? This area of research would assist 
AFRICOM in discovering further environmental sensitivities and how the Command can 
more effectively align its programs and activities.   
3. How Does AFRICOM’s Culture Affect Behavioral Expectations of Its 
Stakeholders? 
 As earlier indicated, the authors were unable to study the culture of AFRICOM 
due to our inability to interview any member of the Command. This area of research 
would look into AFRICOM’s emerging organizational culture relative to that of the 
stakeholders in its environment. It would examine how behavioral expectations are 
influenced by the Command’s culture. Generally, this area of research would address 
how outcomes are affected by organizational culture and how they can be 
accommodated. This is necessary to gauge the impact internally in implementing 
AFRICOM’s programs and activities.  
                                                 
286 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification, February 
4, 2008, 102. 
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 1:   African HIV/AID Statistics and PEPFAR/DHAPP Funding 





(2009) **   
(million) 















(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1 Angola 17.1 0.24 0.19 2.1 11,000 108,000 5.5 
2 Benin 8.9 0.07 0.064 1.2 3,300 5,000 2.3 
3 Botswana 2.0 0.35 0.3 23.9 11,000 9,200 54.9 
4 Burkina Faso 15.8 0.3 0.13 1.6 9,200 6,100 - 
5 Burundi 8.3 0.25 0.11 2.0 11,000 20,100 2.1 
6 Cameroon 18.9 0.56 0.54 5.1 39,000 13,650 - 
7 CAR 4.5 0.26 0.16 6.3 11,000 2,300  - 
8 Chad 10.3 0.2 0.2 3.5 14,000 26,940  - 
9 Comoros 0.7 NA <200*** <0.1 <100 645 - 
10 Congo Brazzaville 3.7 0.09 0.12 3.5 6,400 11,800 0.18 
11 Cote d’Ivoire 21.4 0.57 0.48 3.9 38,000 10,650 46.6 
12 DRC 68.7 1.1 0.5 1.35 29,000 63,500 9.3 
13 Djibouti 0.9 0.009 0.016 3.1 1,100 8,400 0.33 
14 Equatorial Guinea 0.7 NA 0.011 3.4 <1,100 1,440  - 
15 Eritrea 5.1 0.06 0.038 1.3 2,600 201,000  - 
16 Ethiopia 82.8 1.5 0.98 2.1 67,000 152,000 123.0 
17 Gabon 1.5 0.048 0.049 5.9 2,300 4,800 0.19 
18 Gambia 1.6 0.007 0.008 0.9 <1,000 1,520 0.15 
19 Ghana 23.8 0.35 0.26 1.9 21,000 8,900 7.3 
20 Guinea 10.1 0.14 0.087 1.6 4,500 10,100 2.4 
21 Guinea Bissau 1.6 0.016 0.016 1.8 1,100 8,400  - 
22 Kenya 39.1 1.2 2.0 7.8 107,500 24,130 208.3 
23 Lesotho 2.1 0.32 0.27 23.2 18,000 2,200 7.0 
24 Liberia 4.0 0.1 0.035 1.7 2,300 2,000 1.7 
25 Madagascar 19.5 0.14 0.14 0.1 <1,000 12,810 2.4 
26 Malawi 14.2 0.9 0.93 11.9 68,000 5,425 16.4 
27 Mali 13.0 0.14 0.1 1.5 5,800 7,400 4.1 
28 Mauritania 3.3 0.009 0.014 0.8 <1,000 15,750  - 
29 Mauritius 1.3 700*** 0.013 1.7 <1,000 750  - 
30 Mozambique 22.0 1.3 1.5 12.5 81,000 5,200 94.4 
31 Namibia 2.2 0.21 0.2 15.3 5,100 9,450 57.3 
32 Niger 15.3 0.070 0.06 0.8 4,000 6,200  - 
33 Nigeria 152.6 3.6 2.6 3.1 170,000 85,100 163.6 
34 Rwanda 10.0 0.25 0.15 2.8 7,800 32,300 72.1 
35 Senegal 12.5 0.044 0.067 1.0 1,800 10,500 6.3 
36 Sierra Leone 5.7 NA 0.055 1.7 3,300 10,392 0.3 
37 Somalia 9.1 NA 0.024 0.5 1,600 -  - 
38 South Africa 49.3 5.3 5.7 18.1 35,000 49,433 221.5 




40 Togo 6.6 0.11 0.13 3.3 9,100 7,503 - 
41 Tanzania 43.7 1.6 0.94 5.4 77,000 25,550 130.0 
42 Uganda 30.7 0.53 1.0 6.7 91,000 45,000 169.9 
43 Zambia 12.6 0.92 1.1 15.2 56,000 18,100 149.0 
44 Zimbabwe 12.5 1.8 1.3 15.3 140,000 34,000 22.0 



































(i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) 
Angola 0.5 6.1 0.5 7.0 0.5 17.0 0.80 
Benin  - 2.3 -  2.3 0.31 -  -  
Botswana 0.6 76.2 0.8 93.2 1.8 92.1 1.90 
Burkina Faso -  -  - 0.1 0.1  - -  
Burundi  - 2.7  - 4.03 0.56  -  - 
Cameroon  - 0.7  - 2.01 0.03  -  - 
CAR  -  -  - -   -  -  - 
Chad  -  -  -  -  -  - - 
Comoros  - -  - 0.08  -  -  - 
Congo Brazzaville - -  - - -  - - 
Cote d’Ivoire  - 84.4  - 120.5 0.3 124.8 0.40 
DRC 0.4 10.8 0.4 15.4 0.4 29.7 1.00 
Djibouti 0.25 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.15  - 0.15 
Equatorial Guinea  - -  -  -  -   - -  
Eritrea  -  -  -  -  - -   - 
Ethiopia 0.8 241.8 1.56 345.5 1.53 346.0 2.70 
Gabon  - -  - 0.15 0.15 -  -  
Gambia  -  -  - 0.06 0.054  -  - 
Ghana 0.3 6.6 0.15 7.5 0.15 17.5 0.16 
Guinea  - 2.7 -  2.0 0.05  -  - 
Guinea Bissau  - -  -  -  -  -  -  
Kenya 8.4 368.1 13.53 534.8 21.3 541.5 23.10 
Lesotho 0.42 9.6 0.31 13.1 0.6 26.7 0.61 
Liberia  - 2.4 0.25 3.5 0.35 -  0.35 
Madagascar 0.075 2.0 - 2.0 0.023 - - 
Malawi 0.13 18.9 0.13 23.9 0.15 43.2 0.15 
Mali  - 4.3 -  4.22 0.35 -  -  
Mauritania  -  -  - 0.11 0.11 -  - 
Mauritius  - -  -  -  -  -  -  
Mozambique 0.89 162.0 0.79 228.6 0.8 250.4 3.40 
Namibia 1.4 91.2 2.23 108.9 2.7 107.1 2.65 
Niger  -  - -  0.05 0.05  - -  
Nigeria 7.8 304.9 9.41 447.6 8.2 442.3 10.97 
Rwanda 1.2 103.0 2.25 123.5 3.2 147.6 4.54 
Senegal 0.5 5.82 0.3 4.56 0.3   0.30 
Sierra Leone  - 0.48  - 0.65 0.15  -  - 
Somalia  -  - -  -  -  - - 
South Africa  -  -  - -  -  -  - 
Swaziland 1.0 397.8 1.15 590.9 1.3 551.4 1.22 
Togo 0.42 9.0 0.31 12.7 0.44 27.1 0.93 
Tanzania 8.8 205.5 15.18 313.4 25.4 311.2 28.00 
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Sources Used for Appendix 1: 
* “2009 world Population Data Sheet,” Population Reference Bureau, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf09/09wpds_eng.pdf (accessed October 6, 2010). 
** Sub-Saharan Africa HIV and AIDS Statistics (from 2008 and 2009 Reports of the 
Global AIDS epidemic, UNAIDS), http://www.avert.org/africa-hiv-aids-statistics.htm 
(accessed March 11, 2010). For most countries, the figures are estimates and ranges 
around the estimates that define the boundaries within which the actual numbers lie. For 
some other countries, UNAIDS provides only a range or an upper boundary to a range. 
Global total is available at UNAIDS, 2009 AIDS Epidemic Update, 2009: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/EpiUpdate/EpiUpdArc...., and 
country totals is available at UNAIDS, 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 2008: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2 
*** Figures are in hundreds 
 
FY 06 Funding - FY 2006 Funding for Other PEPFAR Countries, by Agency & Account, 
http://www.pepfar.gov/about/81930.htm (accessed May 22, 2010). 
 
FY 08 Funding - FY 2008 Budget for Focus Countries by Agency Receiving Funds 
Allocation Approved as of June 2008, 
http://www.pepfar.gov/document/organization/107838.pdf (accessed May 22, 2010). 
 
FY 07 and FY 09 Funding – The Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
Fiscal Year 2009: PEPFAR Operational Plan, June 2010, 




Abbreviations Used in Appendix 1: 
PLWHA – People Living With HIV/AIDS  
CAF - Central African Republic 
DRC – Democratic republic of Congo 
 
 
Uganda 1.5 236.6 3.16 283.6 4.04 285.9 4.17 
Zambia 6.1 216.0 5.56 269.3 7.61 270.4 7.86 
Zimbabwe 0.25 23.5 0.1 26.4 0.05 46.5  - 
Total        
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Appendix 2: Statistics of Africa’s Military Equipment Holding 
 
Army 





of 200 n mile     
(200xC) 
SP MBT APC IFV RV Serial 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
1 Angola 1,246,700 863.9 172,786.2 100,000 159 113 150 40 
2 Benin 112,620 65.3 13,067.0 4,600 - - - 36 
3 Botswana 581,730 - - 8,700 174 158 - 11 
4 Burkina Faso 274,200 - - 5,500 - 8 - 36 
5 Burundi 27,834 - - 20,000 - 18 - 35 
6 Cameroon 475,422 217.1 43,412.5 12,000 140 35 14 38 
7 CAR 622,984 - - 2,000 3 32 - 8 
8 Chad  1,259,200 - - 26,640 - 24 - 45 
9 Comoros 1,850  183.6 36,717.1 600 - - - - 
10 Congo-Brazzaville 342,000 91.3 18,250.5 10,000 - - - - 
11 Cote d'Ivoire 322,462 281 56,200 9,000 - 16 13 21 
12 DRC 2,345,410 20.0 3,995.7 55,000 - 12 - - 
13 Djibouti 23,000 169.5 33,909.3 8,000 - 19 - 13 
14 Equatorial Guinea 28,050 159.8 31,965.4 1,200 - - - - 
15 Eritrea 121,144  621 124,200 200,000 - - - - 
16 Ethiopia 1,127,127 - - 150,000 260 - 90 90 
17 Gabon 267,667 480 96,000 3,200 - 44 12 72 
18 Gambia 11,295 43 8,600 1,370 - - - - 
19 Ghana 238,533 292 58,400 5,800 - - - - 
20 Guinea 245,860 173 34,600 9,000 8 40 - 22 
21 Guinea-Bissau 36,120 189.0 37,797 8,000 3 50 - 10 
22 Kenya  582,645 292 58,400 20,000 318 70 - 84 
23 Lesotho 30,355 - - 2,050 - - - 4 
24 Liberia 111,370 312.6 62,527.0 2,000 - - - - 
25 Madagascar 587,041 2,608 521,603 12,000 - 25 - 39 
26 Malawi 118,484 475 - 5,000 - - - - 
27 Mali 1,240,190 - - 7,000 - - - 20 
28 Mauritania 1,030,700 405 81,000 15,000 - - - - 
29 Mauritius 2,040 95.6 19,114.5 - - - - - 
30 Mozambique 806,100 1,334 266,800 4,000 - 5 - - 
31 Namibia 823,629 848.8 169,762.4 9,000 - 62 - 12 
32 Niger 1,267,000 - - 6,000 - 8 - - 
33 Nigeria  923,770 460 92,000 70,000 41 261 - 383 
34 Rwanda  26,338 - - 32,000 260 47 60 12 
35 Senegal 196,190 286.7 57,343.4 9,000 - 32 - 69 
36 Sierra Leone 71,740 217.1 43,412.5 10,092 - - - - 
37 Somalia 637,660 1,633.4 326,673.9 - - - - - 
38 South Africa 1,210,080 1,512 302,400 35,525 3,817 3,738 - 240 
39 Swaziland 17,363 - - 3,000 - - - - 
40 Togo 56,785 30.2 6,047.5 7,000 - 3 15 15 
41 Tanzania 945,087 767 153,400 21,000 15 36 - 40 
42 Uganda 236,860 - - 44,000 - 61 31 6 
43 Zambia 752,614 - - 16,500 10 13 - 30 
44 Zimbabwe 390,580 - - 30,000 400 183 - 90 
























(j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
1 890 - - - - 7 - -  8 57.6 11,519 
2 220 - - - - 4 - - 2  10.9 2,177.8 
3 - - - - - 2 -  - - - - 
4 - - - - - - -  -  - - - 
5 100 - - - - 2 -  -  - - - 
6 1,250 - - - - 41 5   -  - 4.8 964.7 
7 100 - - - - 0 -  -  - - - 
8 - - - - - - -  -  - - - 
9 30 - - - - 2 -  -  - 91.8 18,358.6 
10 800 - - - - 0 -  -  -   
11 950 - - - - 5 -  -  - 56.2 11,240 
12 6,700 - - - - 0 2  -  - 10 1,997.9 
13 380 - - -  - 17 1   -  - 9.4 1,883.9 
14 120 - - - - 10 -  -  - 16 3,196.5 
15 1,100 - - - - 55 7 2xLST   - 9.7 1,940.6 
16 - - - - - - -  -  - - - 
17 600 - - - - 18 3  1xLCVP 1 20.9 4,174 
18 150 - - - - 5 -  -  - 8.6 1,720 
19 2,100 - - - - 3 4  - 2  32.4 6,488.9 
20 400 - - - - 11 -  - -  15.7 3,145.5 
21 310 - - - - 4 -  - 1  37.8 7,559.4 
22 1,370 - - - - 11 5 4xLCM  - 15.4 3,073.7 
23 - - - -  - -  -  -  - - - 
24 - - - -  - -  -  -  - - - 
25 430 - - - - 6 - 1xLCM   - 372.6 74,514 
26 225 - - - - 4 -  -  - 118.75 - 
27 - - - -  - -  -  -  -  - - 
28 500 - - -  - 7 7   -  2  25.3 5,062.5 
29 750 - - - - 85 2  -  3 1 212.4 
30 200 - - - - 10 - - - 133 26,680 
31 350 - - - - 2 7 -  5  60.6 12,125.9 
32 - - - - -  -  -  -  - - - 
33 8,000 - 1 - 2 78 8 2xLST and 2xMCMV 32 3.6 724.4 
34 - -  - - -      - - - - 
35 900 - - -  - 5 4 2xLCT   - 26 5,213 
36 270 - -  - - 8 1 -   - 24 4,823.6 
37 - - - - - - - - - - - 




 17 27 5,400 
39 - - - -  - -  -  - - - - 
40 223 - -  - - 2 -  - - 15.1 3,023.8 
41 1,050 - -  - - 10 - 2xAuxiliary  - 109.8 12,783.3 
42 200 - -  - - 26 -  - - - - 
43  - - -  -  - -  -  -  - - - 
44 350 - - - - 10 - - - - - 




Air force  






(u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z) 
1 7,000 116 85 88 14 
 Navy: IPCs built and donated by South Africa in 1980-81. 
Received 5xPVC-170 class patrol boats in 2009 for fishery 
protection duties. The 7 EADS-CASA and one 27 MPA for the 
navy is operated by the air force. It is suggested that there is no 
military capability within the Angolan navy. Air Force: 
Acquisitions were made in 1983, 1985, 1976, 1999, 2000, 2002, 
and 2005. Most of the aircraft in the inventory have been upgraded. 
2 180 - - 3 5 
Navy: One Do 128 procured in 1988 (non operational) and a DHC-
6 Twin Otter reconnaissance aircraft for the navy is used 
surveillance. The operational status is doubtful Air Force: Air 
defense is the responsibility of the army, however, there is a small 
air arm maintained by the air force with transport/utility aircraft 
(Boeing 727, Twin/Otter, BAE 748 and A-109BA`acquired in 
1996, 2002, and 2009. 
3 500 9 - 27 15 
 Given the small population, Botswana has large armed forces. 
Army: There are unbalanced procurements of equipment and it is 
suggested that the tanks lack strategic mobility. There are about 
249 Air Defense and Anti-Tank Weapons and the most commonly 
used infantry weapons are the 7.62 mm FN AL and FN MAG. 
Most of the procurements are between 1986 and 2003. A 
reasonable number of equipment are operational. Navy/Air Force: 
Botswana has no navy, but a small air force, whose primary 
function is VIP transport, utility transport and with limited 
availability to furnish air support for ground-based elements of the 
defense and police forces.   
4 600 - 2 5 5   
5 - - 4 1 2 
 Air Force: The former Burundian Army Air Force Regiment was 
reinvigorated after 2001. Acquisitions were made in 1983, 1991, 
and 2001, mostly second-hand equipment. 
6 400 6 - 5 5 
Army: most of the acquisitions were made in the 1990s. Navy: 
Cameroon is the only country that claims territorial sea of 50nm. 
Acquisitions are in 1974, 1976, 1984, 1987, 2000 and 2002. Last 
major refit of some capital ships was completed in 1999. 
Operational status of some of the vessels in unknown. Air Force: 
Acquisitions are in 1970, 1977, 1982, 1983, 1997 and 2002. The 
six Atlas Impala jet trainers have limited attack capability. Some 
aircraft in the inventory are reported to have been withdrawn from 
service  
7 200 - - 5 1   
8 300 1 8 4 2   
9 15 - - - 1 Navy: Vessels commissioned in 1981, operational status is doubtful. 
10 1,000 - - - - Navy: claims 200nm territorial sea. Has mainly riverine craft 
11 700 3 1 3 2  Navy: Apart from 2x RODMAN 890 delivered in 1997, the other vessels built in 1968 and 1977 are not operational 
12 1,800 - 8 3 1  Navy: Vessels were originally delivered in 1976-78, operational status is doubtful. 
13 200 - 2 5 3  Navy: The vessels were built or transferred in 1960, 1984, 1989, and 2006. Some are not operational.  
14 120 1 3 - - Navy: Vessels were built or acquired in 1963, 2000, and 2001. About two or more are not operational. 
15 1,000 26 4 4 4 Navy: Vessels were built or acquired in 1977, 1993, 2000, and 2006. All are reported to be operational.  
16 2,000 23 20 6 35   
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17 1,000 9 - 8 -  Navy: 12 of the vessels included as PC are 7-12m LCVP and 6 are Rodman 20m craft used by the police. 
18 - - - - -   
19 1,000 4 - 9 8 
 Navy: 2xUSCG buoy tenders built in 1944 and transferred in 
2001, one Ex-US Navy IPC built in 1975 and transferred in 2001, 
and 2xFAC commissioned in 1981 
20 700 4 4 2 5 
 Army: Equipment are extremely old, much of it is unserviceable 
and the operational effectiveness is assessed as being low and 
suitable for minimum level of internal security operations. Navy: 
Either unserviceable or operational status doubtful.  
21 100 - - - - 
 Navy: Either unserviceable or operational status doubtful. Air 
Force: Some of the acquisitions are in 1978. Majority of the 
aircrafts have not flown in several years 
22 3,000 5 12 22 12 
 Army: There are about 321 Anti-Tank and air Defense Weapons 
in addition to several 7.62mm FN-FAL, FN MAG, G3, HK21A1, 
and Bren L4, among others. Procurements were made between 
1980 and 2007. Navy: There are 9 coastal radar stations spread 
along the coast each station has 30ft fast boats to investigate 
contacts. The vessels were acquired in 1974, 1987, 1994, 1997/8, 
and 2006. Some of the ships are sea going, but operational 
capability is limited. 
23 150 - - 3 4   
24 - - - - -   
25 500 - - 8 - 
 Navy: Some of the vessels are USCG lifeboats constructed in 
1960, transferred in 2003; the amphibious vessel was built in 1964 
and transferred from France in 1985. There are about 4 tug boats.  
26 200 - 1 3 3 
 Navy: The shore line is principally from a lake. Two of the IPCs 
were donated by South Africa. The operational status the PCs is 
doubtful 
27 400 2 - 7 2   
28 250 6 - 6 2 
Navy: Most of the vessels were transferred from France, China, 
Spain, and European Union in 1982, 2002, 2007, and 2000 
respectively.  
29 - - - - -  Navy: From the 85 IPCs about 70 are glass fibre boats of less than 9m length. 
30 1,000 - 2 4 -  Navy: A total of eight Defender Class PCs were donated by the U.S, in 2006. 
31 150 10 4 4 1  Navy: The MPAs are ex-U.S. Air Force Cessna observation aircraft.  
32 200 - - 4 -   
33 9,500 30 8 36 12 
 Army: Procurements are from several countries: China, Russia, 
North Korea, and India, due to Western sanctions. The equipments 
in the army inventory are procured from the 1970s with substantial 
new acquisitions made from 2000. Navy: Apart from about five 
Agusta 109E helicopters, the status of the others is doubtful. There 
are 4 USCG buoy tenders transferred between 2002 and 2003 (built 
in 1942 and 1944). Some of the other vessels were commissioned 
in 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1988. Air Force: A substantial number 
of the aircrafts are being upgraded and returned to service just as 
some have been scrapped on the grounds of being beyond 
economic repairs. New acquisitions were made between 2005 and 
2009.   
34 300 - 10 - - 
 Army: There are about 2050 Anti-Tank Weapons. 7.62mm AK-
47, G3, FN-FAL, and FN MAG are the most commonly used 
infantry weapons. Most of the procurements are between 1996 and 
1998 
35 600 1 - 3 2 
 Navy: Most of the vessels were commissioned in 1974, 1977, 
1983, 1987, and 1993.  There is a harbor tug and fisheries research 
vessel. Operational status unknown.   
36 30 - - - 1   
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37 - - - - -   
38 9,180 47 15 61 72 
Army: There are about 414 Air Defense and Anti-Tank Weapons, 
and several makes of 7.62mm and 5,56mm rifles, among others. 
Most of the procurements were made between 1990 and 2008.   
39 100 - - 3 3   
40 280 10 - 2 4   
41 3,500 10 - 6 3 
 Navy: Four of the vessels were transferred from China in 1975 
and 1992, and the two other vessels were obtained in 2005 (built in 
1998) and the other four were delivered in 1973 and 1974. Because 
of their sizes they have been categorized as IPCs. 
42 800 5 11 - 3   
43 1,600 16 - 19 19   
44 4,000 20 8 15 8 
Army: There are about 980 Air Defense and Anti-Tank Weapons, 
and several makes of 7.62mm rifles, among others. It is suggested 
that most of the weapons are non-operational or lost in DRC. Most 
of the procurements began in 1980. Navy: The coastline is from a 
lake. All the vessels are unarmed Rodman Class boats. 
Total        
  
Sources Used for Appendix 2: 
All estimates are from “Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010 and Jane’s Defense Publications 
at http://defence.janes.com/ (accessed August 23, 2010). See Jane’s publications for more 
information on status of military equipment. 
Legend: 
SP  Service Personnel 
MBT Main Battle Tanks 
APC Armored Personnel Carriers 
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicles 





PV Patrol Vessels 
FAC Fast Attack Crafts 
FA Fighter Aircraft 
RPC River Patrol Craft 
CPV Coastal Patrol Vessel 
CH Combat Helicopters 
T-FW Transport - Fixed Wing 
T-RW Transport - Rotary Wing 
Notes:  
1. Artillery Weapons and Tanks are included under MBT 
2. Generally, majority of capital military hardware are second-hand equipments 
3. The statistics are estimates and remarks are collated from the Jane’s publications. 
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